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Chapter 1
Introduction
“[. . . ] economics has increasingly (if unknowingly for the most part) moved
toward an approach that combines the mathematical advances of the last cen-
tury with three of the methods of the classical economists. From Adam Smith
to John Stuart Mill and Karl Marx (and excepting David Ricardo), the clas-
sical economists were nondisciplinary (the disciplines had not been invented),
concerned about the empirical details of the social problems of their day, and
modest about the degree of generality to which their theories aspired.”
– Samuel Bowles (2009, pg. 15)
The title I have given this dissertation, Seemingly Unrelated Manuscripts: Experi-
ments on Human Behavior, may sound glib to the reader. Much like seemingly unre-
lated regressions, however, the chapters of this dissertation can be viewed separately but
maintain some underlying correlation across chapters. Superficially, the main connection
between the chapters in this dissertation is the common use of experiments with real
monetary incentives. More importantly, but perhaps less obvious, is the emphasis on un-
derstanding human behavior without being constrained by rigid disciplinary boundaries.
In this sense, I am attempting to follow in the footsteps of classical economists as noted
in the quote above by Samuel Bowles but also follow the lead of a recent generation of
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economists who have transcended their original disciplinary boundaries – most notably by
Bowles himself along with Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Herb Gintis – and their colleagues
from other disciplines, particularly Robert Boyd, Joe Henrich, and Pete Richerson.
1.1 General background
The chapters of this dissertation fall under two broad themes. Chapters A and B are
about understanding human cooperation. Chapter C is about understanding the neural
foundations of decision making, in which we focus specifically on risky decision making.
Descriptions of the chapter contents are described in more detail in Section 1.2. Here, we
present a general background for the two broad themes.
1.1.1 Human cooperation
Human cooperation has long been a topic of interest in the social and biological sciences,
and integrating knowledge across fields is crucial in identifying the foundations of cooper-
ative behavior (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; Henrich, 2004). Due
to the confluence of knowledge from these various disciplines, Science regarded the puzzle
of human cooperation as one of the most fundamentally important open questions upon
which we may achieve a greater understanding in the coming decades (Pennisi, 2005).
The social sciences have generally looked for mechanisms that can be used to es-
tablish and maintain cooperation. Repeated interactions and punishment – and their
combination – are used to sustain cooperation in both natural environments (Ostrom,
1990; Mathew and Boyd, 2011) and laboratory environments (Ostrom et al., 1992; Fehr
and Ga¨chter, 2000). It is not surprising that long-term repeated interactions can sustain
cooperation; these interactions have long been used in industrial organization to explain
the existence of cartels, as the threat of withdrawing future cooperation can serve as an ef-
fective deterrent to defect from the cartel in the present time period (Tirole, 1988). What
remains surprising and still lacks explanation, however, is the observation that people will
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punish non-cooperators in short-term interactions in which the costs of punishment ex-
ceed the gains from future cooperation (Ga¨chter et al., 2008) and will even punish in
one-shot interactions with no potential future gains, so-called “altruistic punishment”
(Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2002).
While the social sciences may be able to find proximate causes to explain human
cooperation, ultimate causes must be explained by evolutionary forces (Fehr and Fis-
chbacher, 2003). Kin selection remains an uncontroversial explanation for some forms of
altruism (Hamilton, 1964); however, as Trivers (1971) clearly states, biological models
of altruism are intended to redefine interactions in such a way that the altruistic act
is no longer a pure form of altruism. Such an approach is similar to economic theories
of social preferences which redefine an individual’s utility function to include features,
such as aversion to inequality, that make the “altruistic” act individually optimal and
hence “selfish” (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). Several forms of
reciprocity, relying on repeated interactions, remain the primary explanation for cooper-
ation in non-related individuals, providing an evolutionary foundation for observations in
the social sciences described above (Trivers, 1971; Nowak, 2006; Axelrod and Hamilton,
1981; Axelrod, 2006). Finally, models of multilevel or group selection remain popular but
controversial; such models suggest that cooperative groups can develop resources to sup-
port increasing population faster than non-cooperative groups, and group-level selective
pressure supports cooperation in the long-run (Henrich, 2004; Nowak, 2006).
The approaches discussed so far assume, implicitly or explicitly, that interactions are
random. However, in many situations, people have some ability to choose their partners
for interaction or to avoid interacting with particular people. Humans are well known to
stereotype and discriminate, and many of the social sciences – particulary psychology and
sociology – have devoted substantial attention to the topic of discrimination. Assortment,
or non-random interaction, can theoretically provide a biological basis for cooperation
(Bergstrom, 2003; Eshel and Cavalli-Sforza, 1982). The existence of observable features
that could serve as the basis for such assortment, however, are generally considered
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implausible (Grafen, 1990; Gardner and West, 2010). Nonetheless, some such features
have been identified in non-human species (Gardner and West, 2010), and Stirrat and
Perrett (2010) claim to identify a candidate feature in humans faces, the bizygomatic
width-to-height ratio. Assortment as an explanation for human cooperation thus remains
an open question, but one that is currently being explored.
1.1.2 Neural foundations of value-based decision making
The other broad theme of this dissertation is an attempt to understand the neural basis
for decision making. This field, neuroeconomics, remains the topic of much debate in eco-
nomics (Camerer et al., 2005; Caplin and Schotter, 2008). I avoid addressing the debate
here and instead focus on the insights gained from the field and how neuroeconomics
may be scientifically important even if it irrelevant for academic economics research.
Much like our understanding of human cooperation benefitting from the confluence of
ideas from several disciplines, neuroeconomics has progressed quickly due to interaction
between neuroscientists, psychologists, and economists (Rangel et al., 2008; Fehr and
Rangel, 2011; Camerer, 2013).
Arguably, the prefrontal cortex have received the bulk of attention in the field. One
possible reason for this attention is that the prefrontal cortex is a fairly recent evolu-
tionary development and seems involved in many advanced behaviors of both non-human
and especially human primates (Teffer and Semendeferi, 2012; Adams et al., 2012). Our
current understanding of the brain circuitry of valuation suggests that primary and sec-
ondary rewards have distinct but overlapping networks which converge in the ventrome-
dial prefrontal cortex, where they are converted into a common neural currency (Levy
and Glimcher, 2011, 2012). The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), while not com-
pletely understood, plays a key role several types of decisions. The DLPFC has long
been thought to govern difficult cognitive processes, such as problem solving, but is also
crucial in exercising self control and demonstrating socially acceptable behavior (Knoch
et al., 2006; Sanfey et al., 2006; Hare et al., 2009). Nonetheless, regions outside of the
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prefrontal cortex – such as the temporoparietal junction – are important in value-based
decisions in social environments (Morishima et al., 2012).
One of the aims of neuroeconomics is understanding the neural processes in abnormal
decision making that characterizes various psychiatric disorders (Montague et al., 2012;
Lee, 2013). Mental illness has serious economic consequences. One estimate from the
World Economic Forum places the worldwide cost of mental illness at US$2.5 trillion in
2010, two-thirds of which are indirect costs such as lost productivity and income due to
worker absenteeism (Bloom et al., 2011). Identifying the neural circuity of value-based
decision making in healthy subjects provides a foundation for identifying aberrations
present in psychiatric disorders. Currently, we have only a partial understanding of how
neuromodulators such as serotonin, norepiniphrine, dopamine, and oxytocin affect be-
havior (Pitman et al., 1993; Kosfeld et al., 2005; Doya, 2008; Cools, 2012; Crockett and
Fehr, 2013). Importantly, serotonin, norepinephrine, and dopamine disturbances have all
been implicated in unipolar depression, which is arguably the most common mental ill-
ness and has the highest cost (Asberg et al., 1976; Owens and Nemeroff, 1994; Nutt et al.,
2006; Dunlop and Nemeroff, 2007; Bloom et al., 2011). Moreover, pharmacological sub-
stances affecting these neurotransmitters are the most common treatments for unipolar
depression, such as selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors and norepinephrine-dopamine
reuptake inhibitors. Thus, neuroeconomics may not only help us understand value-based
decision making in normal, healthy individuals but also to identify causes and potential
treatments for aberrations in mental illnesses.
1.2 Contents of this dissertation
This section describes the three chapters comprising this dissertation. These chapters are
included as appendices to this introductory chapter.
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1.2.1 Endogenous emergence of institutions to sustain cooper-
ation
This chapter experimentally examines the roles of “good” people and “good” institutions
on cooperation. We first allow a large group (12 subjects) to experience the free-rider
problem in a typical public goods game. We then allow subjects to self-select into one of
four institutions allowing (or disallowing) different punishment mechanisms and cheap-
talk communication. Cooperative people quickly sort into the institutions allowing both
punishment – either peer or centralized – and communication. Self-interested people
then migrate into these institutions and cooperate by contributing to the public good,
minimizing the need for punishment against low contributions. We follow up with a
control treatment to disentangle the sorting effects and institutional effects and find
support for both effects. The combined effects of sorting into effective institutions quickly
and efficiently establishes high rates of cooperation.
1.2.2 What you see is what you get? The effect of facial cues
on trust-related behavior
This chapter experimentally examines whether people discriminate in their trust-related
behavior and, if so, whether this discrimination is financially beneficial. Oosterhof and
Todorov (2008) identify facial features that affect non-incentizived ratings of trustworthi-
ness. We use photographs of real subjects in a modified trust game, along with morphing
software, to test whether these perceptions affect behavior in the presence of monetary in-
centives. We find evidence that many first-movers and second-movers discriminate based
on their perceptions, even though only first-movers have a financial incentive to discrim-
inate (conditional on the perceptions being accurate). Furthermore, we find that these
perceptions are wildly inaccurate, and average payoffs are no better than the expected
payoff from making random choices. Using such facial cues is consistent with an attempt
at sustaining cooperation by assortment, but the lack of benefit from such assortment
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fails to provide evidence for assortment as an ultimate cause of cooperation; nonetheless,
there may be other observable features that are valid cues for assortment.
1.2.3 Neural evidence for computational processes underlying
risky decision making
This final chapter attempts to provide some clarity to the use of – and information gained
from – various behavioral models of risky decision making to identify neural regions en-
coding and comparing subjective value. Subjects in our study completed a two-alternative
forced choice in which the options were lotteries with monetary payouts. In a first step,
we use the three most common models of subjective value in the neuroeconomics litera-
ture: expected utility, prospect theory, and a type of mean-variance model which includes
skewness. All three models identify the same neural regions, providing robust evidence
for the findings of valuation which do not attempt to use alternative models. Portions of
the lateral intraparietal area and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex correlate with the sum of
behavioral utilities, suggesting that these regions encode subjective value; moreover,the
medial orbitofrontal cortex and ventromedial prefrontal cortex correlate with the dif-
ference in behavioral utilities, suggesting comparison of subjective value. We then use
Bayesian model selection to test whether the best-fitting behavioral model also best ex-
plains neural activity in these regions. Using only those subjects whose behavior is most
consistent with prospect theory, we find that the neural activity of these subjects is best
explained by a mean-variance-skewness model. Finally, we suggest that this apparent
discrepancy can potentially be reconciled using theories of optimal foraging and rein-
forcement learning (both of which are common in the animal learning literature) that
can generate reference-dependent and domain-specific risk preferences that are consis-
tent with prospect theory but only require encoding of simple statistical moments such
as mean and variance.
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Appendix A
Endogenous emergence of
institutions to sustain cooperation
This chapter is being prepared for submission to a leading economics journal and follows
standard formatting for such journals. Work in this chapter was conducted with Ernst
Fehr. This chapter was written by Tony Williams and Ernst Fehr.
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A.1 Abstract
Formal and informal institutions, such as laws and social norms, are pervasive in daily
life. They help maintain cooperation by coordinating and constraining individuals’ be-
haviors. However, our understanding of the comparative benefits and the endogenous
emergence of institutions remains limited. Here, we study the emergence and perfor-
mance of sanctioning institutions in a public goods context when individuals are free to
migrate between different institutions. We show experimentally that efficient peer and
centralized sanctioning emerge as dominant institutions that immediately generate and
maintain high levels of cooperation without much need for costly punishment. The quick
establishment of high cooperation is due to both the self-selection of prosocial individ-
uals into these institutions and the institutions’ intrinsically beneficial properties. In
addition, voluntary migration into the centralized sanctioning institution leads to the se-
lection of stable prosocial leaders who refrain from antisocial punishment, while remnants
of antisocial punishment still exist under peer punishment.
A.2 Introduction
Institutions are pervasive in social and economic life. They “are the humanly devised
constraints that shape human interaction” which include both formal institutions such
as laws and constitutions as well as informal institutions such as social norms, con-
ventions, and taboos (North, 1990). Institutions shape economic and social incentives
and are therefore of paramount importance for the economic performance of individuals,
groups, companies and, perhaps, even countries. In the long run, however, institutions
are themselves subject to individual and political choices, and may thus be viewed as an
equilibrium outcome in a broader “game” in which different institutions compete for the
support of the population.
In this paper we study the endogenous emergence of a particularly important “hu-
manly devised constraint” - sanctioning institutions - in the context of public goods
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provision. Throughout human evolution, social groups faced important public goods
problems that ranged from the provision of social insurance through food sharing among
hunter-gatherers and cooperation during warfare between neighboring groups to the pro-
vision of effort among coworkers who receive a group bonus in case of high profits. The
experimental literature on public goods provision (e.g. Fischbacher et al., 2001) has shown
that many people are willing to contribute voluntarily to public goods if others do so as
well, but it is generally not possible to sustain a high level of cooperation if free-riders face
no sanctions (Ostrom et al., 1992; Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000). Historically, peer sanctions
are probably the oldest form of sanctioning that emerged among hunter-gatherers long
before humans developed more centralized sanctioning institutions that involved judges
and central enforcement of punishments. However, peer punishment has been shown
to generate high initial costs because of coordination failure among peers and because
a considerable amount of initial sanctioning is necessary to establish the credibility of
the punishment threat and, in small groups, punished individuals may not necessarily
respond to sanctioning in a prosocial manner (Ga¨chter et al., 2008; Dreber et al., 2008).
Peer punishment is, in particular, often associated with “antisocial punishment,” i.e.
when low contributors punish individuals who make above average contributions to the
public good (Ga¨chter et al., 2008).
The short and medium run inefficiency of uncoordinated peer punishment raises the
question whether and how human groups are capable of avoiding the high initial costs of
peer punishment. We study this question in an experimental environment in which indi-
viduals are free to sort themselves into different sanctioning institutions. Ethnographic
evidence indicates that early human groups were characterized by high mobility and fre-
quent migration in and out of existing groups (Boehm et al., 1996; Kaplan et al., 2005;
Wiessner, 2005; Mathew and Boyd, 2011). Thus, allowing individuals to leave and join
groups freely seems to capture an important component of social life in the early evolu-
tion of humans.1 In our experiment, individuals can sort into four different institutions;
1Our set up is also related to Tiebout (1956) who argues that public goods are largely provided
at the level of the local community and that consumer-voters will ”vote with the feet” by moving to
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within an institution, they can contribute to, and benefit from, a public good that only
benefits members of the institution. For simplicity, and to have a stark contrast between
individual and collective interest, it is in an individual’s rational self-interest to contribute
nothing to the public good when he or she faces no sanctions for free-riding, but group
welfare is maximized if everybody contributes the whole endowment to the public good.
One of the available institutions is characterized by the absence of any explicit op-
portunity for the sanctioning of individual free-riders (“no punishment”). The second
institution provides an opportunity for each group member to sanction any other group
member after they have observed each of their contributions to the public good. We
denote this institution as “uncoordinated peer punishment” because it does not offer any
explicit possibility to coordinate the group members’ contribution or punishment activi-
ties. This institution has dominated the experimental economics literature in recent years
starting with Ostrom et al. (1992) and Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000). We add a cheap-talk
normative request to peer punishment in a third institution, denoted by “coordinated
peer punishment,” as minor communication could act as a coordination device for contri-
butions, determine when and who should be punished, and potentially affect beliefs about
others’ preferences. Here, each institution member can state how much he or she thinks
everyone in the institution should contribute. The average of these statements is then
communicated to every institution member before the contribution decision. The ratio-
nale for the coordinated peer punishment institution is that sanctioning typically does not
take place in a normative vacuum. Rather, people often sanction for a reason, i.e., they
punish what they consider as normatively inappropriate behavior. It thus makes sense to
allow them to express their normative views and provide them with feedback about the
average view in the group. The fourth and final institution (“coordinated central pun-
ishment”) maintains the cheap-talk normative request but allows for the delegation of
punishment to a single (central) authority elected by the group while also socializing the
cost of punishment. This type of institution is prevalent in both small-scale societies (e.g.
communities that best satisfy their preferences.
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village elders and tribal chiefs, with collective punishment by the group) and large-scale
societies (e.g. police, courts, and prisons funded by taxes).
Our results show that both coordinated peer punishment and centralized punishment
function very well and establish extremely high cooperation levels from the beginning
with little need for sanctions. After an initial adjustment phase, subjects thus predom-
inantly choose these two institutions, while the other two institutions - no punishment
and uncoordinated peer punishment - become depopulated. In fact, the uncoordinated
peer punishment institution is almost never chosen, even at the very beginning.
The centralized punishment institution completely removes the inefficiencies of unco-
ordinated peer punishment and already leads to payoff levels that are significantly greater
than in “no punishment” in the first period. In addition, centralized punishment removes
antisocial punishment. The high efficiency of this institution is based on the two key facts.
First, many prosocial individuals (i.e., those with prosocial other-regarding preferences)
enter this institution at the very beginning, leading to high normative contribution re-
quests and the selection of a prosocial central authority. Rather than being merely cheap
talk, the high normative requests are associated with high actual contributions - individ-
uals seem to use the average contribution request as a coordination device. Subjects thus
quickly establish a strong cooperative culture in the centralized punishment institution.
The second reason for the superiority of centralized punishment is due to its intrinsi-
cally beneficial properties - even in the absence of endogenous sorting of subjects, this
institution is capable of producing high cooperation with comparably little punishment
costs.
Coordinated peer punishment shares many of the good properties of centralized pun-
ishment. Many prosocial individuals immediately enter this institution; they establish
very high normative requests followed by equally high contributions. However, this in-
stitution requires more actual sanctions during the first few periods, and some antisocial
punishment still persists. Therefore, initial payoffs are not larger than in “no punishment”
but - in contrast to the uncoordinated punishment institution (Ga¨chter et al., 2008) - pay-
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offs are never smaller than in “no punishment.” In fact, coordinated peer punishment
outperforms “no punishment” in terms of overall payoff after only three or four periods.
Taken together, our results show that efficient punishment institutions emerge endoge-
nously through a competitive process in an environment in which people can “vote with
their feet.” Prosocial individuals play a key role in this process because they quickly es-
tablish a cooperative culture that considerably shortens the length of time that it takes to
render an institution efficient. While uncoordinated peer punishment incurs large initial
costs, the combination of endogenous sorting of prosocial individuals with the possibility
of coordinating group behavior through normative requests very quickly makes both peer
punishment and centralized punishment the superior institutions.
Our results speak to a growing body of research on endogenous choice and coopera-
tion. Broadly speaking, these papers fall into three categories: endogenous groups with
fixed institutions (e.g. Ahn et al., 2008, 2009), fixed groups with endogenous institutions
(e.g. Kosfeld et al., 2009; Sutter et al., 2010), and endogenous groups with endogenous
institutions (e.g. Gu¨rerk et al., 2006). The last category is the smallest but also best
captures the idea of “voting with feet” to select communities that satisfy the individual’s
preferences due to Tiebout (1956). Our paper falls into this category.
Gu¨rerk et al. (2006, 2011, 2013) precede our work in allowing for both endogenous
groups and endogenous institutions. Their treatments restrict subjects to only two insti-
tutions, (i) a non-sanctioning institution and (ii) an uncoordinated peer-sanctioning in-
stitution. Their treatments allow for punishment, reward, or both in the peer-sanctioning
institution. However, only one sanctioning institution is available in any treatment and
subjects cannot express their normative requests in any of their treatments. Our study
shows that the existence of these requests is not innocuous because - if available - subjects
immediately leave the uncoordinated punishment institution in favor of coordinated peer
punishment or centralized punishment. In addition, we provide insights into the key role
of prosocial individuals for the quick and smooth functioning of punishment institutions
because we also elicit an independent measure of subjects’ prosociality.
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Like us, Grechenig et al. (2013) extend the punishment institutions to also allow
for centralized punishment. In contrast, however, our central authority is elected by
institution members each period and also bears part of the cost of punishment, while they
exogenously and permanently assign subjects to be the central authority. The election
allows us to examine to whom subjects delegate authority, while the exogenous and
permanent assignment in Grechenig et al. (2013) rules out this possibility. We also allow
for a cheap-talk normative request that serves as a coordination device for contributions,
which helps to quickly establish a cooperative culture. Finally, our work differs from
Grechenig et al. (2013) because they neither provide an independent measure of subjects’
prosociality nor do they compare the functioning of institutions under endogenous sorting
and under exogenous assignment of individuals to institutions.
Our approach may also be a useful complement to research on the persistence of
macro-institutions and historical development. Lab experiments are not a substitute for
empirical data and identification of effects due to natural experiments and the use of in-
struments. However, laboratory experiments can provide a controlled setting to test the-
ories that emerge from naturally-occurring data without the need for (non-experimenter)
exogenous variation. Nunn (forthcoming) includes a discussion of mechanisms underly-
ing the persistent effects of institutions in historical development and focuses on culture,
norms, genetics, and coevolutionary processes. Much of the current knowledge of these
various factors has been shaped by work involving cross-cultural lab-in-field experiments
(Henrich et al., 2006, 2010; Marlowe et al., 2008).2 Kimbrough et al. (2008) is a note-
worthy example of how controlled lab experiments can help inform our understanding of
historical development, in which they focus on the emergence of long-distance trade.
2For example, an unresolved question in the macro-institutions literature that is also relevant for
development policy is whether institutions will continue to be successful when exogenously imposed
in new environments. Acemoglu et al. (2011) find evidence supportive of exogenous imposition in the
French Revolution, while Berkowitz et al. (2003a,b) argue that the evidence for exogenously imposed
institutions following World War II and the fall of the Soviet Union has been much more mixed. Lab
and field experiments can potentially identify the important common features of institutions and which
specific features may be effective in similar contexts (eg. common culture) but likely to fail in alternative
environments. They may also be able to do so at lower cost while improving the effectiveness of costly
large-scale interventions by identifying critical aspects in advance.
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Figure A.1: Experiment timeline.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section A.3 presents our experi-
mental design in detail. Section A.4 presents our results. Section B.8 concludes the paper
and discusses open questions and possible fertile future studies.
A.3 Experimental design and procedures
The experiment consists of three parts. Parts 1 and 2 are conducted in the lab during
the same session. Part 3 is conducted online after subjects leave the lab and provides an
independent measure of subjects’ social preferences.
Subjects are initially assigned to a large group of size N ∈ {9, 11, 12} that stays fixed
for Parts 1 and 2 of the experiment. We attempted to have 12 members in all groups but
occasionally used smaller groups due to subjects registering for the study but failing to
show up to the lab. Subjects are randomly assigned a unique identification number from
the set {1,2,. . . ,N} which also stays fixed for Parts 1 and 2 of the experiment.
Part 1 consists of five periods of a typical public goods game without punishment.
Part 2 consists of 20 periods of a public goods game in which subjects can endogenously
form subgroups by adopting different punishment institutions; we also include a control
treatment to disentangle institutional effects from selection effects (see Section A.3.2).
Part 3 is conducted online and measures social preferences using the Social Value Orien-
tation scale of Murphy et al. (2011). The experiment timeline is summarized in Figure
A.1.
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A.3.1 Part 1: Public goods game
Subjects begin by playing five rounds of a typical public goods game without punishment.
At the beginning of each period, subjects receive an endowment of points, e, and can
contribute any amount gi ∈ {0, 1, . . . , e} to a group project. Each point contributed to
the group project is multiplied by m and shared equally among all N group members.
Each point not contributed to the project goes into a private account. Thus, per-period
earnings are given by
pii = e− gi +
(m
N
) N∑
j=1
gj. (A.1)
A social dilemma exists whenever (i) ∂pii/∂gi = (m/N)−1 < 0 and (ii) ∂(
∑N
j=1 pij)/∂gi =
m− 1 > 0 for all gi > 0. Condition (i) means that own payoff is decreasing in own con-
tribution to the project, so that free-riding is individually optimal for payoff-maximizers.
Condition (ii) means that aggregate payoffs are increasing in own contribution to the
project, so that full contributions by all group members are socially optimal.
The marginal per-capita return (MPCR) is given by (m/N) and is decreasing in
group size N . We set m = 1.5 in the experiment, so that MPCR ranged from 0.125
when N = 12 to 0.167 when N = 9. Previous experiments suggest that these values
for the MPCR and group size should lead to the breakdown of cooperation within five
periods.3 Subjects should therefore directly experience the public goods problem during
Part 1 of the experiment and have a potential motivation to form institutions to establish
and maintain cooperation in order to improve their own payoffs. In each period and
after making private contribution decisions, group members are informed of every group
member’s contribution. In addition to m = 1.5, we set e = 20 and m = 1.5. The
parameter values are summarized in Table A.1.
3Hamman et al. (2011) used an MPCR of 0.15 with fixed group size of 9. Average contributions
began around 45% of the endowment in the first period and declined to about 15% in period 5.
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Parameter Value Meaning
e 20 Endowment
m 1.5 Multiplier for contribution to public good
N 9, 11, or 12 Group size
Table A.1: Parameter values used in Part 1.
A.3.2 Part 2: Public goods game with endogenous punishment
institutions
Subjects remain in the same group and retain the same identification number in Part 2 of
the experiment. Part 2 lasts for 20 periods and provides subjects with the opportunity to
form institutions with other group members after experiencing the public goods problem
during Part 1. At the beginning of each period, subjects individually select into one
of four institutions and interact only with other group members who adopt the same
institution in that period. Migration between institutions is costless, and subjects can
adopt any of the institutions at the start of each period. The institutions are (i) No
Punishment, (ii) Uncoordinated Peer Punishment, (iii) Coordinated Peer Punishment,
and (iv) Coordinated Central Punishment. By “Coordinated,” we mean the presence of
a normative request that can be used as a coordination device for contributions; it does
not refer to the coordination of punishment. These institutions are described in more
detail in Section A.3.2.
Each period contains a contribution stage which is identical to the decision in Part
1, except that contributions to the group project only affect members of the group who
adopt the same institution. In addition, a punishment stage is added which provides
an additional endowment in each period. In the event that only one subject adopts a
particular institution in the period, both the contribution stage and punishment stage
endowments go directly to the private account, and the subject is not able to contribute
to a group account. This design feature was included because the idea of a public good
necessarily involves more than one person benefitting from contributions.
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Figure A.2: Sequence of decisions in Part 2.
We next describe the four institutions in greater detail. During each period, subjects
make several decisions, and their choice opportunities depend partly on the institution
adopted. We then describe the information provided to subjects at each decision point.
Finally, we describe the material payoffs resulting from subjects’ choices.
Institutions
Subjects begin each period by selecting which institution they want to adopt in the
current period. For the remainder of the period, subjects only interact with other group
members who have also adopted the same institution. The sequence of decisions made
during each period is summarized in Figure A.2.
No Punishment. No Punishment is identical to Part 1, except that (i) contributions
to the group project only affect members of the group who adopt the No Punishment
institution and (ii) subjects receive a second endowment in the punishment stage which
is added directly to their earnings.
Uncoordinated Peer Punishment. In Uncoordinated Peer Punishment, subjects
make the same contribution decision as in No Punishment. However, during the pun-
ishment stage, subjects can assign deduction points to other institution members which
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reduce the recipient’s earnings at a cost to the person assigning punishment. The cost
structure for punishment is described in Section A.3.2 and defined in equation (A.4).
Coordinated Peer Punishment. The contribution and punishment stages in Coor-
dinated Peer Punishment are identical to Uncoordinated Peer Punishment. However,
prior to the contribution stage, each institution member makes a normative request by
privately answering the question, “How many points do you think each participant should
contribute to the project?” The average of these private responses is reported on each
institution member’s computer screen during the contribution stage.4 The normative
request is non-binding and public knowledge within the institution. The cost structure
for punishment is described in Section A.3.2 and defined in equation (A.4).
Coordinated Central Punishment In Coordinated Central Punishment, one mem-
ber of the institution is elected to assign all of the punishment for the group, and the
total cost of punishment is shared equally by all institution members. At the start of the
period, subjects in Coordinated Central Punishment vote for a single institution member
to assign the punishment; the central authority is the person who receives the most votes,
and ties are broken randomly. After casting their votes, subjects then create a normative
request in the same manner as in Coordinated Peer Punishment. Then, subjects enter
the contribution stage, where they are informed of the normative request and make the
same contribution decision as in all other institutions. Finally, during the punishment
stage, only the central authority can assign deduction points to institution members, and
these deduction points reduce the recipient’s earnings at a cost which is shared equally
by all members of the institution.5 The cost structure for punishment is described in
4 While the normative request is cheap talk, it may act as a coordination device for equilibrium
selection when multiple cooperative equilibria exist; social preference models, eg. Fehr and Schmidt
(1999), often suffer from the problem of multiple equilibria. In such cases, the normative request is both
self-signalling and self-committing in the sense of Farrell and Rabin (1996).
5To our knowledge, this particular institution is novel. Therefore, in Appendix A.7.1, we characterize
a class of cooperative equilibria in which some individuals have inequity averse social preferences in a
one-shot interaction; we do so for comparison with the other institutions based on previous research, eg.
Fehr and Schmidt (1999). The existence of only one group member who is strongly averse to inequality
is both necessary and sufficient for the existence of cooperative equilibria. Under peer punishment with
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Section A.3.2 and defined in equation (A.5).
Other possible institutions. Our design superficially looks to be a 3 × 2 factorial
design with two omitted institutions, (i) Coordinated No Punishment and (ii) Uncoor-
dinated Central Punishment. We first want to stress that we do not actually have a
factorial design, as we do not run separate sessions or treatments for each institution. In-
stead, we allow subjects to endogenously determine – based on their decisions – whether
all institutions, some institutions, or only one institution will be adopted in each period.
Our motivation is to understand what institutions people will adopt in natural environ-
ments and to see how successful these institutions become in establishing and maintaining
cooperation.
In our view, these two potential institutions are not relevant to understanding natural
environments. We start from the perspective that peer punishment is always available
in natural environments, negating the need to include Coordinated No Punishment; in
addition, numerical cheap-talk, such as the normative request we use in this paper, typ-
ically is not effective in establishing cooperation.6 The No Punishment institution is a
convenient benchmark and has been the traditional way of examining social dilemmas,
hence its inclusion. We also do not find it plausible that a group would somehow lose the
ability to establish a normative request when moving from peer punishment to centralized
punishment, which negates the need to include Central Punishment without a normative
request.
We also face a practical concern regarding the number of institutions because we
do not allow a subject to contribute to a public good if she is the only one to adopt
social preferences, a single group member who is inequity averse is necessary but not always sufficient
for the existence of cooperative equilibria.
6 Verbal and written communication often enhances cooperation (Isaac and Walker, 1988a; Sally,
1995; Ostrom, 1998); however, numerical communication in which written messages cannot be sent is
generally unable to establish cooperation and occasionally performs worse than an environment without
communication (Wilson and Sell, 1997; Bochet et al., 2006; Bochet and Putterman, 2009). In light of
these previous findings, one can reasonably assume that numerical communication itself is not the driving
force behind cooperation in our institutions with a cheap-talk normative request, though it may interact
with and enhance institution performance.
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the institution in the period. If we increase the number of institutions, subjects face
a primary concern of adopting an institution based on their beliefs that at least one
other person will adopt the same institution; otherwise, they will not be able to even
potentially benefit from a public good. Concerns about beliefs in such cases casts doubt
on any inferences that can made regarding preferences over institutions, as beliefs about
others’ choices can override one’s own preference. These concerns also led us to omit the
two implausible institutions.
Information
The information provided during each period is summarized in Figure A.3. All informa-
tion described in Figure A.3 is provided in each institution even if no decision is made at
that point. We intentionally chose this feature to rule out desire for increased information
as a confounding explanation for institution selection. Subjects receive more information
about their own institution than they do about the other institutions, which captures
the notion that we a great deal about the people we interact with but have only limited
information about those with whom we do not interact.
At the beginning of each period and before subjects join an institution, all subjects
are informed of the number of group members who joined each institution in the previous
period and the average earnings for each institution in the previous period. After sub-
jects join an institution, they learn the contribution of each current institution member
in the previous period; the Coordinated Central Punishment institution elects the central
authority at this point.7 During the contribution stage, the Coordinated Peer Punish-
ment and Coordinated Central Punishment institutions are informed of the institution’s
normative request. Finally, at the punishment stage, members of all institutions observe
the contribution of each institution member in the current period.
7In the first period of Part 2 (period 6 overall), subjects are informed of the average contribution of
each current institution member during Part 1.
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Figure A.3: Sequence of information in Part 2. Information is known by all institution
members regardless of whether a decision is made at that stage.
Material payoffs
Earnings in each period are the sum of the contribution stage earnings and the punishment
stage earnings. Contribution stage earnings for individual i in institution inst, pi1i,inst, are
given by
pi1i,inst = e
1 − gi,inst +
(
m
sinst
) sinst∑
j=1
gj,inst. (A.2)
where e1 is the contribution stage endowment, gi,inst is the individual’s contribution to
the institution project, m is the multiplier for contributions to the institution project, and
sinst is the endogenously determined institution size (number of institution members).
Punishment stage earnings for individual i in institution inst, pi2i,inst, are given by
pi2i,inst = e
2 − ci,inst(d)− r
sinst∑
j=1
dji,inst (A.3)
where e2 is the punishment stage endowment, ci,inst(d) is the cost of assigned punishment,
r is the reduction in earnings for each deduction point received, and dji,inst is the number
of deduction points assigned to subject i by subject j in institution inst. The cost of
assigned punishment, ci,inst(d), differs by institution and is given by
ci,inst(d) =
sinst∑
j=1
dij,inst (A.4)
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Parameter Value Meaning
e1 20 Endowment for contribution stage
m 1.5 Multiplier for contribution to public good
sinst Endogenous Institution size
e2 20 Endowment for punishment stage
r 3 Reduction in earnings from unit of punishment
ci,inst(d) See equations (A.4) and (A.5) Cost of assigned punishment
Table A.2: Parameter values used in Part 2.
if inst ∈ {Uncoordinated Peer Punishment, Coordinated Peer Punishment} and
ci,inst(d) =
∑sinst
j=1 dAj,inst
sinst
(A.5)
if inst = Coordinated Central Punishment, where dAj,inst is the number of deduction
points assigned to subject j by the central authority A in the Coordinated Central Pun-
ishment institution. In the No Punishment institution, ci,inst and dji,inst are always equal
to zero for all i and j.
Finally, we imposed a bankruptcy condition so that earnings in a single period could
not be negative. Subjects would still have to pay for assigned deduction tokens even if
the tokens could not reduce the recipient’s earnings any further. Therefore, per-period
earnings are given by
pii,inst = max{pi1i,inst + pi2i,inst, 0}. (A.6)
Table A.2 summarizes the parameter values used in the experiment. We set e1 = e2 =
20, m = 1.5, and r = 3. The total cost of each deduction point is 1, but the cost for each
institution member is determined according to equation (A.4) in institutions utilizing
peer punishment and equation (A.5) in the central punishment institution.
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Control treatment – Exogenously assigned perfect matching groups
Under endogenous institution selection, institutions may be successful in establishing
and maintaining cooperation for two primary reasons. First, cooperative individuals may
select into the same institutions, and cooperation is likely to follow regardless of the
institution itself. Second, the institution may create incentives that induce cooperative
behavior, regardless of whether the individuals joining the institution are generally coop-
erative. In our view, the most likely explanation is an interaction of these aspects. Our
design with endogenous selection does not allow us to disentangle these explanations.
Therefore, we conducted a control treatment with exogenous assignment. For each group
in our endogenous selection sessions, we create a matching group of the same size and
with identical migration patterns. This exogenous assignment allows us to examine the
effects of institutions independently of self-selection.
A.3.3 Part 3: Social Value Orientation
Part 3 of the experiment consists of the Social Value Orientation (SVO) measure of
Murphy et al. (2011) which consists of six allocation decisions between oneself and one
other anonymous individual. The allocation decisions constitute modified versions of the
dictator game (Forsythe et al., 1994) in which the relative price of giving varies, similar
to the approach in Andreoni and Miller (2002); unlike Andreoni and Miller (2002), the
SVO measure provides a numeric score which can be used to make comparisons across
individuals. Higher SVO scores indicate greater prosociality. Full details of the SVO
measure are provided in Appendix A.7.2. This part of the experiment was conducted
online after subjects completed Parts 1 and 2 in the lab. Subjects knew that one of
their allocation decisions would be selected and implemented and that they would be the
recipient of a different person’s allocation decision; payments were mailed to subjects.
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A.3.4 Experimental procedures
Sessions for Part 1 and Part 2 were conducted in a computer lab at the University of
Zurich in December 2012 and April 2013. Part 3 was conducted online using Qualtrics
(www.qualtrics.com). Experimental instructions are provided in the Appendix. Subjects
were mostly students from the University of Zurich and Swiss Federal Institute of Tech-
nology (ETH-Zurich). Recruitment was conducted using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004), and
we excluded students who listed economics or psychology as their major in ORSEE from
receiving invitations. Experiments were programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
Points were used as the experimental currency and converted to Swiss Francs (CHF)
at the end of the study; subjects were informed of the exchange rate in the instructions.
In Parts 1 and 2, conducted during the same lab session, the exchange rate is 1 point =
CHF 0.05, and final earnings were the sum of all per-period earnings. In Part 3, conducted
online, the exchange rate is 1 point = CHF 0.10. Average earnings were CHF 56.41 for
the lab session (consisting of both Parts 1 and 2), including a show-up fee of CHF 10.
Earning from Part 3 were CHF 15-20. Lab sessions lasted 2.5-3 hours on average, and
the online portion of the experiment took 10-20 minutes.
Overall, 256 subjects participated in the lab sessions; 128 subjects participated in the
endogenous selection treatment, and another 128 subjects participated in the exogenous
assignment treatment. Each treatment consisted of eleven groups in total. Nine of these
groups had twelve members. One group of nine members and one group of eleven members
were used in each treatment due to subjects not coming to the lab. Partner matching
was used in Parts 1 and 2, so each group remained fixed for the entire lab session.
For subjects in the endogenous treatments (where we predict assortment effects), 84
of 128 subjects (66%) completed Part 3 of the experiment online. We do not find obvious
evidence for selection effects. Subjects who completed Part 3 (average age = 22.0, percent
female = 0.37, average earnings in Parts 1 and 2 = CHF 57.40) are similar in observable
characteristics to those who did not complete Part 3 (average age = 22.3, percent female
= 0.34, average earnings in Parts 1 and 2 = CHF 56.66).
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A.4 Results
We begin by taking a revealed preference approach to institutions. When subjects are
given a choice, which institutions are adopted? The answer provides our first major
result and demonstrates that Uncoordinated Peer Punishment is almost never adopted.
We include the institution in Result A.1 but drop it from subsequent analysis due to lack
of observations.
Result A.1. Subjects are initially evenly distributed between the No Punishment (NP),
Coordinated Peer Punishment (PP), and Centralized Punishment (CP) institutions while
Uncoordinated Peer Punishment is almost never chosen. Over time, only Coordinated
Peer Punishment and Centralized Punishment survive.
Evidence for Result 1. The result is documented in Figure A.4, which displays the
aggregate distribution of subjects (i.e. data from all groups is pooled to calculate the
distribution). The figure shows that initially a substantial number of subjects are in
NP, but after period 5, the percentage of subjects entering NP becomes negligible. In
addition, the figure shows that, from the very beginning, the share of subjects selecting
Uncoordinated Peer Punishment is negligible.
The strong dominance of coordinated peer sanctioning and centralized sanctioning
raises the question of why these two institutions prevail. With a revealed preference
approach, one would suspect these institutions to prevail because they are successful
either in maintaining cooperation or increasing earnings. We find evidence for both
conjectures.
Result A.2. Under both PP and CP, very high cooperation levels are quickly obtained.
Initially, only the CP institution outperforms the NP institution in terms of aggregate
payoff. However, within a few periods, PP also outperforms the NP institution.
Evidence for Result 2. The trend for contributions can be seen in Figure A.5a. The
unit of observation is the matching group, so that the average contribution for an insti-
tution is first taken at the group level; the result is then averaged across groups, which
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Figure A.4: Distribution of subjects across institutions in Part 2.
is displayed in the figure. Figure A.5a shows that already in the first period of Part 2
the average contribution (as a percentage of the endowment) in PP and CP is about 90%
and soon reaches close to 100%. In contrast, average contributions in NP quickly decline
to low levels. Evidence for earnings is provided in terms of efficiency, which we define
as the percentage of the social optimum (full contributions by all subjects) earned by
subjects in the institution. Average efficiency can be seen in Figure A.5b. In the first
period of Part 2, efficiency is significantly higher in CP relative to NP (Mann-Whitney
U, p=0.001). However, efficiency in PP is only marginally significantly different than in
NP during the initial period (Mann-Whitney U, p=0.066). By period 4, the efficiency in
PP is significantly higher than in the NP.
Why do coordinated peer punishment and centralized punishment perform so well
in terms of quickly establishing and maintaining cooperation and in terms of aggregate
payoffs? One reason could be that the institutions themselves have beneficial intrinsic
properties that lead to high performance – at least in the long run – regardless of the
migration pattern (i.e. even with random assignment to institutions). A second reason
could be that prosocial individuals are the first ones to migrate into these institutions
and quickly establish a beneficial social norm of full cooperation such that whose who
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(a) Average contribution.
(b) Average efficiency.
Figure A.5: Contributions and efficiency under endogenous selection. The unit of obser-
vation is the matching group, so that the average for an institution is first taken at the
group level; the result is then averaged across groups, which is displayed in the figure.
Efficiency is the percentage of the socially optimal outcome (full contributions) earned
by subjects. Efficiency from zero contributions differs between periods 1–5 (Part 1) and
periods 6-25 (Part 2) due to the additional endowment received in periods 6–25.
join later can be smoothly integrated into a “high cooperation society.” In the following,
we study these two potential factors.
Result A.3. Under exogenous assignment, institutions that allow for sanctioning and
normative requests induce cooperative behavior. These institutions perform better in the
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long run than NP under exogenous assignment. Under both endogenous selection and
exogenous assignment, the normative request is an effective coordination device for con-
tributions, and contributions increase immediately upon entering the sanctioning regimes
from the non-sanctioning institution.
For the sake of clarity, we examine the evidence for each of these properties separately.
We first examine the effectiveness of PP and CP under exogenous assignment. Selection
effects cannot explain superior performance of these institutions because subjects are
exogenously assigned to an institution.
Result A.3a. Institutions that allow for sanctioning and normative requests perform
better than NP after a few periods. Initially, the efficiency in PP and CP is not higher
than in NP; however, after a few periods, both PP and CP outperform NP.
Evidence for Result 3a. The trend for contributions can be seen in Figure A.6a.
Figure A.6a shows that average contributions as a percentage of the endowment are
roughly 75% already in the first period of Part 2, and they reach 100% after 12 periods.
Thus, contributions are significantly higher in the punishment institutions than in NP
from the beginning for both PP (Mann-Whitney U, p=0.066) and CP (Mann-Whitney U,
p=0.001). Average efficiency is documented in Figure A.6b, which shows that, during the
first few periods of Part 2, the efficiency in the NP treatment is rather similar compared
to the PP and the CP; however, from periods 5-6 onwards, efficiency in both PP and CP
is significantly higher than in NP. These results indicate that under exogenous assignment
there are considerable initial efficiency losses due the punishment activities of the players.
The aggregate pattern of contributions and efficiency in our coordinated peer punish-
ment institution under exogenous assignment is remarkably similar to previous studies on
uncoordinated peer punishment, in which the institution induces high contributions but
initially performs worse than a sanction-free environment due to the use of punishment
(Ga¨chter et al., 2008). The existence of a strong institutional effect on contribution levels
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(a) Average contribution.
(b) Average efficiency.
Figure A.6: Contributions and efficiency under exogenous assignment. The unit of obser-
vation is the matching group, so that the average for an institution is first taken at the
group level; the result is then averaged across groups, which is displayed in the figure.
Efficiency is the percentage of the socially optimal outcome (full contributions) earned
by subjects. Efficiency from zero contributions differs between periods 1–5 (Part 1) and
periods 6-25 (Part 2) due to the additional endowment received in periods 6–25.
suggests that we should also observe changes in contribution behavior when individuals
migrate into PP and CP from NP. Indeed, we do observe these changes.
Result A.3b. Individual contributions never decrease when individuals migrate from
NP to either PP or CP, and most people increase their contributions upon entering a
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Figure A.7: Contribution behavior immediately before and after entering a punishment
institution. Horizontal axis indicates the contribution type in the No Punishment insti-
tution in the last period before joining a punishment institution. Bar height indicates
relative frequency of contribution type upon entering a punishment institution conditional
on type before migrating. Number above bars indicates the overall number of subjects
from that treatment who fall into the category.
sanctioning regime.
Evidence for Result 3b. Figure A.7 displays subjects’ contribution types upon enter-
ing a punishment institution as a function of contribution type in the period immediately
before entering the punishment institution. For example, approximately 70% of the sub-
jects who were low contributors in endogenous selection (far left in Figure A.7) become
high contributors upon entering a punishment institution. Taken together, Figure A.7
documents that even many of those subjects who were low contributors before they en-
tered a punishment institution immediately turned into higher contributors upon entering
a punishment institution.
We acknowledge that while this behavioral change provides evidence for institutional
effects, the result itself is not terribly surprising. It is well documented in the literature
that institutions allowing for punishment induce changes in behavior, even within the
same subject (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000; Gu¨rerk et al., 2011). The noteworthy aspect of
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the institutions adopted by subjects is the use of the normative request. While the threat
of punishment may increase contributions, there is still no way of knowing the “right”
contribution and what others expect you to give. The normative request, despite being
cheap talk, solves this problem, even though the request itself is not generally effective
in the absence of punishment.8
Result A.3c. The normative request is an effective coordination device for contribu-
tions in PP and CP, and it is effective under both endogenous selection and exogenous
assignment.
Evidence for Result 3c. We restrict attention to the first five periods of Part 2 because
average contributions tend towards full contributions quickly and eliminate any variation
in the data afterwards. To provide support for Result A.3c, we regress subjects’ contri-
bution levels on the average normative request in a group and a constant and a restricted
model in which we set the coefficient on the constant term to zero (i.e. β0 = 0); these
models are reported in Table A.3.9 We can only reject the restricted model in favor of
a model with both normative request and constant for CP under endogenous selection.
However, for commonly observed values of the normative request (16-20), the predicted
contributions almost perfectly match the normative request.10 For the remaining condi-
8See footnote 6 for discussion and references on numerical communication in public goods experi-
ments.
9An econometric issue arises when running regressions on our data, but there is a simple solution. We
need to cluster standard errors at the level of the group, and we have a relatively small number of groups.
It is well known that in such cases the standard errors will be inconsistent and lead to over-rejection
of the null hypothesis (Bertrand et al., 2004). Bootstrapping can overcome this problem, and we use a
pairs cluster bootstrap-t with cluster robust standard errors proposed by Cameron et al. (2008) which
performs quite well in their simulations. In this bootstrap, resampling is at the level of clusters instead
of individual observations. The Wald statistics from the bootstrap samples are then used to create the
distribution against which the Wald statistic from the original data is tested. Cameron et al. (2008)
suggests using a wild cluster bootstrap-t procedure in OLS regressions; however, in their simulations,
the pairs cluster bootstrap-t with cluster robust standard errors performs only slightly worse than the
wild cluster bootstrap-t. We opt to use the pairs cluster bootstrap-t with cluster robust standard errors
for consistency with later analyses in which the wild cluster bootstrap-t is inappropriate, specifically
the Tobit regressions in Table A.4. The wild bootstrap involves estimating yˆi and either adding or
subtracting the residual εi with equal probability to create new pseudo-samples, where yˆ
∗
i is the value
of yi in the wild bootstrap pseudo-sample. With corner solutions in a Tobit regression, we would need
to set yˆ∗i = 0 whenever yˆ
∗
i < 0. In doing so, we would have βˆ
∗
i 6= βˆi, which appears inappropriate for
inference using the wild bootstrap.
10For example, with a normative request of 16, the predicted contribution is 16.669 (= 5.693 + 16×
0.686). With a normative request of 20, the predicted contribution is 19.413 (= 5.693 + 20× 0.686).
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Endogenous Selection Exogenous Assignment
Peer Central Peer Central
Punishment Punishment Punishment Punishment
Panel A – Restricted model (constant constrained to β0 = 0)
Normative request 0.981 0.997 1.001 0.968
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Panel B – Unrestricted model
Normative request 1.078 0.686 1.144 1.073
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Constant -1.827 5.693 -2.253 -1.803
(0.083)* (0.581) (0.001)*** (0.000)***
Likelihood ratio, χ2(1) 0.54 6.69 2.49 1.69
(0.461) (0.010)*** (0.115) (0.194)
N 201 292 201 292
Number of clusters 11 11 11 11
Bootstrap samples 9,999 9,999 9,999 9,999
Table A.3: The role of normative requests as a coordination device for contributions
in the first five periods (periods 6-10 overall). OLS regressions with robust standard
errors clustered by matching group. Bootstrapped p-values given in parentheses based on
9,999 bootstrap samples computed using pairs cluster bootstrap-t with clustered standard
errors.
tions, we cannot reject the model with only the normative request as a regressor using a
likelihood ratio test. In the restricted model, coefficients on the normative request range
from 0.968 to 1.001, indicating that normative request is a clear coordination device
leading to contributions that are not significantly different from the normative request.
We have so far provided evidence that coordinated peer punishment and centralized
punishment institutions have beneficial intrinsic properties that lead to high performance
– at least in the long run – regardless of the migration pattern (i.e. even with random
assignment to institutions). However, these intrinsic properties were one of the two
potential reasons for why these institutions perform so well in terms of quickly establishing
and maintaining cooperation and in terms of aggregate payoffs. A second reason could be
that prosocial individuals are the first ones to migrate into these institutions and quickly
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establish a beneficial social norm of full cooperation such that those who join later can
be smoothly integrated into a “high cooperation society.” In the next two results, we
study the latter potential factor and find evidence in support of sorting effects.
Result A.4. Under endogenous selection, prosocial individuals are quick to migrate into
the coordinated peer punishment and centralized punishment institutions and establish a
culture of high cooperation. This culture of cooperation includes making higher normative
requests and following through by making higher contributions than the subjects under
exogenous assignment.
Evidence for Result 4. We provide four pieces of evidence in support of the result.
Statistical results presented as evidence are based on Mann-Whitney U tests.
1. Contributions and efficiency are much higher in PP and CP under endogenous
selection relative to exogenous assignment. While the institutions under exogenous
assignment eventually converge to the performance under endogenous selection, it
takes much longer. The trend across time can be seen in Figure A.8. In the first
period of Part 2, the endogenously selected institutions perform significantly better
with respect to both contributions (PP, p=0.021; CP, p=0.012) and efficiency (PP,
p=0.016; CP, p=0.035). The unit of observation is the matching group, so that one
observation is obtained for each institution in a matching group (if it is adopted).
2. Higher average contributors during the baseline public goods game in Part 1 of the
experiment are more likely to adopt coordinated peer punishment and centralized
punishment institutions in the first period of endogenous selection. This behavior
can be seen clearly in Figure A.9a, where the average individual contribution during
the baseline public goods game without punishment in Part 1 is the unit of analysis
(PP > NP, p=0.012; CP > NP, p=0.015).
3. Prosocial individuals, as measured by the Social Value Orientation scale in Part
3 of the experiment (conducted online), are more likely to adopt coordinated peer
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(a) Contributions in coordinated peer punishment. (b) Efficiency in coordinated peer punishment.
(c) Contributions in central punishment. (d) Efficiency in central punishment.
Figure A.8: Contributions and efficiency between treatments in Part 2. The unit of
observation is the matching group, so that the average for an institution is first taken
at the group level; the result is then averaged across groups, which is displayed in the
figure. Efficiency is the percentage of the socially optimal outcome (full contributions)
earned by subjects. Periods 15-20 are omitted from the figure since there is no observable
difference between treatments for either institution in these periods.
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(a) Average baseline contribution (b) Social Value Orientation
Figure A.9: Assortment in first period of endogenous selection (period 6 overall). Error
bars represent standard error of the mean.
punishment and centralized punishment institutions in the first period of endoge-
nous selection. This behavior can be seen in Figure A.9b. Individual SVO scores
are the units of analysis. Since not all subjects completed Part 3 of the experiment
online, we pool the PP and CP institutions for the statistical test and find that
the prosociality of individuals selecting into punishment institutions is significantly
higher than those who select into NP (PP and CP > NP, p=0.021).11
4. Individuals in the coordinated peer punishment and centralized punishment institu-
tions make higher normative requests than members of the same institution under
exogenous assignment in the early periods. Figure A.10 displays the cumulative
density functions for individual normative requests in both institutions under en-
dogenous selection and exogenous assignment for (a) the first period and (b) the
first five periods. In all cases, the normative request under endogenous selection
11See Section A.3.4 for lack of evidence for bias in completing Part 3. For those who completed Part 3,
30 subjects selected NP in the first period of Part 2, 33 selected PP, and 19 selected CP. Given the similar
baseline contributions (Figure A.9a) and contributions in the initial period of Part 2 (Figure A.5a), we
find it reasonable to pool the SVO scores across the two punishment institutions for the statistical test.
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(a) Period 1.
(b) Periods 1-5.
Figure A.10: Cumulative density functions of normative requests in (a) the first period
and (b) the first five periods. In all cases, the normative request under endogenous
selection first-order stochastically dominates the normative request under exogenous as-
signment. Density functions are based on individual normative requests in each period.
first-order stochastically dominates the normative request under exogenous assign-
ment. In the first five periods of the endogenous selection treatment more than 80%
of the subjects in PP had a normative request of 18 or more while only about 30%
of the subjects had similarly high requests under exogenous assignment. Likewise,
almost 90% of subjects in the CP institution requested a contribution level of 17 or
more when they self-selected into this institution while only 60% had similarly high
requests under exogenous assignment. These results show that the vast majority
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of subjects requested very high contribution levels right from the beginning under
endogenous selection, but a substantial number of subjects were satisfied with lower
requests under exogenous assignment.
Taken together, these results suggest that subjects adopting punishment institutions
under endogenous selection quickly established a cooperative culture. These institutions
attracted a high share of prosocial individuals who quickly established high normative
requests; these requests successfully coordinated the whole group to high contribution
levels such that little punishment was necessary to enforce the widely agreed high con-
tribution norm. In contrast, exogenous assignment of subjects to institutions puts sand
into the gears of cooperation. It prevents the self-selection of prosocial individuals and
causes substantial adjustment costs during the initial phases because subjects demand
lower contributions and cooperate less, which then requires higher punishment costs to
establish cooperation.
Why can’t the subjects under exogenous assignment coordinate on high normative
requests in the early periods? One reason could be that subjects in the exogenous as-
signment treatments are aware that the institution members are not very cooperative;
therefore, trust must be built up over time and incrementally from lower initial requests.
While this question is interesting, we cannot address it with our data; thus, it remains
open for future investigation.
One final result emerged from our data that we did not anticipate in advance. Our cen-
tralized punishment institution was motivated by the presence of such institutions across
societies from small-scale tribes to international organizations such as the United Nations
Security Council, and we anticipated that centralization would lower the overall amount
of punishment by removing the problem of coordinating punishment without communica-
tion under peer punishment. Antisocial punishment, in which above-average contributors
are punished, is commonly observed under peer punishment (Herrmann et al., 2008). We
find that centralization has an important effect on antisocial punishment.
Result A.5. Centralization eliminates antisocial punishment.
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Endogenous Selection Exogenous Assignment
Peer Central Peer Central
Punishment Punishment Punishment Punishment
Own negative deviation 0.234 0.080 0.367 0.195
from average contribution (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)***
Own positive deviation 0.212 -0.097 0.146 -0.410
from average contribution (0.000)*** (0.022)** (0.029)** (0.003)***
N 1,008 1,323 1,008 1,323
Left-censored 886 1,194 825 1,167
Uncensored 122 129 183 156
Number of clusters 11 11 11 11
Log-likelihood -582.82 -589.61 -778.60 -821.82
AIC 1171.64 1185.22 1563.20 1649.64
∆AIC 79.38 26.04 96.24 41.22
Bootstrap samples 9,999 9,999 9,999 9,999
Table A.4: Punishment received based on deviation from average group contribution
during the period. Tobit regressions with robust standard errors clustered by matching
group. Coefficients reported are average partial effects. Bootstrapped p-values given in
parentheses based on 9,999 bootstrap samples computed using pairs cluster bootstrap-t
with clustered standard errors. ∆AIC is the difference in Akaike Information Criterion
for the reported regression compared to a model with deviations from normative request
as independent variables; values exceeding 10 are considered very strong evidence in
support of the regressions presented in the table.
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
Evidence for Result 5. Table A.4 contains average partial effects from Tobit regressions
estimating the effects of both negative and positive deviations from the average contribu-
tion. In all cases, larger negative deviations from the average are met with significantly
higher amounts of punishment. Antisocial punishment remains a problem in coordinated
peer punishment, as larger positive deviations are met with significantly higher amounts
of punishment (average partial effect is 0.212 under endogenous selection and 0.146 un-
der exogenous assignment). However, the opposite is found in centralized punishment,
where larger positive deviations are met with significantly lower amounts of punishment
(average partial effect is -0.097 under endogenous selection and -0.410 under exogenous
assignment). We also considered the possibility that deviations from the normative re-
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quest were the basis for punishment, but this model performed substantially worse than
deviations from the average contribution. We report differences in Akaike Information
Criterion, ∆AIC, in Table A.4; these values ranged from 26.04 to 79.38 in our data, and
∆AIC > 10 is generally considered very strong evidence in support of the favored model
(Burnham and Anderson, 2002).
Why should centralization eliminate antisocial punishment? Some recent papers do
not find the same result (Fischer et al., 2013; Grechenig et al., 2013). The critical dif-
ference appears to be that we allow institution members to select the central authority,
while these other recent papers exogenously assign the role randomly and keep it fixed
throughout the experiment. In particular, it is often speculated that antisocial punish-
ment comes from below-average contributors targeting above-average contributors either
to send a message not to punish low contributions or to retaliate against received pun-
ishment (Herrmann et al., 2008). In our experiments, institution members tended to
delegate authority to high average contributors, suggesting that they chose the “right”
people and did not elect antisocial punishers. Figure A.11 illustrates delegation to high
contributors in the first period of Part 2. Authority was always delegated to one of the
two highest baseline contributors (Figure A.11a); the highest contributor was elected
87.5% of the time under endogenous selection but only 50% of the time under exogenous
assignment. Figure A.11b illustrates that these contribution types, however, are very
different between treatments. Under endogenous selection, 50% of the initial authorities
contributed at least 16 points to the group project on average during Part 1 and 87.5%
contributed at least 11 points on average. In contrast, 75% of the initial authorities in the
exogenous assignment treatment contributed half of their endowment (10 points) or less
on average. Thus, while subjects tend to delegate authority to the highest contributors
in a relative sense (Figure A.11a), there is a difference in absolute contributions across
treatments which is due to the self-selection of prosocial individuals in the endogenous
selection treatment.
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(a) Contribution rank (b) Contribution type
Figure A.11: Baseline contribution behavior (Part 1) for subjects elected as central au-
thority in first period of Part 2 (period 6 overall).
A.5 Discussion and concluding remarks
Institutions “are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (North,
1990). People routinely make decisions that determine who they interact with and in
which institutions those interactions occur. As a result of these endogenous selection
effects and varying institutions, real-world interactions may differ substantially from be-
havior in typical lab experiments in which interaction partners are random, institutions
are exogenously imposed, or – most commonly – both.
There has been a recent surge in the economics literature exploring the role of en-
dogenous group formation on cooperation and a corresponding surge exploring the effect
of endogenous institution formation within fixed groups. By only varying one of these
two aspects, the other factor, which commonly occurs outside the lab and which may
be critical to sustain cooperation, is overlooked; while this approach is useful for identi-
fication of a single effect, it also prevents a fuller understanding of cooperation outside
the lab. Moreover, the institutional options are often very limited and may not reflect
institutions that are adopted in natural environments.
Our goal in this paper is to provide subjects with the opportunity to select into in-
stitutional environments in a public goods game and only interact with others who also
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select into the same institution. Selection occurs every period, allowing us to observe
migration patterns and changes in behavior across time. We allow subjects to select into
four institutions. The first two institutions, no punishment and costly peer punishment,
are commonly used in lab experiments. In the third institution, we add a cheap-talk
normative request to peer punishment. In the fourth, we maintain the cheap-talk nor-
mative request but now allow the institution members to elect one member to assign all
punishment that period but socialize the cost so that the burden is shared equally by all
institution members.
Our first major result provides new evidence on which institutions people will adopt
when given the option. Subjects are initially evenly divided among the institutions with
no punishment, peer punishment with a normative request, and central punishment with
a normative request; the peer punishment institution (without a normative request) used
in many studies is almost never adopted. This result questions the inferences we can make
about behavior outside the lab based on most previous experiments, as these experiments
have typically relied on institutions that subjects would not normally adopt.
We also find several other interesting results. We demonstrate that prosocial indi-
viduals are more likely to select into punishment institutions in early periods. We also
find that the cheap-talk normative request in these punishment institutions is used as
a coordination device for contributions but not for determining punishment, which ap-
pears to be driven by deviations from the average contribution. The central punishment
institution is able to eliminate the initial inefficiency that is usually observed with peer
punishment and is also able to eliminate antisocial punishment.
Our work demonstrates the ability to capture several complex phenomena related to
cooperation in an experimental design that allows these phenomena to be disentangled
in the lab. The results shed new light on the early stages of institutional emergence
and cooperation and how they coevolve in a manner that describes many real-world
settings. Our design leaves open the possibility of many extensions that incorporate
realistic extensions of the coevolutionary process, of which we suggest a few obvious
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candidates: costly migration and entry restrictions; permanent formal authorities who
can extract rents; increasing group size and imperfect information; and the process of
internalizing norms as the basis for punishment. These extensions provide fertile ground
for new experiments and allow for a better understanding of the coevolution of cooperative
behavior and institutions in natural environments.
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A.7 Appendix
A.7.1 Cooperative equilibria in Coordinated Central Punish-
ment
Here, we characterize one set of cooperative equilibria in a one-shot version of the public
goods game with centralized punishment and cheap-talk normative request. We use the
inequity aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) for simplicity and tractability. One
could alternatively use other popular inequity aversion models such as Bolton and Ocken-
fels (2000) or Charness and Rabin (2002). With Charness and Rabin (2002) preferences,
one needs to include their demerit profile to capture reciprocity; the simpler version with
only the disinterested social-welfare criterion cannot explain punishment behavior, as
punishment strictly decreases own payoff and social surplus while weakly decreasing the
minimum payoff in the institution (see Appendix 1 in their paper for both versions of the
model).
Utility under inequity aversion due to Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
Let pi = (pi1, . . . , pin) denote the vector of monetary payoffs. Then, player i’s utility is
given by
ui(pi) = pii−αi
(
1
n− 1
)∑
j 6=i
[
max{xj−xi, 0}
]
−βi
(
1
n− 1
)∑
j 6=i
[
max{xi−xj, 0}
]
(A.7)
with the conditions that βi ≤ αi and 0 ≤ βi ≤ 1. In the utility function, αi captures the
decrease in utility due to disadvantageous inequality, while βi captures the decrease in
utility due to advantageous inequality.
Proposition 1. Without loss of generality, order the values of αi such that α1 ≤ α2 ≤
. . . ≤ αn. Suppose there exists q ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} such that preferences satisfy (m/n)+βj ≥
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1 and
c < nrαj (A.8)
for all j ≥ q and that αj = βj = 0 for the remaining players, where j < q. In the public
goods game with centralized punishment, all strategy profiles satisfying the following three
properties constitute subgame perfect equilibria:
1. Voting results in one of the players j ≥ q being elected as central authority with
certainty. (Note that no specific member needs to be elected; moreover, ties are
acceptable as long as j ≥ q for all candidates tied for the largest number of votes.)
2. During the contribution stage, gi = g ∈ [0, e1] for all i.
3. If one of the players contributes gi < g, the central authority assigns (g − gi)/r
punishment points to player i.
4. Off the equilibrium path, any player j < q elected to be the central authority will not
punish because αj = βj = 0. Using backwards induction, this lack of punishment
results in zero contributions at the contribution stage.
Proof. Suppose that one of the players contributes gi < g during the contribution stage.
Let P denote the punishment assigned by the central authority to player i. Monetary
payoffs are
pii = y − gi +
(m
n
)
[(n− 1)g + gi]− rP −
( c
n
)
P (A.9)
for player i and
pij = y − g+
(m
n
)
[(n− 1)g + gi]−
( c
n
)
P (A.10)
for all j 6= i.
Notice, importantly, that player i’s monetary payoff is reduced by both the received
punishment and by her share of the cost of punishment, which is shared equally by all
group members. We propose that the value of P that equalizes final payoffs will constitute
55
an equilibrium.
pii = pij
y − gi +
(m
n
)
[(n− 1)g + gi]− rP −
( c
n
)
P = y − g+
(m
n
)
[(n− 1)g + gi]−
( c
n
)
P
−gi − rP −
( c
n
)
P = −g −
( c
n
)
P
g − gi = rP
P =
g − gi
r
.
While it should be clear that pii is less than the equilibrium payoff, we include the
algebra here for completeness. The monetary payoff from equilibrium is pi = y+(m−1)g.
pi = y + (m− 1)g > y − g+
(m
n
)
[(n− 1)g + gi]
> y − g+
(m
n
)
[(n− 1)g + gi]−
( c
n
)
P
= pij
= pii.
Therefore, player i has no incentive to deviate, conditional on the punishment threat
being credible.
Suppose the central authority reduces P by ε. The central authority’s monetary payoff
increases by (c/n)ε, as does the payoff of all other institution members (including player i).
Unlike peer punishment, there is no inequity between the central authority and the other
full contributors, as the cost of punishment is shared equally by all institution members.
Player i’s monetary payoff increases by rε from the reduction in received punishment and
by (c/n)ε from the reduction in the cost of assigned punishment. Therefore, the central
authority, player j, suffers a non-monetary reduction in utility due to disadvantageous
inequality in the amount of αjrε. Thus, if αjrε > (c/n)ε, the punishment threat is
credible and the central authority prefers not to deviate from the proposed equilibrium.
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Since the ε term is common, the requirement reduces to c < (nrαj), which is the condition
stated in the proposition.
Notice also that the central authority does not have an incentive to punish player
i beyond the point of equal payoffs. Any excess punishment causes a reduction in the
central authority’s utility by decreasing the monetary payoff due to increased costs of
punishment and by increasing advantageous inequality with respect to player i.
Finally, we need to demonstrate that the central authority will not deviate in the
contribution stage. The argument is the same here as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999)’s
proof of their Proposition 5. The central authority can reduce her contribution to the
public good by ε > 0 and increase her material payoff by (1− (m/n))ε. Doing so creates
advantageous inequality of ε relative to each of the other institution members, causing
an overall decrease in utility of βi(1/(n − 1))(n − 1)ε = βiε. The central authority will
only deviate if (1− (m/n))ε > βiε or, equivalently, (m/n) + βi < 1. This last condition
is ruled out by assumption in the proposition. Therefore, the central authority will never
deviate in the contribution stage.
The condition on voting is trivial.
A.7.2 Social Value Orientation
The Social Value Orientation (SVO) measure of Murphy et al. (2011) consists of six
allocation decisions between oneself and one other anonymous individual. The SVO scale
can be used to classify individuals as (1) altruistic, (2) prosocial, (3) individualistic, or
(4) competitive.12 The decision-making criteria for the four social preference types are
given in Table A.5.
12The 6-item SVO scale cannot distinguish between prosocial individuals who are efficiency maximizers
(Type 2.a) and prosocial individuals who are inequity averse (Type 2.b); an additional 9 items are
provided by (Murphy et al., 2011) to distinguish between these two subtypes but are not relevant for
the other classifications. Therefore, we rely on the 6-item measure as it provides a useful measure for all
subjects. Moreover, distinguishing between efficiency-maximization and inequity aversion is not necessary
or useful, as groups converge to the Pareto-dominant cooperative equilibrium of full contributions, which
is consistent with both subtypes.
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Figure A.12: Social Value Orientation (SVO) allocation decisions. Each numbered line
represents the set of options for one decision. Options consist of nine equally spaced
allocations along the line. Source: Adapted from Murphy et al. (2011).
Type Condition Intuition
1 Altruistic max{pij} Maximize other’s payoff
2.a Prosocial (efficiency) max{pii + pij} Maximize total payoff
2.b Prosocial (inequity averse) min{pii − pij} Minimize relative payoff
3 Individualistic max{pii} Maximize own payoff
4 Competitive max{pii − pij} Maximize relative payoff
Table A.5: Decision criteria for Social Value Orientation types.
The six allocation decisions are displayed by the numbered lines in Figure A.12.13
The SVO score is measured in degrees and is given by
SV Oi = arctan
(
pij − 50
pii − 50
)
(A.11)
where pii (pij) is the average amount allocated to oneself (other person) over the six
allocation decisions. Higher SVO scores indicate stronger social preferences.
13For example, line 2 in Figure A.12 represents choosing among 9 equally spaced allocations ranging
from (100,50) to (85,15), where the first entry is payoff to self (pii) and the second entry is payoff to other
(pij). An individualistic person maximizes own payoff and would choose (100,50). A competitive person
maximizes the relative difference between her own payoff and her counterpart’s payoff; such a person
would choose (85,15) because it yields the maximal relative payoff difference of 70.
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A.7.3 Experimental instructions: Part 1
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Instructions	for	Part	I	
 
Thank you for participating  in today’s study on decision‐making.   For participating  in today’s study, 
you will receive a fixed payment of 10 CHF in addition to earnings based on your decisions during the 
study.  There are two parts to today’s study.  This is Part I.  You will receive instructions for Part II of 
the study after completing Part I.  During both parts of the study, you will earn points.  At the end of 
the study, these points will be converted to Swiss Francs at the following rate: 
1 point = 0.05 CHF 
Your earnings from Part II will be added to your earnings from Part I.  At the end of the study, all of 
your earnings and your fixed payment will be paid to you in cash. 
 
If you have any questions during the study, please raise your hand and wait for someone to come 
to you.  Please do not make any noise or try to communicate with other participants during the 
study.  Also, please turn off any electronic devices such as mobile phones and iPods.  If you violate 
these rules, you may be asked to leave the study without receiving any payment. 
 
Each participant in the study will be assigned a participant number when Part I begins and will 
interact with the same set of people throughout Part I.  This number is assigned randomly by a 
computer.  You will see your participant number each period, and participant numbers will not 
change.  For example, if you were Participant 5 in period 1, you will still be Participant 5 in period 2.  
In addition, Participant 4 in period 2 will be the same person in who was Participant 4 in period 1.  
Your group will have up to 12 members in total, including yourself. 
 
This part of the study is divided into 10 periods.  In each period, you receive 20 points.  You will then 
decide how many points you want to contribute to a project and how many points to send to a 
private account.   
 
Each  point  in  the  private  account  adds  1  point  to  your  earnings.    Earnings  from  the  project  are 
calculated in the following manner: the average number of points contributed to the project will be 
multiplied by 1.5 and added  to your earnings.    In addition, every other member of  the group will 
receive the same amount from the project.  Therefore, points contributed to the project add to both 
your earnings and the earnings of the other group members.   Earnings for each group member are 
calculated in the same way.  You will only be asked how many points you would like to contribute to 
the project.  All remaining points are sent to your private account. 
 
 
 
Earnings in each period are calculated in the following manner: 
 
20 – (your contribution to the project) + 1.5*(average contribution to the project) 
 
Your earnings in each period are added together to determine your final earnings from Part I. 
 
Example.  There are 2 group members.  Participant 1 contributes 5 points to the project (and 
15 points to the private account).   Participant 2 contributes 15 points to the project (and 5 
points to the private account).  The average number of points contributed to the project is 10 
points ( [5 + 15]/2 = 20/2 = 10 ).  Each group member receives 15 points (10*1.5 = 15) from 
the project.  In addition, Participant 1 earns 15 points from the private account for a total of 
30 points (15 + 15 = 30).  Participant 2 earns 5 points from the private account for a total of 
20 points (15 + 5 = 20). 
 
The decision screen will look like this: 
 
  
 
After all group members make their decisions, you will see two additional screens.   The first screen 
will display each group member’s participant number and contribution to the project.   
 
The screen will look like this: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The second screen will show your decisions and earnings from this period and your overall earnings 
for Part I.   
 
The screen will look like this: 
 
 
 
Please complete the questions on the next sheet.  If you have any questions or are finished 
answering the questions, please raise your hand.  When everyone has completed the questions 
correctly, we will begin Part I of the study.  
 
The following table may be helpful when completing the questions. 
 
1.5*1 = 1.5  1.5*6 = 9  1.5*11 = 16.5  1.5*16 = 24 
1.5*2 = 3  1.5*7 = 10.5  1.5*12 = 18  1.5*17 = 25.5 
1.5*3 = 4.5  1.5*8 = 12  1.5*13 = 19.5  1.5*18 = 27 
1.5*4= 6  1.5*9 = 13.5  1.5*14 = 21  1.5*19 = 28.5 
1.5*5 = 7.5  1.5*10 = 15  1.5*15 = 22.5  1.5*20 = 30 
 
 
A.7.4 Experimental instructions: Part 2
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Instructions	for	Part	II	
 
As in Part I, you can earn points in Part II. At the end of the study, these points will be converted to 
Swiss Francs at the following rate:  
1 point = 0.05 CHF 
Your earnings from Part II will be added to your previous earnings from Part I and the fixed payment. 
At the end of the study, all of your earnings and your fixed payment will be paid to you in cash. 
 
You will keep your participant number from Part I; if you were Participant 5 in Part I, you will still be 
Participant  5  in  this  part.  You will  also  interact with  the  same  set  of  12  people  from  Part  I;  for 
example,  Participant  4  in  Part  I will be  the  same person  in  Part  II  and will  still  be  referred  to  as 
Participant 4.  
 
This part of the study  is divided  into 20 periods.  In each period, you will have the option to decide 
which group to join. Groups are defined by the rules of interacting with other group members. These 
rules will be described  in more detail below. You can  join a new group each period or  stay  in  the 
same group. The four groups are Group A, Group B, Group C, and Group D. 
 
Each  period  consists  of  group  selection,  which  takes  place  at  the  very  beginning  of  the  period, 
followed by three stages.  
 In Group Selection, you will decide which group to join.  
 Stage 1 will only  take place  in  some  groups.  In  Stage 1,  if  it  takes place,  the participants 
indicate how many points they think each group member should contribute to the project. 
In Stage 2, they will learn how many points the members of their group think each member 
should contribute. We call this the “group opinion.” 
 In Stage 2, which  takes place  in all  four groups, you will  receive 20 points and  then make 
contribution decisions on the basis of the same rules as in Part I of the study.  
 In Stage 3, you will receive another 20 points. In some groups, the members will be able to 
reduce the earnings of other group members by assigning deduction points to them.  
In Group  Selection,  every  participant  is  asked which  group  he  would  like  to  join.  After  the  first 
period, this screen will also contain  the average earnings  in each group  in the previous period and 
the number of people in each group in the previous period. 
In Stage 2, the members in all groups will make contribution decisions according to the same rules as 
in Part  I. You will  receive 20 points  at  the beginning of  Stage 2  and  can  send points  to  a private 
account and a project. Each point in the private account adds 1 point to your earnings. Earnings from 
the project are calculated in the following manner: The average number of points contributed to the 
project in your group will be multiplied by 1.5 and added to your earnings. In addition, each member 
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of  the group will  receive  the  same amount  from  the project. Therefore, points contributed  to  the 
project add to both your earnings and the earnings of the other group members. Earnings for each 
group member are calculated  in the same way. You will only be asked how many points you would 
like to contribute to the project. All remaining points are sent to your private account. 
 
Your earnings in Stage 2 are calculated in the following manner: 
 
20 ‐ (your contribution to the project) + 1.5 * (average contribution to the project) 
 
The different groups that you can  join will be explained briefly below. Afterwards, you will see the 
screens  presented  during one period.  These  screens will differ based on  the  group.  You will  also 
receive  additional  information  about  your  group  members’  previous  contributions  and  their 
contributions to the project during the current period. This information will be clear from the screen 
shots. 
 
The Groups 
 
In total there are four different groups that have partly different and partly identical rules. In Group 
Selection of a given period, the participants decide which group they want to join.  
The groups differ with  regard  to Stage 1. Stage 1 only  takes place  in Groups C and D, but not  in 
Groups A and B.  In Stage 1,  if  it  takes place,  the participants  indicate how many points  they  think 
each member of their group should contribute to the project.  
The rules of all groups are identical with regard to Stage 2 of a given period. Recall that, in Stage 2, 
the group members can make a contribution to a project,  i.e., they make contribution decisions on 
the basis of the same rules as in Part I. 
In addition,  the groups differ with  regard  to Stage 3.  In Groups B and C, all group members can 
reduce other  group members’ earnings by  assigning deduction points.  In Group D,  the  group will 
elect one group member to assign all deduction points for the group. In Group A, no deduction points 
can be assigned.  
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Stage	1	
Formation	of	
group	opinion 
Stage	2	
Contribution	to	
project 
Stage	3	
Assignment	of	
deduction	
points 
Who	can	assign	
deduction	points	in	
Stage	3? 
Group	A  ‐   ‐  Nobody 
Group	B  ‐      All group members 
Group	C        All group members 
Group	D        Only the group member elected by the group 
 
 
Group A (no formation of group opinion; no assignment of deduction points) 
The rules for Group A are the same as the rules  in Part I of the study, except for the 20 points that 
you now receive in Stage 3. 
 Stage  1  does  not  take  place,  i.e.,  the  participants  cannot  indicate  how many  points  each 
member of their group should contribute to the project. 
 
 Before  Stage  2,  the  members  of  Group  A  are  informed  about  each  group  member’s 
contribution to the project in the previous period. 
 
 In Stage 2, members of Group A receive 20 points and make contribution decisions on the 
basis of the same rules as in Part I of the study.  
Exception: If you are the only person to join Group A in a given period, all 20 points will be 
sent directly to your private account. 
 
 In  Stage  3,  each  member  of  Group  A  receives  an  additional  20  points  which  are  added 
directly to his earnings. 
 
Group  B  (no  formation  of  group  opinion;  every member  assigns  deduction 
points) 
 Stage  1 does not  take place,  i.e.,  the participants  cannot  indicate how many points each 
member of their group should contribute to the project. 
 
 Before  Stage 2,  as  in Group A,  the members of Group B  are  informed  about  each  group 
member’s contribution to the project in the previous period. 
 
 In Stage 2, members of Group B receive 20 points and make contribution decisions on the 
basis of the same rules as in Part I of the study.  
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Exception: If you are the only person to join Group B in a given period, all 20 points will be 
sent directly to your private account. 
 
 In Stage 3, each member of Group B receives an additional 20 points which can be used to 
reduce the earnings of other group members. Members of Group B can reduce the earnings 
of others in the group by assigning deduction points. This decision is made after each group 
member has been  informed about the other group members’ contributions to the project. 
Assigning 1 deduction point  to a group member will  reduce  that member’s earnings by 3 
points. Each deduction point you assign will reduce your earnings by 1 point. You can assign 
as many deduction points as you like to each group member, and you may assign deduction 
points to as many group members as you like. The only condition is that you cannot assign 
more  than  20  deduction  points  in  total.  Any  points  remaining  after  you  have  assigned 
deduction points are added to your earnings.  
Exception. Your earnings cannot be negative  in any period.  If your earnings are negative after 
assigning and receiving deduction points, you will receive 0 points at the end of the period. 
 
Group  C  (formation  of  group  opinion;  every  member  assigns  deduction 
points) 
Group C  is  the  same as Group B, but with one addition.  In Stage 1, each member of Group C will 
decide how many points he thinks each group member should contribute to the project. Thus, after 
at least one participant has joined Group C, periods are structured as follows: 
 In Stage 1, group members will answer  the  following question: “How many points do you 
think  each  group  member  should  contribute  to  the  project?”  In  Stage  2,  the  average 
number of points entered by the group members will be displayed on the screen when group 
members are asked to make a contribution decision.  
 
 Before  Stage 2, as  in Groups A and B,  the members of Group C are  informed about each 
group member’s contribution to the project in the previous period. 
 
 Stage  2  is  the  same  in  all  groups;  members  of  Group  C  receive  20  points  and  make 
contribution decisions on the basis of the same rules as in Part I of the study.  
Exception: If you are the only person to join Group C in a given period, all 20 points will be 
sent directly to your private account. 
 
 Stage 3  is  the same as  in Group B. Each group member  receives 20 points and can assign 
deduction points to the other group members after he has been  informed about the other 
group members’ contributions to the project. 
Exception. Your earnings cannot be negative  in any period.  If your earnings are negative after 
assigning and receiving deduction points, you will receive 0 points at the end of the period. 
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Group  D  (formation  of  group  opinion;  elected  member  assigns  deduction 
points) 
Group D has  the  same  rules as Group C, but  instead of all group members being  in a position  to 
assign  deduction  points  to  each  other,  the  group  can  elect  one member who will  assign  all  the 
deduction points in Stage 3. Thus, periods are structured as follows:  
 In Stage 1, group members will answer  the  following question: “How many points do you 
think  each  group  member  should  contribute  to  the  project?”  In  Stage  2,  the  average 
number of points entered by the group members will be displayed on the screen when group 
members are asked to make a contribution decision. 
 
 In addition, before Stage 2, the members of Group D can elect one member of the group 
who will then assign all the deduction points  in Stage 3. Before the participants elect this 
member, they are  informed about each group member’s contribution to the project  in the 
previous  period.  In  addition,  they  are  also  informed  about  who  was  selected  to  assign 
deduction points  in the previous period. This participant may or may not be  in Group D  in 
the  current  period,  depending  on  whether  he  left  the  group.  The  group  member  who 
receives the most votes will assign the deduction points. In case of a tie, one person will be 
randomly selected from those who received the most votes (with each one equally likely to 
be selected). 
 
 Stage  2  is  the  same  as  in  all  groups; members  of Group D  receive  20  points  and make 
contribution decisions on the basis of the same rules as in Part I of the study.  
Exception: If you are the only person to join Group D in a given period, all 20 points will be 
sent directly to your private account. 
 
 In Stage  3  the elected member will assign deduction points  to  the other members of  the 
group  after  he  has  observed  the  contributions  of  all  group  members.  Each  received 
deduction point reduces your earnings by 3 points. However, in contrast to Groups B and C, 
the cost of the deduction points assigned will be shared equally by the group members. For 
example, if there are 10 group members and 1 deduction point is assigned, then each group 
member’s earnings will be reduced by 0.1 points (1/10 = 0.1). The total number of deduction 
points  that  the  elected  group  member  can  assign  is  given  by  20*(number  of  group 
members). For example, if there are 3 group members, then the elected group member can 
assign up to 60 (20*3 = 60) deduction points in total. 
Exception. Your earnings cannot be negative  in any period.  If your earnings are negative after 
assigning and receiving deduction points, you will receive 0 points at the end of the period. 
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Earnings 
 
Final earnings in each period are calculated as follows: 
 
(Earnings from Stage 2) + 20 ‐ (3* received deduction points) ‐ (cost of assigned deduction points) 
 
 
If this amount is negative, then final earnings for the period are 0 points.  
 
In Groups B and C,  
 
cost of assigned deduction points = 1*(number of deduction points you assigned) 
 
In Group D,  
 
cost of assigned deduction points  =  (
total number of deduction points assigned by elected 
group member  )
number of group members 
 
Your final earnings from Part II are the sum of your earnings from each period. These earnings will be 
added to your earnings from Part I and your fixed payment. 
 
On the following pages, you will see the screens shown during one period. These screens will differ 
based on  the  group. Afterwards,  you will be  asked  to  complete  a  few questions.  If  you have  any 
questions  or  are  finished  answering  the  questions,  please  raise  your  hand.  When  everyone  has 
completed the questions correctly, we will begin Part II of the study.  
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Group	Selection	
At the beginning of each period, all participants will see the Group Selection screen on which each participant  is asked which group he would  like to  join. After the first 
period, this screen will also contain the average earnings in each group in the previous period and the number of people in each group in the previous period.  
 
All participants decide which group to join at 
the beginning of each period. 
Average earnings in each group in the previous period and the number of people in 
each group in the previous period will be displayed after the first period. 
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Stage	1:	Group	Opinion		
In Stage 1, members of Group C and Group D will be asked to answer the following question: “How many points do you think each group member should contribute to 
the project?” In Stage 2, the average number of points entered by the group members will be displayed on the screen when group members are asked to make a 
contribution decision. 
 
This screen will not be shown to members of Groups 
A or B.  Only Groups C and D will form a group 
opinion. 
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Before	Stage	2:	Previous	contributions	and	election		
Before Stage 2, all participants are informed of every group member’s contribution to the project in the previous period. In addition, the members of Group D can elect one 
member of the group who will then assign all the deduction points in Stage 3.  
 
All participants see each group member’s 
contribution in previous period. 
Only Group D elects a member to 
assign deduction points in Stage 3. 
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Stage	2:	Contribution	
Stage 2  is the same  in all groups; participants receive 20 points and make contribution decisions on the basis of the same rules as  in Part  I of the study.  In Group C and 
Group D, group members will also be informed of the group opinion. 
 
Only Group C and Group D are 
informed of group opinion. 
All participants make a contribution decision. 
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Stage	3:	Deduction	points	
In Stage 3, all participants receive 20 points and are informed of every group member’s contribution to the project in the current period. In addition, members of Groups B 
and C and the elected member of Group D can assign deduction points to all group members.  
 
This text will differ between groups.  You will 
always see your participant number. 
Participants in every group are 
informed of each group 
member’s contribution to the 
project in the current period.   
Members of Groups B and C and the elected 
member of Group D can assign deduction 
points to all group members. 
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Please complete the questions on the next sheet. If you have any questions or are finished answering 
the questions, please raise your hand. When everyone has completed the questions correctly, we will 
begin Part II of the study.  
 
The following table may be helpful when completing the questions. 
 
1.5*1 = 1.5  1.5*6 = 9  1.5*11 = 16.5  1.5*16 = 24 
1.5*2 = 3  1.5*7 = 10.5  1.5*12 = 18  1.5*17 = 25.5 
1.5*3 = 4.5  1.5*8 = 12  1.5*13 = 19.5  1.5*18 = 27 
1.5*4= 6  1.5*9 = 13.5  1.5*14 = 21  1.5*19 = 28.5 
1.5*5 = 7.5  1.5*10 = 15  1.5*15 = 22.5  1.5*20 = 30 
 
A.7.5 Experimental instructions: Part 3
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Your task 
 
In this task you have been randomly paired with another person, whom we will refer to as the other. 
This other person is someone you do not know and will remain mutually anonymous. All of your 
choices are completely confidential. You will be making a series of decisions about allocating points 
between yourself and another person. We will refer to this person as the other. For each of the 
following questions, please indicate the distribution you prefer most by clicking on the button below 
your preferred distribution. You can only make one choice for each question. Your decisions will yield 
money for both yourself and the other person. There are no right or wrong answers, this is all about 
personal preferences. As you can see, your choices will influence both the amount of money you 
receive as well as the amount of money the other receives. Your choices will not be revealed to any 
of the other participants. You will also not be informed of which choice determines your payment. 
 
Your payment 
 
You will be randomly paired with another participant in the study. One of your choices will be 
selected at random and paid out in cash, so that both you and the other person will receive a 
payment based on your decision. In addition, you will also be the recipient of the choice made by 
another randomly selected participant. This person will be different from the person who receives 
payment based on your decision. Each point is worth 0.10 CHF (eg. 10 points = 1 CHF). We will 
combine both of your payments into one lump sum and mail that amount to the address you provide 
at the end of the study. 
Appendix B
What you see is what you get? The
effect of facial cues on trust-related
behavior
This chapter is being prepared for submission to a leading economics journal and follows
standard formatting for such journals. Work in this chapter was conducted with Bastiaan
Oud, Jan Engelmann, Eva Krumhuber, and Ernst Fehr. This chapter was written by Tony
Williams.
79
B.1 Abstract
Economic and social life are dominated by encounters with strangers whom we may never
come into contact with again, and we need to determine which of these strangers to in-
teract with and which ones to avoid. Given these encounters, people need to somehow
discriminate among unknown individuals and select partners based on “first impressions.”
While it seems almost preposterous that we would choose to interact with people we be-
lieve are untrustworthy, relatively little is know about how we determine which individuals
are trustworthy and therefore deserving of our trust. This paper experimentally examines
the basis of these beliefs using static facial features by allowing participants in a trust
game to see photographs of their counterparts, relying on both subjective ratings and
an exogenous manipulation. By weakly relaxing anonymity in a lab experiment, this pa-
per is able to identify a distinction between dispositional reciprocity and type-dependent
reciprocity. Moreover, a large number of people react strongly to the perceived informa-
tion in photographs and condition their behavior on these perceptions yet, paradoxically,
these perceptions are wholly uninformative.
B.2 Introduction
The need to judge trustworthiness of strangers will little or no information is pervasive
in social and economic interactions. Within firms, monitoring is costly and workers often
have opportunities to shirk, requiring firms to trust employees, so firms may prefer to
hire trustworthy workers. Firms may possess private information about profits, and the
perceived trustworthiness of managers is likely a key determinant in the firm’s ability
to convince workers of the need to renegotiate contracts. Consumers may be willing to
pay higher prices to a well-known online retailer to offset potential feelings of betrayal
aversion if a package does not arrive (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004). More generally,
we make many decisions each day about who we interact with, and these decisions often
need to be based on “first impressions” in the absence of additional information. These
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interactions are not always repeated, which can prevent concerns for building a good
reputation from offsetting selfish tendencies. In situations where interaction is repeated,
allowing for the formation of reputation, the initial perceptions still serve as prior beliefs
which are updated based on later interactions, and more positive information is needed
to establish a good reputation when the prior suggests that the partner is not trusting
or trustworthy. Despite its importance, little is known about the basis for perceptions
about others’ tendencies to engage in trusting and trustworthy behavior and whether
these perceptions are either accurate or relevant in incentivized settings.
This paper experimentally examines the effect of observable facial features on trust
and trustworthiness. We restrict our attention to static photographs of subjects’ faces in
a modified version of the trust game (Berg et al., 1995). While a greater understanding of
static and dynamic features and their roles in determining perceptions of trustworthiness
is desirable, we feel that this restriction is important experimentally and for many real-
world settings outside the lab. From a practical perspective, we are able to maintain the
greatest experimental control by using static photographs in which non-facial features
are cropped out, thereby reducing or eliminating potential confounds. Perhaps more
importantly, the widespread and increasing use of static photographs in online profiles
related to employment, dating, and social networks (e.g. LinkedIn, Match.com, and
Facebook) justifies our restriction and highlights its importance in naturalistic settings
where social and economic decisions are made. Prior to online media, print advertisements
for professional services, such as real-estate agents and lawyers, commonly did (and still
do) use static photographs of the service provider.
In a broader context, our work is motivated by the evolution of altruism and cooper-
ation, which has mostly been the domain of biology and psychology. Specific phenotypic
features that signal willingness to cooperate are referred to as “green beards” in the evo-
lutionary literature, though their existence and feasibility as an explanation for altruism
and cooperation are often considered unrealistic by biologists; however, a small num-
ber of “green beards” have been found in other species (see thorough review in Henrich
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(2004)). In spite of this view, a vast literature exists in psychology examining the ability
of humans to predict the behavior of others based on static and dynamic features, such
as bizogymatic width-to-height ratio in males (Stirrat and Perrett, 2010), difficult-to-fake
features while smiling (Krumhuber et al., 2007), and “thin-slice” videos without sound
(Vogt et al., 2013). However, even in cases where subjects can predict behavior better
than chance, there is still little reason to believe that such skills are accurate enough
to be plausible explanations for the evolution of altruism (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2005).
We discuss our results with respect to “green beards” and as explanation for cooperative
behavior in Section B.8; lack of repeated interaction rules out direct reciprocity as a mo-
tivation for behavior in our study (Trivers, 1971). Such identifiable features have been
explored in economics, notably Frank (1987) (see also follow-up on evolutionary stability
in Harrington (1989) and Frank (1989)).
In interpreting our results, we often refer to reciprocity, and it is important to clarify
what we mean here. We rely on a definition common in economics, but not biology, that
reciprocity is “being nice to those who are nice to us” and similarly for those who are
not-so-nice. From the evolutionary and biological perspective, Trivers (1971) explains
clearly that “[m]odels that attempt to explain altruistic behavior in terms of natural
selection are models designed to take the altruism out of altruism.” For instance, his
own model of reciprocal altruism can be characterized precisely in terms of cartel models
in industrial organization relying on standard folk theorems for repeated games (Tirole,
1988). Indirect reciprocity does not rely on repeated interactions with the same individ-
ual, but it does require more than one round of interaction and some knowledge about a
counterpart’s reputation; a model of indirect reciprocity that allows for uncertainty about
the reputation of others can be relevant for trying to understand our findings, such as
Panchanathan and Boyd (2003). For general overviews of evolutionary approaches to reci-
procity, see Nowak and Sigmund (1998) and Nowak (2006) for a biological persepective
and Sethi and Somanathan (2003) for an economic perspective.
Closest to our paper in the economics literature is Eckel and Petrie (2011), who also
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use photographs of one’s counterparts in a trust game. Our study differs from their
paper in a few important ways. The primary difference between designs is that Eckel and
Petrie (2011) showed photographs of counterparts who were currently in the lab. While
there is some chance that subjects interacted while waiting prior to their experiment,
this concern is relatively minor. A more pressing concern in face perception research is
that non-facial features may be present in photographs (eg. clothing, jewelry, hair style
and color), and these non-facial features may be the features utilized by subjects. While
this concern does not affect interpretation of their results, the concern is relevant in our
motivation. We avoid this concern by having our subjects interact with photographs
of previous participants in an identical trust game (with the exception of photographs)
but, prior to the experiment, we place an oval cut-out over the images to exclude non-
facial information. We are also able to collect data on perceptions of trustworthiness
and correlate these perceptions with behavior. Additionally, we have a treatment with
an exogenous manipulation of trustworthiness. Overall, we show that these perceptions
can be reliably predicted but are also inaccurate and uninformative (though, it should be
noted, Eckel and Petrie (2011) also find no evidence that first-movers in a trust game can
accurately infer second-mover behavior). Finally, we avoid the possibility of self-selected
face-to-face interaction, which they identify as important to increase first-mover earnings,
because only one party is present in the lab at any given time, and there is no need to
pay money to view photographs in our study (similar to their control treatment in which
there was no option and subjects always viewed a photograph).
While our primary motivation was to examine determinants of cooperation in the
context of trust and trustworthiness, one of our key findings warrants an early discus-
sion. Individuals form perceptions of trustworthiness from static photographs and use
them in incentivized settings, yet these perceptions are, on average, incorrect and lead to
earnings no better than random choice in our task. Goldin and Rouse (2000) examine the
effect of blind auditions on hiring by orchestras and finds that women are more likely to
be hired under blind auditions than non-blind. The uninformative nature of perceptions
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from static photographs also calls into question the common practice in many European
countries of including a personal photograph on resume´s, which causes similar concerns
to the role of discrimination towards stereotypically “black” names on resume´s (Bertrand
and Mullainathan, 2004). Both of these other papers highlight the (mis)use of uninforma-
tive signals as being informative, leading to discrimination in labor markets. Our paper
cannot address this broader theme, but it is relevant for research on discrimination in
general and implicit discrimination more specifically (Bertrand et al., 2005; Chugh, 2004;
Greenwald et al., 1998).
Our findings also suggest an important dimension of discrimination in dynamic set-
tings, resulting in a self-fulfilling prophecy that strengthens stereotypes. In the example
we present here, the initial perception is based on race, but it may be any other observ-
able feature (and may, for instance, be a perception regarding a patron’s dispositional
generosity). For instance, a widespread stereotype in the United States is that African-
Americans are poor tippers in restaurants. In anticipation of a small tip, servers may
divert effort to other patrons from whom they expect higher tips, thereby providing poor
service to African-Americans. If tips reflect the quality of service received, one would
then expect lower tips from African-Americans due not to their race but to poor service
received in anticipation of a low tip (Conlin et al., 2003). Evidence suggests that such
discrimination does occur and likely leads to self-reinforcing stereotypes (Brewster and
Rusche, 2012; Dirks and Rice, 2004; Noll and Arnold, 2004).
Finally, our paper helps fill a gap in the literature between general altruism, such as
pure or warm-glow altruism (Andreoni, 1989, 1990, 1995), and targeted altruism with the
hope of future gains from interaction (Leider et al., 2009). The latter form of altruism is
direct reciprocity in the evolutionary sense; see footnote 1 and Trivers (1971).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The modified trust game used in
this study is described in Section B.3. Our experimental treatments are described in
Section B.4. Empirical specification and relation to existing models is in B.5, followed by
results and robustness in Sections B.6 and B.7, respectively. Discussion of the results is
84
in Section B.8, and we end with concluding remarks.
B.3 Modified Trust Game
We use a modified version of the trust game developed by Berg et al. (1995). The game
consists of two players, Player A and Player B. Both players receive the same initial
endowment, e, denoted in Swiss Francs (CHF). Player A has a binary decision and can
send x ∈ {0,m} to Player B. The amount sent by Player A is then tripled by the
experimenter, and this tripled amount is given to Player B. Player B can then send any
amount y ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 3x} back to Player A. Final monetary payoffs are given by
piA = e− x+ y (B.1)
piB = e+ 3x− y (B.2)
We elicit Player B decisions using the strategy method. As a result, Player B only has to
give a conditional back transfer for the case when x = m. When x = 0, Player B cannot
send any back transfer. This information was provided clearly both in the instructions
and on the decision screen for Player B. We emphasize this detail here and elsewhere
in the paper because it is important when interpreting our results; importantly, it rules
out confusion about the conditional nature of the decision as an explanation for Player
B decisions (i.e. it is implausible that Players B thought that they were making an
unconditional back transfer). The decision screen for Player B contained a table in the
following form (translated from the original German text; see Appendix B.11 for actual
screen shots):
If Player A has sent
You will receive:
How much would you like
the following amount over: to send back to Player A?
0 0 0
10 30 (empty space for entry)
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In our experiment, we set e = 12 and m = 10. Both players received the same
endowment to minimize concerns about inequity-aversion as a motivation for Player A to
send positive amounts of money to Player B due to inequality of endowments. Moreover,
we set m = 10 instead of m = 12 to prevent an all-or-nothing decision by Player A
that could lead either or both players to extreme decisions (eg. Players A unwilling to
risk everything by trusting or Players B feeling a stronger need to send back a non-zero
amount). In the remainder of the paper, we refer to subjects in the role of Player A as
first-movers and subjects in the role of Player B as second-movers and their decisions as
transfers and back transfers, respectively.
B.4 Experimental Treatments
In all experimental sessions, subjects were recruited online using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004)
and sessions were conducted in a computer lab at the University of Zurich. All exper-
iments are programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Participants were primarily
students from the University of Zurich and Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH
Zu¨rich). Individuals studying economics or psychology were excluded from recruitment.
Over all treatments, two subjects are excluded from analysis. One subject had two
accounts in ORSEE and participated in both an initial session and a treatment UN-
MODIFIED session (after which he informed the experimenters that he viewed his own
photograph). One subject in treatment MODIFIED was asked to leave for using a lap-
top and delaying the experimental session. Details on number of subjects and average
earnings for all treatments are presented in Table B.1. In all sessions, subjects received a
show-up fee of 10 CHF for participating in the study, in addition to any earnings obtained
during the experiment.
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Treatment N Trustors Trustees Average earnings (CHF)
Initial session 84 42 42 28.67
UNMODIFIED 116 55 60 29.13
MODIFIED 157 75 81 29.67
Panel (oval cutouts) 174 — — 33.41
Panel (no oval cutouts) 92 — — 33.34
Guess modifications 29 — — 43.59
Table B.1: Summary statistics
B.4.1 Initial Sessions
In research focusing on facial features, the standard practice is to crop the face using
an oval cut-out to remove non-facial features, such as hairstyle and earrings, since these
features may influence perceptions about the person in the photograph in ways unrelated
to the research question. We chose to follow this standard practice, which required us
to collect photographs in advance of the main treatments. Additionally, we employ face
morphing technology in one of our treatments, which also required collecting photographs
in advance. This approach allows us to exclude non-facial features as an explanation for
our results; nonetheless, these other features may be relevant in forming perceptions and
making decisions, and exploration of these other features remains an open and interesting
question for future research.
Subjects were invited to the lab and played five rounds of the modified trust game de-
scribed above (N = 84, average earnings = 28.67 CHF). Subjects were randomly matched
with a new partner every period. In these sessions, subjects did not see photographs of
their counterparts. Prior to the start of the experiment, subjects were informed that
there would be a second optional study that they could participate in and that they
would receive details on this second study later.
After completing the trust game, an experimenter publicly announced the optional
study while consent forms were distributed to all subjects. Subjects were told that they
would receive 10 CHF if they allowed us to take a photograph of their face and use it in
subsequent studies. They were also told that they may potentially earn additional money
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from the use of their photograph and strategies in future studies and that any earnings
would be mailed to them.
All subjects then began completing a series of long questionnaires. We then proceeded
in a specific manner to minimize selection bias. During the questionnaires, each subject
was individually taken to a side room where a camera was set up for taking photographs.
At this time, subjects gave us their consent form indicating whether they wanted to
participate or not. After submitting the consent form (and, if applicable, having their
photograph taken), subjects returned to the main lab and continued completing the ques-
tionnaires. As a result, each subject informed the experimenters in private whether or
not they chose to participate, and these decisions could not influence other participants.
Each subject was outside the main lab for approximately two minutes, making it difficult
for subjects to infer the participation decisions of others. We also used the long question-
naires so that all subjects would be kept busy with the main experiment until after each
subject was given the opportunity to participate in the second study, as otherwise some
subjects may have finished early and chosen to leave the lab before having the option to
participate in the second study. After completion of the questionnaires, one round was
randomly selected for payment; the experimental currency was denoted in Swiss Francs,
so there was no need for an exchange rate.
Sixty-three subjects (75%) allowed us to take their photograph and use their pho-
tograph and behavior in the lab in future studies. We find no significant differences in
behavior between those who allowed us to take their photographs and those who did not
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distributions: first-movers, exact p = 0.208;
second movers, exact p = 0.735). We excluded one photograph in our main treatments
in order to balance the number of first-movers and second-movers and to balance gender
(31 photographs for each role; 17 male first-movers, 15 male second-movers).
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B.4.2 Main Treatments
In our main experiments, new subjects were provided instructions for the modified trust
game and informed that (i) they would see a photograph of their counterpart and (ii)
these counterparts previously came to the lab and played the same game without seeing
photographs of the other players. Subjects were also informed that their decisions would
affect both their own payoffs and the payoffs of their counterparts, as the counterparts
would receive their payment by mail. At the start of the experiment, each subject was
assigned to the role of either Player A or Player B and remained in this role for the
duration of the experiment. Each counterpart that provided a photograph in our initial
sessions is seen once by each subject in the opposite role in our main experiments, for a
total of thirty-one periods.
In treatment UNMODIFIED (N = 116, average earnings = 29.14 CHF), subjects
saw the original photograph (after cropping) of their counterpart in each round. The
middle photograph in Figure B.1 is an example. In treatment MODIFIED (N = 157,
average earnings = 29.67 CHF), each photograph was morphed with computer-generated
prototype faces that have previously been shown to be perceived as “more trustworthy” or
“less trustworthy” in non-incentivized settings (Oosterhof and Todorov, 2008). Examples
of the prototype faces can be seen in the far left and far right in Figure B.1. The middle left
and middle right photographs in Figure B.1 show the versions of the original photograph
used in our MODIFIED treatment. Each subject in our MODIFIED treatment saw each
counterpart once, and half (either 15 or 16) of the images were morphed to be more
trustworthy and the remaining images morphed to be less trustworthy. Morphing was
done using JPsychoMorph software (Tiddeman et al., 2005).
Photographs were presented in random order in our UNMODIFIED treatment. In
our MODIFIED treatment, the modified images were counterbalanced across subjects,
and we imposed a requirement that one type of modification could not be seen more than
six times in a row. We did this to reduce the chance of subjects noticing commonalities
among the morphed images. A concern still remains that subjects may be able to detect
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Figure B.1: Example of photographs and computer-generated faces. Middle represent
and unmodified image. Far left and far right are examples of computer-generated faces
that are claimed to be less- and more-trustworthy, respectively (Oosterhof and Todorov,
2008). Each computer-generated face was morphed with the unmodified photograph to
create one downmodified image (middle left) and upmodified image (middle right).
that images have been modified. 1
After completing thirty-one rounds of the modified trust game, subjects then saw the
images in the same order and were asked to rate them based on a series of characteristics,
including trustworthiness. Photographs were presented in the same order to maximize
the amount of time between subjects’ decisions in the trust game and their ratings and
to reduce the chances of a consistency bias between behavior in the experiment and sub-
jective ratings. Additional details on these ratings will be provided below in our results
in Section B.6. These ratings provide us with a subjective measure of perceived trust-
worthiness in both our UNMODIFIED and MODIFIED treatments, while our exogenous
1An independent sample of subjects (N = 29, average earnings = 43.59 CHF) was recruited to
examine whether or not the morphed images were detectable. In the first part of the experiment, these
subjects saw two photographs from each of the 62 subjects in our initial session who provided consent (114
photographs); one photograph was image used in our UNMODIFIED treatment, and the other was one of
the two images used in our MODIFIED treatment. These subjects also saw an additional 16 photographs
morphed in a similar manner but which did not contain oval cutouts in a second part. In the experiment
instructions, subjects were informed that 10 of the 140 total rounds from both parts would be randomly
selected; each accurate guess would add 4 CHF to the subject’s earnings, and each incorrect guess would
add 0 CHF to the earnings. They were able to guess whether an image had been morphed only slightly
above chance (56.8% over the first 114 periods) and did not show any learning effects at the individual
or aggregate level; the marginal effect of Period in a probit regression, Correct = β0 + β1Period + ε,
again only using the first 114 periods, is 0.0002 (p = 0.25, robust standard errors clustered by subject).
As a result, we are reasonably confident that our morphed photographs in treatment MODIFIED do not
appear unnatural and are not easily distinguished from the unmorphed images used in the same sessions.
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manipulation in the MODIFIED treatment gives us an objective measure (validated by
an external sample, as described later in Section B.7).
Following the ratings, subjects completed a short questionnaire; afterwards, one round
was randomly selected for payment; the experimental currency was denoted in Swiss
Francs, so there was no need for an exchange rate.
B.5 Empirical Specification
Before proceeding to our results, we need to specify a functional form to gain tractability
and formulate predictions. With first-movers, there is a strategic motive to assess trust-
worthiness of one’s counterpart; however, we cannot disentangle preferences over final
outcomes from beliefs about expected back transfers from second-movers. Additionally,
first-movers make a binary decision, leaving a probit (or logit) as the only feasible esti-
mation option, and we can include subjective trustworthiness ratings. For first-movers,
we are interested only in whether they discriminate in their trusting decisions based on
their perceptions about their counterparts’ trustworthiness.
We instead focus more on model specification for second-movers, as second-movers
do not face any strategic motive to send money to first-movers and act essentially as
dictators in a dictator game; nonetheless, substantial evidence exists demonstrating that
second-movers will often send a back transfer. Our final estimation will use the same
linear specification as for first-movers, but it has an intuitive model-based interpretation
for second-movers.
Importantly, we can decompose second-mover behavior into dispositional reciprocity
and type-based reciprocity. Dispositional reciprocity corresponds to traditional models of
inequity aversion and is a preference over final states of wealth independent of the charac-
teristics of one’s counterparts (aside from wealth). Type-based reciprocity corresponds to
differential back transfers based on perceptions of a counterpart’s average behavior and
is captured intuitively in Levine (1998). Because second-movers only send conditional
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back transfers (since we use the strategy method), any discrimination in back transfer
behavior cannot be based on expectations about receiving money from the first-mover.
For a variety of reasons discussed below, we opt for a simple Cobb-Douglass specifi-
cation for second-movers,
U(piS, piO) = (piS)
1−α−βT (piO)α+βT (B.3)
where piS and piO denote payoffs to self and other, respectively, and T indicates the
perceived trustworthiness of the other player. We require α, β ∈ [0, 1] and, for technical
reasons, also require T ≤ (1 − α)/β. If we let piS + piO = w and use the substitution
piS = w − piO in equation (B.3), maximizing the utility function yields the standard
Cobb-Douglass condition:
piO = (α + βT )w, (B.4)
so that the share of total wealth being given to the first-mover is determined by the
second-mover’s dispositional reciprocity (α) and type-based reciprocity (β). Note that,
since the second-mover only makes a conditional back transfer when the first-mover trusts,
the actual decision of the first-mover does not factor into the second-mover’s back transfer
decision; in addition, we can also see that w = 2(e+m).
The first major reason for specifying Cobb-Douglass preferences is its consistency with
Andreoni and Miller (2002)’s findings on altruistic preferences. They specify a constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) model, of which Cobb-Douglass is a special case. In their
study, they use a modified dictator game and vary both endowments and relative prices
of giving money to the other person, allowing them to estimate elasticity of substitution.
We keep the relative price of giving fixed, preventing estimation of the elasticity of sub-
stitution. Cobb-Douglass allows for two of the three main preference classes identified
by Andreoni and Miller (2002), selfish and Leontief (perfect equality), while our design
does not provide specific predictions for their third class, perfect substitutes. Any Player
A who has perfect substitute preferences or maximizes social efficiency will always send
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x = m, as this increases the total payoff to both players from 2e to 2(e+m).
The second reason for using Cobb-Douglass utility relates to the array of social pref-
erences models in the literature (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002;
Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). The most common models are linear and make extreme predic-
tions in two-person games, predicting either perfect selfishness or perfect equality. Our
Cobb-Douglass specification allows for both of these predictions as well as intermediate
levels of inequality. Selfish behavior is consistent with α = β = 0, while perfect equality
is captured by α = 0.5 and β = 0.
Third, we want to allow for players to discriminate in their decisions based on sub-
jective perceptions of their counterparts. Such discrimination is captured by the logic of
Levine (1998). In his model, subjects respond not to the actual behavior of others but
to a perception about how the other person generally behaves. The model would predict
perfect selfishness in our experiment, but his notion of type-based altruism is captured
in our specification by β > 0.
B.6 Results
B.6.1 Behavior in main treatments
We begin by analyzing first-mover behavior, and our first major result is not surprising
given the strategic motive for first-movers to make inferences about the trustworthiness
of second-movers.
Result B.1. First-movers discriminate based on perceived trustworthiness in both UN-
MODIFIED and MODIFIED treatments. Effect sizes for perceived trustworthiness are
not significantly different between treatments and are nearly identical.
The result can be seen in the coefficients for subjective ratings (Trustworthiness) in
the top row of Table B.2 across the MODIFIED, UNMODIFIED, and pooled data. In all
cases, an one-unit increase in the perceived trustworthiness leads to about a 10% increase
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Unmodified Modified Pooled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Trustworthiness 0.097 0.101 0.099 0.099
(0.026)*** (0.018)*** (0.019)*** (0.015)***
Upmodified 0.108 0.021
(0.021)*** -0.023
N 1705 2325 2325 2325 4030
Table B.2: First-mover transfer decisions. Probit regressions (marginal effects reported).
Robust standard errors clustered by subject. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
in the probability of transferring and is highly significant (p < 0.01).
Our manipulation in treatment MODIFIED also provides an exogenous source of vari-
ation and allows us to test the credibility of claims regarding trustworthiness perceptions
from facial features.
Result B.2. Perceived trustworthiness varied significantly from unmodified photographs
in both predicted directions in treatment MODIFIED. Moreover, subjects were 11% more
likely to trust the upward-modified photographs over the downward modified photographs.
The increase of 11% in trusting behavior can be seen in column (3). Interestingly, the
effect shifts completely to subjective trustworthiness ratings, which can be seen in column
(4); the effect of perceived trustworthiness is still about 10% and highly significant, but
the effect of the modification is now only about 2% and is no longer significant. Thus, the
modification appears to be working directly through changes in subjective perceptions of
trustworthiness.
In light of our first two results, it is apparent that subjects are indeed making infer-
ences about the trustworthiness of their counterparts and discriminating based on these
inferences. If these inferences are valid, subjects should have high earnings in our study.
Our next result contradicts this hypothesis.
Result B.3. Average earnings for first-movers in both treatments are not significantly
different from choosing a strategy at random and are significantly lower than if subjects
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Strategy Mean Std. Error [95% CI]
Best response 13.95 0.08 13.80 14.10
Never trust 12.00 — — —
Actual earnings 10.42 0.13 10.16 10.68
Random choice 10.42 0.09 10.25 10.59
Always trust 8.83 0.17 8.49 9.18
Number of observations: 1705
Table B.3: Expected earnings from different strategies and actual choices for UNMODI-
FIED treatment. Our MODIFIED treatment is omitted from analysis to avoid potential
bias introduced by morphing photographs. Best response assumes subject could maxi-
mize payoff on each trial. Subjects could expect to earn, based on their actual choices,
no more than if they decided randomly.
ignored photographs and never trusted second-movers.
Table B.3 presents average earnings for first-movers and places them in the context of
other potential strategies. Actual average earnings were 10.42 CHF. Subjects using a fixed
strategy of never trusting would earn 12 CHF with certainty, while always trusting would
have led to earnings of 8.83 CHF on average. Therefore, in our sample, trusting does not
pay off on average, in line with previous trust games (Camerer, 2003). However, a subject
who is able to accurately predict her counterpart’s back transfer on each trial would
earn 13.95 CHF on average, making the ability to detect the trustworthiness of others
a profitable skill. Actual earnings are significantly less than the hypothetical maximum
earnings and earnings from a fixed strategy of never trusting but are also significantly
higher than a fixed strategy of always trusting. Importantly, we can also compute the
expected payoff from random choice, in which a subject trusts with probability 0.5.
Random choice would yield expected earnings of 10.42 CHF, which is identical to our
subjects’ actual average earnings.
Result B.4. Second-movers also appear to discriminate based on perceived trustworthi-
ness. However, second-movers can be divided into roughly four groups. First, 40% of
subjects are purely selfishly and always send zero. Second, 27% of subjects display dis-
positional reciprocity but not type-dependent reciprocity. Third, 10% of subjects display
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type-based reciprocity but not dispositional reciprocity. Finally, 18% of subjects display
both dispositional and type-dependent reciprocity. Seven subjects (5%) cannot be catego-
rized.
We begin by estimating the Cobb-Douglass preferences introduced previously in Sec-
tion B.5 and use the linear specification
(Back Transfer) = α + β(Trustworthiness) + ε (B.5)
where α measures dispositional reciprocity and β captures type-based reciprocity. Due to
potential censoring, we use a two-sided Tobit regression. Figure B.2 displays individual-
level parameter estimates, and we set non-significant parameters to zero. Roughly 40%
of subjects are not significantly different from purely selfish preferences (α = 0, β = 0).
Another 27% of subjects display some degree of dispositional reciprocity but not type-
dependent reciprocity (α > 0, β = 0); these subjects’ preferences conform to the logic of
outcome-based models of inequity aversion. Next, 10% of subjects display only type-based
reciprocity (α = 0, β > 0); this behavior is consistent with the phenomenon captured
in Levine (1998). Finally, 18% display both dispositional reciprocity and type-based
reciprocity (α > 0, β > 0), suggesting a more complex mix of preferences including both
inequity aversion and type-based altruism. The distribution of subject classifications are
listed in Table B.4.
A potential concern here is that second-movers were confused about the conditional
back transfer and were engaging in reciprocity based on expected transfer. We again
emphasize that the conditional nature of the back transfer was made explicit on the
decision screen each time the subjects entered their decisions (see on-screen text in Section
B.3 above and Appendix B.11 for experiment instructions containing screenshots).
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Figure B.2: Distribution of dispositional (α) and type-based (β) reciprocity parameters.
Non-significant parameters are set to zero. Seven outliers are omitted; these correspond
to the uncategorized subjects in Table B.4. Total payoff for both subjects is 44 CHF.
Natural focal points for dispositional reciprocity include 0 (selfish), 0.33 (10 CHF, perfect
repayment), 0.5 (15 CHF, equal split of amount received by second-mover), and 0.67 (20
CHF, equal final payoffs after including initial endowments). Slight jitter added so that
all data points can be seen.
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Type Frequency Percent
Selfish 57 40.43
Dispositional Only 38 26.95
Type-based Only 14 9.93
Dispositional and Type-based 25 17.73
Uncategorized 7 4.96
Table B.4: Subject classification into reciprocity types based on estimates from equa-
tion (B.4). Non-significant estimates are set to zero. Categories correspond to (α, β)
parameters: Selfish (α = 0, β = 0); Dispositional only (α > 0, β = 0); Type-based only
(α = 0, β > 0); Dispositional and Type-based (α > 0, β > 0); and Uncategorized (α < 0
or β < 0 or both).
B.6.2 Predicting Behavior
Thus far, we have provided evidence that individuals form perceptions of trustworthiness
based on certain facial characteristics and that these characteristics can be exogenously
manipulated to change trusting and trustworthy behavior in reliable, predictable ways.
However, in all of these situations, decisions made by our subjects affect both their own
payoffs and the payoffs of others. Therefore, subjects’ decisions reflect motives such
as efficiency or inequity-aversion and do not accurately reveal beliefs about the general
behavior of counterparts. To address these concerns, we conducted additional sessions
with new independent samples. In these sessions, which we refer to as PANEL, subjects
did not play the modified trust game. Instead, we explained the trust game in the
instructions as before, and subjects were incentivized to predict the average behavior of
the person in the photograph. These new subjects always viewed unmodified images. In
some sessions (N = 174, average earnings = 33.41 CHF), subjects saw the same images as
in treatment UNMODIFIED, in which the photographs contained an oval cut-out. Since
these images may seem artificial in some sense, we conducted additional sessions (N = 92,
average earnings = 34.34 CHF) in which subjects viewed images without the oval cut-out.
The important aspect here is that decisions of subjects in our PANEL sessions do not
affect the payoffs of others, which rules out concerns about efficiency, reciprocity, and
inequity-aversion. When viewing Players A, subjects were asked to predict what percent
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of the time (0-100%) the person in the photograph transferred 10 CHF to his or her
counterpart. When viewing Players B, subjects were asked to predict the average back
transfer (0-30 CHF) the person in the photograph sent to his or her counterpart. The
experimental currency in PANEL sessions is points. Subject earnings, in points, were
200− 2× |predicted transfer− actual transfer| if the trial selected for payment contained
a Player A and 200 − 5 × |predicted transfer − actual transfer| if the trial selected for
payment contained a Player B. The differing multiplicative terms were selected in advance
to equalize expected earnings regardless of whether the trial contained a Player A or a
Player B. At the end of the experiment, one round was randomly selected for payment;
the experimental currency was denoted in points, with an exchange rate of 10 points =
1 CHF.
Subjects viewed two blocks during the experiment, with each block consisting of only
first-movers or only second-movers. Each block contained 9-11 photographs, counterbal-
anced across subjects so that we had approximately the same number of predictions for
each photograph, for a total of 18-22 predictions per subject. All subjects predicted be-
havior of both first-movers and second-movers. We used these blocks to avoid confusion
resulting from full randomization of photographs and roles across trials, though pho-
tographs were randomized with a block. Order of block (first- or second-movers) was also
counterbalanced across subjects. After making their predictions, subjects then viewed
the photographs in the same order again and provided ratings on the same characteristics
from the MODIFIED and UNMODIFIED treatments. These sessions provide our next
major result.
Result B.5. Subjects cannot predict average behavior of individuals in static photographs
better than chance. Moreover, confidence in predictions does not increase accuracy of
predictions.
Our results for predictions can be seen in Table B.5. We find no evidence of accuracy
at the aggregate level. It remains possible that a subset of the population can accurately
infer trustworthiness from facial features or that it is easier for everyone to infer trust-
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worthiness from some faces but not others. We also hypothesized that, if a subset of the
population does in fact possess this skill, these individuals would be more confident in
their predictions; therefore, we elicited confidence in prediction on each trial. Figures B.3
and B.4 demonstrate our (null) results intuitively. We find no evidence that a subset of
the population can accurately infer trustworthiness from facial features or that it is eas-
ier for everyone to infer trustworthiness from some faces but not others when analyzing
the data at the level of individual PANEL subject or individual photograph. Also, we
find no evidence for accuracy of predictions increasing with confidence; people who are
confident in their predictions are no more accurate than people who lack confidence in
their predictions.
B.7 Robustness and Additional Measures
Our analysis of first-mover and second-mover behavior has been fairly simple. We have
only used self-reported trustworthiness ratings as a proxy for trustworthiness perceptions,
though our exogenous manipulation also provides evidence that there is a coherent basis
for these perceptions. For now, we will restrict attention to our MODIFIED treatment,
since it is an exogenous source of variation in trustworthiness that we may be able to
explain away using additional measures.
Our definition of trustworthiness has been behavioral-based, though a more common
but ill-defined notion is that trustworthiness is a personality trait, and we may poten-
tially develop an index of trustworthiness using alternative measures. Along with ratings
of trustworthiness, we also collected subjective ratings on the following features: at-
tractiveness, anger, fear, happiness, surprise, disgust, sadness, dominance, masculinity,
femininity, competitiveness, friendliness, and warmth. Given that several of these mea-
sures seem to be capturing aspects of the same latent characteristics and including all
of these ratings as regressors in a single model would create a multicollinearity problem,
we used factor analysis reduce these ratings into fewer distinct factors which can then be
100
used as regressors. Using the standard practice of retaining only factors with an eigen-
value greater than one, we are able to reduce our ratings to four factors, which we label
as (i) positive affect, (ii) negative affect, (iii) power, and (iv) femininity. Details on factor
loadings are in Table B.6.
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Actual transfer (% endowment) Actual back transfer (CHF)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Prediction 0.030 0.098 0.051 -0.062 -0.036 -0.052
(0.032) (0.051)* (0.028)* (0.042) (0.048) (0.032)
Constant 65.719 62.482 64.766 6.865 7.21 6.974
(1.634)*** (2.689)*** (1.413)*** (0.513)*** (0.553)*** (0.390)***
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 1798 951 2749 1798 950 2748
Table B.5: Panel accuracy. Raters in columns (1) and (4) saw photographs with oval cutout. Raters in columns (2) and (5) saw
photographs without oval cutout. Columns (3) and (6) contain pooled data. OLS regressions. Robust standard errors clustered by
subject. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Figure B.3: Lack of accuracy in panel predictions. Images on left are from panel that did see oval cutouts; images on the right
are from panel that did not see oval cutouts. Top row contains panel predictions when viewing first-movers; bottom row contains
panel predictions when viewing second-movers. Slight jitter added so that all data points can be seen. The 45◦-line is included for
visualization purposes.
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Figure B.4: Lack of accuracy in panel predictions as a function of rater certainty. Images on left are from panel that did see
oval cutouts; images on the right are from panel that did not see oval cutouts. Top row contains panel predictions when viewing
first-movers; bottom row contains panel predictions when viewing second-movers. Slight jitter added so that all data points can be
seen.
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Ratings
Factors
UniquenessPositive affect Negative affect Power Femininity
Attractiveness 0.60 -0.02 0.36 0.26 0.44
Anger -0.39 0.33 0.64 -0.12 0.31
Fear 0.13 0.79 -0.06 0.08 0.35
Happiniess 0.83 -0.05 0.03 0.07 0.30
Surprise 0.15 0.68 0.04 0.06 0.52
Disgust -0.18 0.64 0.35 -0.04 0.43
Sad -0.04 0.73 0.01 -0.03 0.46
Dominant -0.11 -0.01 0.87 -0.07 0.23
Masculine 0.04 0.05 0.19 -0.92 0.10
Feminine 0.25 0.10 0.08 0.89 0.12
Competitive 0.19 -0.02 0.78 -0.05 0.36
Friendly 0.89 0.04 -0.12 0.08 0.19
Warm 0.86 0.08 -0.10 0.08 0.24
Table B.6: Ratings variables and factor analysis. After completing the trust game, sub-
jects in treatment MODIFIED viewed the photographs in the same order and gave sub-
jective ratings on the characteristics in the left-hand column. Ordering of variables was
kept fixed for each subject but randomized across subjects. Factor loading greater than
0.50 in magnitude are marked in bold to indicate strong loadings. Factor analysis with
principal components factors and varimax rotation.
We then drop trustworthiness ratings and include these factors as regressors to predict
behavior for both first-movers and second-movers. We also include specifications with
gender effects, as gender (of subject, counterpart, or both) seems an obvious a priori
explanation for at least a portion of our trustworthiness perceptions. Results for first-
movers are in Table B.7 and for second-movers in Table B.8.
Result B.6. The effect of our exogenous manipulation in treatment MODIFIED on first-
mover behavior can be explained by positive affect and femininity, while the back transfer
decision of second movers in treatment MODIFIED is explained by positive affect.
Surprisingly, we do not find robust evidence for any gender effect for either first-movers
or second-movers. Importantly, the effect of our exogenous manipulation on perceived
trustworthiness is no longer significant in any of our specifications after including our
four factors capturing latent variables. In particular, positive affect and femininity are
robust and highly significant in predicting transfers from first movers, while only positive
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affect is robust and highly significant in predicting back transfers from second movers.
Even though we are able to decompose our other subjective ratings into these four
factors for our sample with modified images, one may be concerned that (i) these factors
do not capture our common notion of trustworthiness or (ii) trustworthiness perceptions
are formed based on unnatural characteristics which are an artifact of our morphing
procedure or based on aspects other than these four factors.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Upmodified 0.108 -0.016 -0.011 -0.011 0.001
(0.021)*** (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025)
Positive affect 0.124 0.123 0.123 0.121
(0.030)*** (0.029)*** (0.029)*** (0.029)***
Negative affect -0.04 -0.038 -0.038 -0.041
(0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Power -0.022 -0.02 -0.021 -0.019
(0.029) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Femininity 0.052 0.05 0.061
(0.011)*** (0.025)** (0.019)***
Female Counterpart 0.028 0.098
(0.047) (0.027)***
Female 0.163 0.131 0.165
(0.088)* (0.088) (0.089)*
Female*Female Counterpart -0.068 -0.058
(0.041)* (0.041)
Female*Femininity -0.027
(0.023)
N 2325 2325 2325 2325 2325
Table B.7: Robustness of first-mover transfer decisions from MODIFIED treatment when including results from factor analysis
and gender effects. We find no evidence of a robust gender effect. The effect of the upmodification disappears when including the
four factors, suggesting that the modification primarily induces transfer by increasing perceptions of positive affect and femininity.
Probit regressions (marginal effects reported). Robust standard errors clustered by subject. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
107
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Upmodified 0.671 -0.227 -0.124 -0.163 -0.128 -0.048
(0.180)*** (0.311) (0.297) (0.302) (0.307) (0.169)
Positive affect 1.132 1.016 1.037 1.017 0.832
(0.334)*** (0.338)*** (0.342)*** (0.340)*** (0.136)***
Negative affect -0.805 -0.727 -0.714 -0.726 -0.008
(0.426)* (0.443) (0.440) (0.442) (0.086)
Power -0.011 -0.034 -0.051 -0.034 -0.198
(0.306) (0.313) (0.311) (0.313) (0.086)**
Femininity 0.183 -0.033 0.007 0.2
(0.183) (0.299) (0.349) (0.075)***
Female Counterpart 0.573 0.532 0.212
(0.402) (0.319)* (0.304)
Female 1.075 1.122 1.084 -3.322
(1.371) (1.393) (1.351) (0.512)***
Female*Female Counterpart 0.065 0.048 -0.065
(0.445) (0.407) (0.425)
Female*Femininity 0.294
-0.402
Constant 5.188 5.738 4.847 5.127 4.869 2.746
(0.658)*** (0.699)*** (1.027)*** (1.076)*** (1.053)*** (0.348)***
R2 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.81
N 2511 2511 2511 2511 2511 2511
Table B.8: Robustness of second-mover transfer decisions from MODIFIED treatment when including results from factor analysis
and gender effects. We find no evidence of a robust gender effect. The effect of the upmodification disappears when including the
four factors, suggesting that the modification primarily induces higher back transfers by increasing perceptions of positive affect.
OLS regressions. Robust standard errors clustered by subject. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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To address these concerns, we generated predictions of the trustworthiness ratings
given by the PANEL using only the four measures from our factor analysis and subsequent
regression coefficients from treatment MODIFIED. We proceeded in four steps.
First, we used the factor analysis results to create factors for the PANEL by combining
the PANEL ratings with the factor loadings from treatment MODIFIED. Next, we regress
the trustworthiness ratings from our MODIFIED treatment on the factors generated
using the ratings and factor analysis from our MODIFED treatment and form in-sample
predictions using the following linear specification:
(Trustworthiness Rating)MODIFIED = β0 + β1(Positive Affect)
+ β2(Negative Affect) + β3(Power)
+ β4(Femininity) + ε (B.6)
where the in-sample predicted trustworthiness for the MODIFIED treatment is
(Trustworthiness Prediction)MODIFIED = βˆ0 + βˆ1(Positive Affect)
+ βˆ2(Negative Affect) + βˆ3(Power)
+ βˆ4(Femininity). (B.7)
Next, we take the same least squares estimates from the regression in equation B.7
and combine them with the out-of-sample factors using the PANEL ratings to generate
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out-of-sample predictions of trustworthiness ratings by PANEL subjects:
(Trustworthiness Prediction)PANEL = βˆ0 + βˆ1( ̂Positive Affect)
+ βˆ2( ̂Negative Affect) + βˆ3(P̂ower)
+ βˆ4( ̂Femininity) (B.8)
.
Finally, we regress the trustworthiness ratings on these predictions,
(Trustworthiness Rating)TREATMENT = α0
+ α1(Trustworthiness Prediction)TREATMENT
+ ε (B.9)
where TREATMENT ∈ {MODIFIED,PANEL}, and we additionally split the PANEL
data into those who saw the unmodified images with an oval cut-out and those who saw
the unmodified images without an oval cut-out. While there are valid reasons for using
the oval cut-outs, as discussed previously, there is a potential concern that subjects view
such images as appearing unrealistic or unnatural. The MODIFIED treatment serves as
a baseline for comparison with the out-of-sample predictions.
Result B.7. Our factors significantly predict trustworthiness ratings in our MODIFIED
treatment. Moreover, out-of-sample trustworthiness predictions based on our MODIFIED
treatment significantly and accurately predict the trustworthiness ratings from PANEL
subjects using unmodified photographs.
Results are presented in Table B.9. While we cannot rule out the possibility of other
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(1) (2) (3)
Trustworthiness 0.545 0.528 0.53
(0.016)*** (0.013)*** (0.019)***
Constant 1.221 1.325 1.446
(0.055)*** (0.043)*** (0.068)***
R2 0.55 0.54 0.59
N 4836 3596 1901
Table B.9: Predicting trustworthiness ratings using factor loadings and OLS estimates
from MODIFIED treatment. Column (1) is in-sample prediction from treatment MOD-
IFIED. Columns (2) and (3) predict out-of-sample trustworthiness rating in the panels
with and without cutouts, respectively. OLS regressions. Robust standard errors clus-
tered by subject. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
factors determining behavior, the results in Table B.9, along with the effect of subjec-
tive trustworthiness ratings on behavior (Table B.2 and Figure B.2), suggest that our
modifications are in fact changing facial characteristics used to form perceptions of trust-
worthiness in a reliable and natural manner. In addition, recall that an independent
sample with financial incentives was only slightly better than chance at determining
whether or not a photograph was modified and did not show any learning effects, further
suggesting that there are not unnatural facial features that are easily identified in our
modified images (see Section B.4).
B.8 Discussion
Our results have at least one important implication for the interpretation of reciprocity
(and altruism) in laboratory experiments. Typical trust games are anonymous inter-
actions without feedback or additional information, so any non-selfish behavior demon-
strated is necessarily interpreted as dispositional reciprocity. Among our sample, 55%
demonstrate some form of reciprocal behavior, which is consistent with previous findings
in trust games (Berg et al., 1995; Camerer, 2003; Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000). However, of
the 55% of subjects who demonstrate some form of reciprocal behavior, half of recipro-
cators (51%) discriminate by engaging at least partially in type-based reciprocity. As a
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result, lab-based measures are likely overestimating the extent of dispositional reciprocity
and fail to capture the many ways in which we treat individuals differentially based on
perceptions formed outside the lab. While we do not know how these type-based recip-
rocators in our study would have behaved in an anonymous setting, one guess is that
they would have simply taken the average amount of their type-based back transfers and
given it to each subject, keeping their total back transfers fixed. While such a guess is
speculative, we note that the overall average back transfer in our study is similar to the
average back transfer in previous anonymous trust games.
To consider our findings in a broader perspective, we now turn to evolutionary ex-
planations for human altruism and cooperation, as it may be easy to misinterpret our
findings with respect to evolutionary “green beards;” in particular, one may be tempted
to conclude that we have rejected a certain set of facial features from functioning as a
“green beard” for trustworthiness. Such a conclusion is not warranted, but it is often
asserted in the literature.
Let us first return to the three requirements for a “green beard” that could produce
altruism or cooperation presented in Hamilton (1964): (i) an observable feature (pheno-
type), (ii) perception of the observable feature by others, and (iii) discrimination based
on perception of the feature (Hamilton’s words were, “social response consequent upon
what was perceived”). On a superficial level, our findings support all three requirements;
nonetheless, they cannot provide a basis for the evolution of altruism or cooperation be-
cause the feature itself is uninformative in our setting, so it fails to signal some underlying
gene for altruism or cooperation.
A green beard would be effective, in the traditional evolutionary sense, if it was
an observable and observed feature that results in one of two non-random aspects of
interaction. First, interaction itself could be conditioned on possessing the green beard,
leading to non-random matching (i.e. assortment), so that green beards interact with
other green beards (and similarly for non-green beards). Second, under random matching,
a green beard is a costless and accurate signal which serves as a coordination device in
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conditional cooperation (i.e. green beards are cooperative when interacting with other
green beards, and they are non-cooperative when interacting with non-green beards;
non-green beards are always non-cooperative).
The subtle but critical issue is that our design – and the typical supposed tests for
green beards in humans, such as Oosterhof and Todorov (2008) and Efferson and Vogt
(2013) – fail these criteria of non-random interaction. The first criterion, assortment,
fails trivially, due to the perfect stranger matching in our design. However, our second
criterion, a coordination device for conditional cooperation, also fails because only one in-
dividual in the interaction is able to identify the (potential) green beard; the counterpart,
the other person in the photograph, participated in a fully anonymous interaction with
a random parter, and therefore could not behave differentially based on an observable
feature. The traditional “green beard” hypothesis implicitly makes no prediction for be-
havior in such settings precisely because the unobservability of the green beard rules out
its role as a coordination device (for non-random matching or conditional cooperation).
Results from our experiment and others with fully or partially anonymous interaction
seem, however, to rule out a specific type of green beard. Gardner and West (2010)
divide green beards into four categories. We list these briefly in Table B.10. Individuals
identified in our study as dispositional reciprocity would seem to be an example of Gardner
and West (2010)’s “helping, obligate” green beard; however, even this categorization is
incorrect, as the unconditional helping behavior does not result in differential benefits for
non-green beards and green beards. Therefore, even when restricting attention to this
specific subtype, our design still does not allow us to test for an evolutionary green beard.2
We again emphasize, however, that this shortcoming is not unique to our paper; instead, it
is present in many papers claiming to test for green beards in the evolutionary biology and
psychology literatures. The control treatment in Eckel and Petrie (2011) in which subjects
always viewed a photograph without a payment represents a clean design that could test
2Generally speaking, a helping obligate green beard will be observationally equivalent to a helping
facultative green beard under perfect assortment, since the counterfactual of interacting with a non-green
beard is never observed; with random matching, as in our design, this potential confound is avoided.
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Type Behavior Occurrence Affects only
Helping, facultative Help Conditional Other green beards
Helping, obligate Help Unconditional Other green beards
Harming, facultative Harm Conditional Non-green beards
Harming, obligate Harm Unconditional Non-green beards
Table B.10: Green beard types specified by Gardner and West (2010). In both obligate
types of green beard, the same action is always performed and the cost always incurred
by the green beard; however, the action results in differential effects for non-green beards
and other green beards. Helping green beards increase the inclusive fitness of other green
beards; harming green beards decrease the inclusive fitness of non-green beards.
for facultative, helping green beards. We note, however, that our motivation was primarily
in the formation, use, and accuracy of perceptions in incentivized settings; we devoted
a large amount of attention to the evolutionary issues because of their prominence in
the biological and social sciences, having particular relevance for economists with respect
to altruism, cooperation, and social preferences. In our view, it appears that controlled
economic experiments can only potentially identify “facultative” green beards (those
who restrict helping or harming behavior conditionally on the type of counterpart), as
the benefit to a fixed behavior – monetary payoffs – does not differ based on type of
counterpart.
A final clarification is important. “Green beards” may appear to function as costly
signals, but they are in fact costless. The green beard effect is generally considered im-
plausible and lacking evolutionary stability because of the appearance of mutants who
have a green beard but are not cooperative (or altruistic, trustworthy, etc). Costly signal-
ing, in economics and biology, can be effective because the cost of the signal differs based
on underlying type, so that a signal can sometimes serve as an honest revelation of type
(Spence, 1973; Grafen, 1990). For a costly signalling approach to explain cooperation
among unrelated humans, see Gintis et al. (2001). Confusion between “green beards”
and costly signals can become even more problematic when using observable “tags” as
the basis for cooperation (Riolo et al., 2001), as these tags are simply assortment mecha-
nisms and can potentially be either green beards or costly signals. Tags can also present
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difficulties as they may initially be meaningless but acquire meaning over time, such as
through migration (Efferson et al., 2008).
B.9 Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided evidence supporting the formation and use of trustworthi-
ness perceptions in experiments with monetary payoffs. These perceptions can be isolated
to (and manipulated by) specific facial features, and these features primarily affect trust-
worthiness perceptions through their use in assessing the positive affect (eg. friendliness
and happiness) of the person. However, we also found that these facial features are unin-
formative regarding behavior in a trust game, both for first-movers and second-movers.
An open question is why people form strong “first impressions” that are not accurate?
And why have we not learned over time that these impressions are uninformative?
Another open question is what, if anything, provides a basis for valid perceptions.
Among the possibilities are be other static features such as symmetry (Zaatari and Trivers,
2007), dynamic “behavioral” green beards such as the expression of genuine emotions
(Krumhuber et al., 2007), or costly signals such as clothing, hairstyle, and language
(Riolo et al., 2001).
While we have helped shed some light on potential sources of stereotyping and dis-
crimination, it is only a small flicker in a vast darkness. Certain forms of discrimination
can help improve market outcomes, as in the case of costly signaling revealing unob-
servable type, but many other forms of discrimination – perhaps the majority – have no
relevance for economic efficiency and lead to unequal outcomes with no justifiable basis.
Future research should continue to identify the sources of immediate perceptions about
the characteristics of others, whether and how those perceptions are used, and whether
there is any evidence whatsoever that these perceptions are accurate.
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Anleitung  	  Vielen	  Dank	  für	  Ihre	  Teilnahme	  an	  der	  heutigen	  Studie!	  	  Im	  Verlauf	  der	  Studie	  werden	  Sie	  zunächst	  an	  einigen	  Entscheidungssituationen	  teilnehmen,	  und	  im	  Anschluss	  einen	  langen	  Fragebogen	  ausfüllen.	  	  	  
Ihre	  Bezahlung	  hängt	  von	  Ihren	  eigenen	  Entscheidungen	  ab,	  sowie	  von	  den	  
Entscheidungen	  einer	  Gruppe	  von	  Teilnehmern,	  die	  vor	  kurzem	  hier	  im	  
Labor	  Ihre	  Entscheidungen	  getroffen	  haben.	  	  Bitte	  lesen	  Sie	  den	  Text	  auf	  den	  folgenden	  Seiten	  gründlich	  durch,	  um	  folgende	  Dinge	  zu	  verstehen:	  
x Die	  Regeln	  
x Wie	  die	  Entscheidungssituation	  funktioniert	  
x Wer	  in	  den	  Entscheidungssituationen	  Ihr	  Gegenüber	  sein	  wird	  
x Wie	  Sie	  in	  Abhängigkeit	  Ihrer	  Entscheidungen	  bezahlt	  werden	  	  Im	  Anschluss	  an	  die	  Anleitung	  wird	  es	  ein	  paar	  Kontrollfragen	  geben,	  die	  sicherstellen	  sollen,	  dass	  Sie	  diese	  vier	  	  Dinge	  gründlich	  verstanden	  haben.	  	  Allgemeine	  Regeln	  
Bitte	  bleiben	  Sie	  während	  der	  gesamten	  Studie	  still	  an	  Ihrem	  Platz	  sitzen,	  
und	  kommunizieren	  Sie	  mit	  niemandem.	  Sollten	  Sie	  Sich	  nicht	  an	  diese	  Regeln	  halten,	  müssen	  wir	  Sie	  bitten	  die	  Studie	  ohne	  Bezahlung	  abzubrechen,	  	  und	  Sie	  werden	  für	  die	  Teilnahme	  an	  zukünftigen	  Studien	  gesperrt.	  	  Sollten	  Sie	  nach	  dem	  Lesen	  dieser	  Anleitung	  oder	  während	  der	  Studie	  noch	  Fragen	  haben,	  heben	  Sie	  bitte	  die	  Hand,	  und	  es	  wird	  ein	  Experimentleiter	  an	  Ihren	  Platz	  kommen,	  um	  Ihnen	  zu	  helfen.
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Grundsätzliches	  Sie	  werden	  an	  31	  Runden	  einer	  Entscheidungssituation	  teilnehmen.	  	  	  
x Am	  Anfang	  der	  ersten	  Runde	  werden	  Sie	  entweder	  der	  Rolle	  A	  oder	  der	  
Rolle	  B	  zugeteilt.	  Diese	  Rolle	  behalten	  Sie	  bis	  zum	  Ende	  der	  Studie	  bei.	  	  	  
x In	  jeder	  der	  31	  Runden	  bekommen	  Sie	  per	  Zufall	  ein	  neues	  Gegenüber	  zugeteilt,	  das	  die	  jeweils	  andere	  Rolle	  übernimmt.	  	  
x Am	  Ende	  der	  Studie	  wird	  nur	  eine	  der	  31	  Runden	  nach	  dem	  
Zufallsprinzip	  ausgewählt.	  	  	  
x Ihre	  Bezahlung	  resultiert	  aus	  Ihrer	  Entscheidung,	  sowie	  der	  
Entscheidung	  Ihres	  Gegenübers	  in	  dieser	  einen	  Runde.	  	  
Wer  sind  Ihre  Gegenüber?  	  
x Ihre	  Gegenüber	  sind	  reale	  Personen,	  die	  aber	  heute	  nicht	  im	  Labor	  
anwesend	  sind.	  Alle	  31	  Ihrer	  heutigen	  Gegenüber	  haben	  vor	  kurzem	  hier	  im	  Labor	  Ihre	  Entscheidungen	  gefällt	  und	  diese	  sind	  von	  uns	  aufgezeichnet	  worden.	  Fuer	  diese	  Teilnehmer	  galten	  die	  gleichen	  Regeln,	  die	  auch	  für	  Sie	  heute	  gelten	  (Details	  weiter	  unten).	  Im	  Anschluss	  wurden	  Fotos	  dieser	  Teilnehmer	  gemacht,	  welche	  Sie	  heute	  waehrend	  des	  Experimentes	  zu	  sehen	  bekommen.	  Alle	  Teilnehmer,	  die	  Sie	  heute	  sehen	  werden,	  haben	  uns	  Ihr	  Einverständnis	  zur	  Verwendung	  der	  Fotos	  und	  Entscheidungen	  gegeben.	  	  
x Während	  Sie	  Ihre	  Entscheidung	  treffen,	  	  werden	  Sie	  auf	  der	  linken	  Bildschirmhälfte	  ein	  Foto	  Ihres	  momentanen	  Gegenübers	  sehen.	  Dieser	  Teilnehmer	  hat	  die	  Entscheidung	  getroffen,	  die	  Ihre	  Auszahlung	  in	  dieser	  Runde	  beeinflussen	  wird,	  falls	  diese	  Runde	  auszahlungsrelevant	  ist.	  	  
x Sie	  werden	  feststellen,	  dass	  wir	  die	  Fotos	  bearbeitet	  haben:	  z.B.	  haben	  wir	  die	  Bilder	  mit	  Hilfe	  einer	  schwarzen	  Umrandung	  so	  ausgeschnitten,	  dass	  Sie	  nur	  das	  Gesicht	  Ihres	  Gegenübers	  sehen	  werden.	  
	  
x Ihr	  Gegenüber	  hat	  bei	  der	  Aufzeichnung	  seiner/ihrer	  
Entscheidungen	  kein	  Foto	  gesehen,	  so	  dass	  Sie	  für	  Ihr	  Gegenüber	  
anonym	  sind.	  	  
x Ihr	  Gegenüber	  wird,	  ebenso	  wie	  Sie,	  auf	  Basis	  Ihrer	  Entscheidungen	  heute	  bezahlt.	  Wir	  lassen	  Ihrem	  Gegenüber	  seine/ihre	  Verdienste	  im	  
Anschluss	  an	  die	  Studie	  in	  Bar	  zukommen.	  	  	  	  	  (bitte	  auf	  nächster	  Seite	  fortfahren)
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2.  Beschreibung  der  Entscheidungssituation	  Im	  Folgenden	  finden	  Sie	  eine	  Beschreibung	  der	  Entscheidungssituation,	  die	  Sie	  heute	  31x	  durchlaufen	  werden.	  
Teilnehmer  A:    
x Am	  Anfang	  der	  jeweiligen	  Runde	  erhalten	  A	  und	  B	  jeweils	  einen	  
Anfangsbetrag	  von	  CHF	  12.	  	  
x Entscheidung:	  Nach	  dem	  Erhalt	  des	  Anfangsbetrags	  muss	  Teilnehmer	  A	  entscheiden,	  wieviele	  seiner	  CHF	  12	  er	  an	  den	  Empfänger	  B	  senden	  möchte.	  Er	  kann	  entweder	  CHF	  0	  oder	  CHF	  10	  senden.	  	  
x Der	  Betrag,	  den	  Teilnehmer	  A	  schickt,	  wird	  verdreifacht,	  bevor	  er	  an	  Teilnehmer	  B	  weitergesendet	  wird.	  	  	  
x B	  hat	  bereits	  in	  der	  Vergangenheit	  entschieden,	  wieviel	  er	  /	  sie	  vom	  empfangenen	  Betrag	  an	  A	  zurück	  schicken	  möchte,	  für	  den	  Fall,	  dass	  er	  
etwas	  von	  A	  empfängt.	  	  	  
x Der	  Verdienst	  von	  Teilnehmer	  A	  für	  die	  gezogene	  Runde	  ist	  entsprechend:	  12	  Ȃ	  (an	  B	  gesendeter	  Betrag)	  +	  (Betrag,	  den	  B	  zurücksendet)	  	  
x Teilnehmer	  A	  wird	  anschliessend	  um	  eine	  Einschätzung	  gebeten,	  wieviel	  er	  denkt,	  dass	  B	  zurücksenden	  würde,	  für	  den	  Fall,	  dass	  er	  CHF	  30	  erhielte.	  (Dies	  muss	  auch	  dann	  eingeschätzt	  werden,	  falls	  A	  nichts	  sendet.)	  Es	  wird	  ebenfalls	  gefragt,	  wie	  sicher	  A	  sich	  bei	  dieser	  Einschätzung	  ist.	  	  Auf	  der	  nächsten	  Seite	  sehen	  Sie	  einen	  Screenshot	  des	  Entscheidungsbildschirms	  von	  Teilnehmer	  A.	  
  (bitte	  auf	  nächster	  Seite	  fortfahren)
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Entscheidungsbildschirm	  von	  Teilnehmer	  A:	  
  
  
  
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (bitte	  auf	  nächster	  Seite	  fortfahren)
Entschei-­‐
dung	  von	  Teilnehmer	  A	  
Restzeit	  für	  die	  Runde	  
Teilnehmer	  Aǯ	  Einschätzung	  darüber,	  wieviel	  B	  zurücksenden	  wird	  Wie	  sicher	  ist	  A	  sich	  bei	  dieser	  Schätzung?	  
Foto	  Ihres	  Gegenübers	  für	  diese	  Runde	  
Entscheidung	  bestätigen	  und	  fortfahren	  Î	  	  (nächster	  Bildschirm)	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Teilnehmer	  B:	  
x Am	  Anfang	  der	  Runde	  erhält	  Teilnehmer	  B	  einen	  Anfangsbetrag	  von	  CHF	  12.	  	  	  
x Entscheidung:	  Nach	  dem	  Erhalt	  des	  Anfangsbetrags	  muss	  B	  sich	  entscheiden,	  wieviel	  er	  an	  A	  zurücksenden	  möchte,	  für	  den	  Fall,	  dass	  er	  
etwas	  gesendet	  bekommt.	  B	  muss	  diese	  Entscheidung	  fällen,	  weiss	  dabei	  
aber	  noch	  nicht,	  wieviel	  A	  gesendet	  hat.	  Das	  bedeutet,	  B	  beantwortet	  die	  folgende	  Frage:	  ǷFalls	  A	  CHF	  10	  sendet,	  so	  dass	  Sie	  30	  Franken	  
bekommen:	  wieviel	  möchten	  Sie	  an	  A	  zurück	  senden?ǲ	  (Zahl	  
zwischen	  0	  und	  30)	  	  
x Falls	  sich	  später	  herausstellt,	  dass	  A	  nichts	  gesendet	  hat,	  dann	  erhalten	  beide	  Teilnehmer	  lediglich	  Ihr	  Startguthaben.	  	  
x Der	  Verdienst	  von	  Teilnehmer	  B	  für	  die	  gezogene	  Runde	  ist	  also:	  Falls	  A	  CHF	  0	  	  	  gesendet	  hat:	  	   12	  +	  0	  	  Ȃ	  0	  Falls	  A	  CHF	  10	  gesendet	  hat:	  	   12	  +	  30	  Ȃ	  (zurück	  gesendeter	  Betrag)	  	  
x Teilnehmer	  B	  wird	  auch	  um	  eine	  Einschätzung	  dessen	  gebeten,	  ob	  er	  denkt,	  dass	  A	  zehn	  oder	  null	  Franken	  gesendet	  hat.	  Es	  wird	  ebenfalls	  gefragt,	  wie	  sicher	  B	  sich	  bei	  dieser	  Einschätzung	  ist.	  	  Auf	  der	  nächsten	  Seite	  sehen	  Sie	  einen	  Screenshot	  des	  Entscheidungsbildschirms	  von	  Teilnehmer	  B.	  	  	  	  (bitte	  auf	  nächster	  Seite	  fortfahren)
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Entscheidungsbildschirm	  von	  Teilnehmer	  B:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  (bitte	  auf	  nächster	  Seite	  fortfahren)
Entschei-­‐
dung	  von	  Teilnehmer	  B.	  
Wie	  sicher	  ist	  sich	  B	  bei	  der	  
¡ǯVerhalten?	   Entscheidung	  bestätigen	  und	  fortfahren	  Î	  	  (nächster	  Bildschirm)	  	  
ǯEinschätzung	  darüber,	  wieviel	  A	  senden	  wird	  
Foto	  des	  Gegenübers	  für	  die	  Runde	  
Restzeit	  für	  die	  Runde	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Die  nächste  Runde  	  Wenn	  Sie	  Ihre	  Entscheidung	  getroffen	  haben,	  endet	  die	  Runde	  und	  Sie	  kommen	  in	  die	  nächste	  Runde,	  mit	  einem	  neuen	  Gegenüber.	  Sie	  bekommen	  hierbei	  keine	  Rückmeldung	  darüber,	  wie	  sich	  Ihr	  Gegenüber	  in	  der	  vergangenen	  Runde	  entschieden	  hat.	  	  
Da	  Sie	  ausserdem	  nicht	  wissen	  können,	  welche	  der	  31	  Runden	  nach	  dem	  
Zufallsprinzip	  für	  Ihre	  Zahlung	  relevant	  ist,	  sollten	  Sie	  jede	  Runde	  separat	  
und	  für	  sich	  genommen	  betrachten.	  	  
	  Erst	  am	  Ende	  des	  Experimentes	  wird	  die	  auszahlungsrelevante	  Runde	  nach	  dem	  Zufallsprinzip	  bestimmt	  und	  Sie	  werden	  darüber	  informiert	  wie	  sich	  Ihr	  Gegenüber	  in	  dieser	  Runde	  entschieden	  hat.	  Sie	  erfahren	  aber	  nicht,	  um	  welche	  Runde	  es	  sich	  gehandelt	  hat.	  Das	  bedeutet,	  sie	  werden	  nicht	  erfahren,	  welches	  Ihrer	  Gegenüber	  diese	  Entscheidung	  getroffen	  hat.	  Dies	  stellt	  sicher,	  dass	  die	  Entscheidungen	  Ihrer	  Gegenüber	  anonym	  bleiben,	  obwohl	  Sie	  deren	  Gesichter	  sehen.	  	  
Bitte	  betrachten	  Sie	  das	  Beispiel	  auf	  der	  folgenden	  Seite,	  um	  ein	  Beispiel	  
dafür	  zu	  sehen,	  wie	  die	  Auszahlungen	  funktionieren.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (bitte	  auf	  nächster	  Seite	  fortfahren)
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Das	  folgende	  Beispiel	  illustriert,	  wie	  die	  Zahlungen	  bestimmt	  werden.	  	  	  
	  	  	  (bitte	  auf	  nächster	  Seite	  fortfahren)
BEISPIEL    
  Am	  Anfang	  der	  Runde	  bekommt	  Teilnehmerin	  A	  12	  Franken.	  Nehmen	  wir	  an,	  sie	  sendet	  10	  Franken	  an	  Teilnehmer	  B.	  
	  	  Der	  Betrag	  von	  10	  Franken	  wird	  nun	  verdreifacht,	  so	  dass	  Teilnehmer	  B	  	  3x10=30	  Franken	  erhalten	  wird.	  	  	  Teilnehmer	  B	  weiss	  zum	  Zeitpunkt	  seiner	  eigenen	  Entscheidung	  allerdings	  noch	  nicht,	  ob	  er	  0	  oder	  30	  erhalten	  wird.	  Er	  bekommt	  ebenfalls	  12	  Franken	  am	  Anfang	  der	  Runde.	  Nehmen	  wir	  an,	  dass	  B	  sich	  entscheidet,	  18	  zurück	  zu	  senden,	  für	  den	  Fall,	  dass	  A	  den	  Betrag	  von	  10	  sendet	  (falls	  A	  null	  sendet,	  kann	  B	  nichts	  zurück	  senden):	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Nun	  haben	  beide	  Teilnehmer	  ihre	  Entscheidungen	  getroffen.	  Falls	  diese	  Runde	  für	  die	  Auszahlung	  gezogen	  wird,	  ergeben	  sich	  die	  Auszahlungen	  wie	  oben	  beschrieben.	  Da	  Teilnehmer	  A	  10	  geschickt	  hat,	  wird	  die	  Entscheidung	  von	  B	  relevant,	  und	  dieser	  sendet	  18	  Franken	  zurück.	  	  	  Also	  endet	  die	  Runde	  mit	  den	  folgenden	  Zahlungen:	  	  
Teilnehmer	  A:	  	  12	  Ȃ	  10	  +	  18	  =	  20	  
	  
Teilnehmer	  B:	  	  12	  +	  30	  Ȃ	  18	  =	  24	  	  	  
18  
9/10	  	  
	  
Fragebogen  Nachdem	  Sie	  die	  31	  Runden	  der	  Entscheidungssituation	  abgeschlossen	  haben,	  werden	  Sie	  gebeten,	  einen	  längeren	  Fragebogen	  auszufüllen.	  	  
  
Überblick:  Zahlungen  	  
x Unabhängig	  von	  Ihren	  heutigen	  Entscheidungen	  erhalten	  Sie	  in	  jedem	  Fall	  eine	  Teilnahmegebühr	  von	  CHF	  10.	  	  
x Wie	  bereits	  erwähnt,	  wird	  eine	  der	  31	  gespielten	  Runden	  nach	  dem	  Zufallsprinzip	  gezogen,	  und	  Sie	  und	  Ihr	  Gegenüber	  erhalten	  die	  Zahlungen,	  die	  aus	  Ihren	  Entscheidungen	  in	  dieser	  Runde	  resultieren.	  Ihrem	  Gegenüber	  stellen	  wir	  die	  erwirtschafteten	  Beträge	  nach	  der	  Studie	  ebenfalls	  in	  Bar	  zu.	  	  
tĞŶŶ^ŝĞĨĞƌƚŝŐƐŝŶĚ͙  Wenn	  Sie	  die	  Studie	  abgeschlossen	  haben,	  bleiben	  Sie	  bitte	  weiterhin	  still	  an	  
Ihrem	  Platz	  sitzen	  und	  warten	  Sie	  darauf,	  dass	  der	  Experimentleiter	  Sie	  zur	  
Auszahlung	  bittet.	  Wenn	  Sie	  gerufen	  werden,	  bringen	  Sie	  bitte	  alle	  Ihre	  Sachen	  (Jacke,	  Tasche	  usw.)	  mit	  sich,	  da	  Sie	  das	  Labor	  durch	  den	  Auszahlungsraum	  verlassen	  werden.	  
	  
͙ŶŽĐŚ&ƌĂŐĞŶ?  Falls	  Sie	  irgendwelche	  Fragen	  zu	  dieser	  Anleitung	  haben,	  heben	  Sie	  bitte	  nun	  die	  Hand,	  und	  ein	  Assistent	  wird	  an	  Ihren	  Platz	  kommen,	  um	  Ihnen	  zu	  helfen.	  	  
Kontrollfragen  Bitte	  füllen	  Sie	  nun	  den	  kurzen	  Verständnistest	  auf	  der	  nächsten	  Seite	  aus,	  um	  sicher	  zu	  gehen,	  dass	  Sie	  verstanden	  haben,	  wie	  die	  Auszahlungen	  der	  Entscheidungssituation	  sich	  zusammensetzen.	  	  	  	  (bitte	  auf	  der	  nächsten	  Seite	  fortfahren)	  
B.11.2 Main group (English translation of earlier version)
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INSTRUCTIONS 
 Thank you for participating in this study.  Today, you will engage in a number of interactions with a number of different people. Afterwards, you will be asked to complete a short survey. When the survey is complete, you will receive your payment in Swiss Francs and will be free to leave thereafter.  
You will be paid based on your decisions, and on those of the other 
participants in the experiment.  Please carefully read the material on the following pages to understand 
• The rules 
• Who your counterparts will be 
• How we will pay you  After you have read the instructions, there will be a few test questions to make sure you have understood these three things.  
Please remain silent during the entire study, remain seated at your place, 
and refrain from communicating with anyone. Failure to comply with this may result in exclusion from the experiment without pay and removal from our list of participants for future experiments.  If you have any questions after reading these instructions or during the experiment, please raise your hand quietly and someone will come and assist you. 
1. DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY There are two types of participants in this study: Proposers and Responders.  You will be assigned one of these two roles. You will then take part in 30 rounds of a decision situation that is described below. In each round, you will be matched with a different counterpart.   Just like you, all of your counterparts have been fully informed about the rules and consequences of the decisions made in the game.  
Note: In these instructions, we use “she” for proposers and “he” for responders for grammatical convenience only.  You may be assigned to the role of either proposer or responder regardless of your gender.  Similarly, your counterpart in any round may be male or female. 
Initial endowment in each round At the beginning of the round, both participants will receive an endowment of 12 tokens. 
Proposers:  At the beginning of a round, the proposer decides how many of her 12 tokens that she wants to send to the responder.  She may only send either 0 or 10 tokens.   Thus, in each round, proposers answer the following question:  
The amount the proposer sends will be tripled before being passed on to the responder. If the proposer chooses to send zero, then the round ends and both the proposer and the responder move on to the next round (with different partners). If the proposer sends 10 tokens, then the responder receives 30, and can decide how much of this to send back (any number between 0 and 30). 
Responders While the proposer decides how much to send, the responder has to decide how much to send back, in case he is going to receive 30 tokens. At this point, the 
responder does not yet know whether the proposer is going to send anything. If it turns out that the proposer sends nothing, then the responder’s choice does not apply and nothing is sent back to the proposer.  
That is, a responder answers the following question: 
 Once both participants have made their decisions, the round ends and both participants move on to the next round, with different partners.   At the end of the experiment, one of the rounds you played is randomly selected. The decisions in this round determine your payment, and that of your counterpart in that round.  The following example illustrates this.  
   
EXAMPLE  
 In the beginning, the Proposer is given 12 tokens. Suppose she chooses to send 10 tokens to the Responder:  
  The number of tokens sent is then tripled, so the Responder will receive 3x10=30 tokens.   The responder, however, does not yet know how much the proposer sent.   The responder is also given 12 tokens in the beginning. Suppose he decides to return 18, conditional 
on the sender sending 10 (if the proposer sends 0, then the responder has no choice but to return zero):  
   Now both members have made their choices, and payments are made according to the rules described earlier. Since the proposer sent 10 tokens, 18 tokens will be sent back by the responder.   Thus the session ends with the following payments:  
Proposer’s payment:  12 – 10 + 18 = 20 
 
Responder’s payment:  12 + 30 – 18 = 24   
Your role  At the start of the study, you will be assigned to the role of either Proposer or Responder.  You will maintain this role through the entire study.    Note that you will NOT be given any information about your counterparts’ decisions until the end of the study.  At the end of the study, one of the trials 
will be randomly selected, and you will get paid based your decision and 
the decision of your counterpart. Even though you will see the decision of the opponent that was randomly selected, and the payments you will receive, you will not see the picture of who this opponent was again (this is to maintain the anonymity of your counterparts).  
Your counterpart  All of your counterparts today are people who participated in a similar study recently. On each trial, you will see a photograph of your counterpart on the left-hand side of the screen. You will notice that we have cut out the hair from the images so that only the face of the participant will be visible to you in front of a black background.  Your counterpart recorded his/her strategy in a recent 
study, and did not know whom they were going to be matched with today. 
Your counterpart did not see a photograph of you when they made their 
choices.  Your payment, and that of your counterpart, will depend on your decisions today, and on the pre-recorded decisions of your counterpart, in the round that is selected for payment. It is important to understand that even though your 
counterparts are not physically present today, your counterpart in the round 
selected for payment will also be paid based on your decisions and the rules 
described above.  
What your screen is going to look like 
 The following images are examples of the computer display that you will encounter, depending on whether you are a Proposer or a Responder.    If you are a proposer, you will see a screen that looks like this: 
 
 If you are a responder, you will see a screen that looks like the following: 
 
SURVEY After making all of your choices, you will then be asked to answer a short survey.   
YOUR PAYMENT At the very end of the study, one of your decisions will be selected at random, and you will be paid based on the decisions made by you and your counterpart on that trial. In addition, you will receive a show-up fee of 10 CHF.  
Please consider each person you see separately and individually. This is 
important because only one of the trials will be drawn for payment, and 
you do not know in advance which one it is. 
 You will receive 1 CHF for each token that you earned. E.g. if you obtained 20 tokens on the trial selected for payment, your total payment would be 10 + 20 = 30 CHF. 
WHAT TO DO WHEN YOU ARE DONE When you are done, please remain seated, continue to be silent and wait for 
the experimenter to call you into the payment room. When you are called, please take all your belongings (bag etc.) with you, as you will exit through the payment room. 
QUESTIONS? If you have any questions about these instructions, please raise your hand now and the experimenter will help you.  
COMPREHENSION TEST On the next page, you will take a short comprehension test to ensure you understand the rules of the exchange and how these rules determine payments to Proposer and Responder.     
B.11.3 Panel of raters (Original German version)
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Anleitung	  	  Vielen	  Dank	  für	  Ihre	  Teilnahme	  an	  der	  heutigen	  Studie!	  	  Im	  Verlauf	  der	  heutigen	  Studie	  werden	  Sie	  die	  Gesichter	  von	  Personen	  sehen,	  die	  vor	  einigen	  Wochen	  an	  einer	  Studie	  hier	  im	  Labor	  teilgenommen	  haben.	  Ihre	  Aufgabe	  wird	  es	  sein,	  zu	  erraten,	  wie	  die	  Personen	  auf	  den	  Bildern	  sich	  in	  
der	  Studie	  verhalten	  haben.	  Im	  Anschluss	  an	  diese	  Phase	  der	  Studie	  wird	  es	  einen	  Fragebogen	  geben.	  	  Am	  Ende	  der	  Studie	  werden	  Sie	  in	  bar	  bezahlt.	  Zum	  einen	  erhalten	  Sie	  eine	  fixe	  Teilnahmegebühr	  iHv	  20CHF.	  Zum	  anderen	  erhalten	  Sie	  eine	  Bezahlung	  (bis	  
zu	  20CHF	  zusätzlich	  zur	  Teilnahmegebühr),	  deren	  Höhe	  sich	  danach	  richtet,	  
wie	  präzise	  Sie	  das	  Verhalten	  der	  Personen	  auf	  den	  Fotos	  erraten	  haben.	  	  Bitte	  lesen	  Sie	  den	  Text	  auf	  den	  folgenden	  Seiten	  gründlich	  durch,	  um	  folgende	  Dinge	  zu	  verstehen:	  
• Die	  Regeln	  der	  heutigen	  Studie	  
• Wie	  die	  Entscheidungssituation	  funktioniert,	  an	  der	  die	  Personen	  in	  den	  Bildern	  teilgenommen	  haben	  
• Wie	  Sie	  für	  die	  Genauigkeit	  Ihrer	  Einschätzungen	  bezahlt	  werden	  	  Im	  Anschluss	  an	  die	  Anleitung	  wird	  es	  ein	  paar	  Kontrollfragen	  geben,	  die	  sicherstellen	  sollen,	  dass	  Sie	  diese	  drei	  Dinge	  gründlich	  verstanden	  haben.	  	  Allgemeine	  Regeln	  
Bitte	  bleiben	  Sie	  während	  der	  gesamten	  Studie	  still	  an	  Ihrem	  Platz	  sitzen,	  
und	  kommunizieren	  Sie	  mit	  niemandem.	  Sollten	  Sie	  Sich	  nicht	  an	  diese	  Regeln	  halten,	  müssen	  wir	  Sie	  bitten	  die	  Studie	  ohne	  Bezahlung	  abzubrechen,	  	  und	  Sie	  werden	  für	  die	  Teilnahme	  an	  zukünftigen	  Studien	  gesperrt.	  	  Fragen?	  Sollten	  Sie	  nach	  dem	  Lesen	  dieser	  Anleitung	  oder	  während	  der	  Studie	  noch	  Fragen	  haben,	  heben	  Sie	  bitte	  leise	  die	  Hand,	  und	  es	  wird	  ein	  Experimentleiter	  an	  Ihren	  Platz	  kommen,	  um	  Ihnen	  zu	  helfen.
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1.	  Wer	  sind	  die	  Personen	  auf	  den	  Fotos?	  	  Vor	  ein	  paar	  Wochen	  haben	  wir	  eine	  Studie	  hier	  im	  Labor	  durchgeführt,	  bei	  der	  eine	  Gruppe	  von	  Personen	  an	  einer	  Entscheidungssituation	  teilgenommen	  hat.	  	  Im	  Anschluss	  wurden	  sie	  fotografiert.	  	  	  
• Alle	  Personen,	  die	  Sie	  heute	  sehen	  werden,	  haben	  uns	  ihre	  Erlaubnis	  erteilt,	  dass	  wir	  ihre	  Entscheidungen	  und	  Ihre	  Fotos	  in	  weiteren	  Studien	  in	  anonymer	  Form	  verwenden	  dürfen.	  
• Sie	  werden	  feststellen,	  dass	  wir	  die	  Fotos	  der	  Personen	  elektronisch	  bearbeitet	  haben	  -­‐-­‐	  wir	  haben	  eine	  ovale	  schwarze	  Schablone	  über	  das	  Gesicht	  gelegt,	  so	  dass	  die	  Haare	  nicht	  mehr	  sichtbar	  sind	  und	  nur	  das	  Gesicht	  sichtbar	  bleibt.	  Es	  handelt	  sich	  abgesehen	  hiervon	  um	  unveränderte	  Originalfotos	  dieser	  Personen.	  	  
2.	  Beschreibung	  der	  Entscheidungssituation,	  an	  der	  die	  Personen	  
teilgenommen	  haben	  	  
• Die	  Personen	  haben	  mehrere	  Runden	  lang	  	  an	  einer	  Entscheidungssituation	  teilgenommen,	  die	  weiter	  unten	  beschrieben	  wird.	  	  
• Sie	  wurden	  dabei	  zu	  Anfangs	  jeweils	  einer	  von	  zwei	  Rollen	  zugeteilt:	  entweder	  Rolle	  A	  oder	  Rolle	  B.	  Diese	  Rolle	  wurde	  am	  Anfang	  festgelegt	  und	  bis	  zum	  Schluss	  beibehalten.	  
• In	  jeder	  Runde	  der	  Studie	  wurde	  eine	  Person	  der	  Rolle	  A	  jeweils	  einer	  Person	  der	  Rolle	  B	  zugeordnet.	  Wer	  wem	  zugeordnet	  wurde,	  wurde	  jede	  Runde	  geändert.	  	  
• Die	  Personen	  wussten	  dabei	  nicht,	  wer	  ihr	  Gegenüber	  ist	  –	  sie	  haben	  auch	  kein	  Foto	  ihres	  Gegenübers	  gesehen,	  sondern	  nur	  einen	  anonymen	  Entscheidungsbildschirm.	  
• In	  jeder	  Runde	  mussten	  die	  Teilnehmer	  eine	  Entscheidung	  fällen.	  Diese	  wird	  auf	  den	  folgenden	  Seiten	  beschrieben.	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2a)	  Beschreibung	  der	  Entscheidungssituation	  von	  Teilnehmer	  A:	  	  
• Am	  Anfang	  der	  jeweiligen	  Runde	  erhalten	  A	  und	  B	  jeweils	  einen	  
Anfangsbetrag	  von	  12	  Schweizer	  Franken.	  	  
• Entscheidung:	  Nach	  dem	  Erhalt	  des	  Anfangsbetrags	  muss	  Teilnehmer	  A	  entscheiden,	  wieviele	  seiner	  12	  Franken	  er	  an	  den	  zugeteilten	  Teilnehmer	  B	  senden	  möchte.	  Er	  kann	  entweder	  0	  oder	  10	  Franken	  senden.	  	  
• Der	  Betrag,	  den	  Teilnehmer	  A	  schickt,	  wird	  verdreifacht,	  bevor	  er	  an	  Teilnehmer	  B	  weitergesendet	  wird.	  Bei	  B	  kommen	  also	  entweder	  3*0=0	  oder	  3*10=30	  Franken	  an.	  	  
• B	  entscheidet	  dann,	  ohne	  zu	  wissen,	  ob	  A	  etwas	  gesendet	  hat,	  wieviel	  er	  vom	  empfangenen	  Betrag	  an	  A	  zurück	  schicken	  möchte,	  für	  den	  Fall,	  dass	  
er	  etwas	  von	  A	  empfängt.	  	  	  
• Der	  Verdienst	  von	  Teilnehmer	  A	  für	  die	  Runde	  ist:	  12	  –	  (an	  B	  gesendeter	  Betrag)	  +	  (Betrag,	  den	  B	  zurücksendet)	  	  	  Hier	  sehen	  Sie	  einen	  Screenshot	  des	  Entscheidungsbildschirms	  von	  Teilnehmer	  A:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (bitte	  auf	  nächster	  Seite	  fortfahren)	  
Entscheidung	  von	  Teilnehmer	  A.	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2b)	  Beschreibung	  Entscheidungssituation	  von	  Teilnehmer	  B:	  
• Am	  Anfang	  der	  Runde	  erhält	  Teilnehmer	  B	  einen	  Anfangsbetrag	  von	  12	  CHF.	  	  	  
• Entscheidung:	  Nach	  dem	  Erhalt	  des	  Anfangsbetrags	  muss	  B	  sich	  entscheiden,	  wieviel	  er	  an	  A	  zurücksenden	  möchte,	  für	  den	  Fall,	  dass	  er	  
etwas	  gesendet	  bekommt.	  	  	  
• B	  muss	  diese	  Entscheidung	  fällen,	  weiss	  dabei	  aber	  noch	  nicht,	  wieviel	  A	  
gesendet	  hat.	  Das	  bedeutet,	  B	  beantwortet	  die	  folgende	  Frage:	  „Falls	  A	  10	  
Franken	  sendet,	  so	  dass	  Sie	  30	  Franken	  bekommen:	  wieviel	  möchten	  
Sie	  an	  A	  zurück	  senden?“	  B	  kann	  hierbei	  jeden	  Betrag	  zwischen	  (einschliesslich)	  0	  und	  30	  Franken	  zurückschicken.	  	  
• Falls	  sich	  später	  herausstellt,	  dass	  A	  nichts	  gesendet	  hat,	  dann	  ist	  die	  Entscheidung	  von	  B	  irrelevant,	  und	  es	  wird	  nichts	  an	  A	  zurück	  geschickt.	  	  
• Der	  Verdienst	  von	  Teilnehmer	  B	  ist	  also:	  Falls	  A	  null	  Franken	  gesendet	  hat:	   12	  +	  0	  	  –	  0	  	  =	  12	  Falls	  A	  10	  Franken	  gesendet	  hat:	  	   12	  +	  30	  –	  (zurück	  gesendeter	  Betrag)	  	  	  Hier	  sehen	  Sie	  einen	  Screenshot	  des	  Entscheidungsbildschirms	  von	  Teilnehmer	  B:	  	  Sobald	  beide	  Teilnehmer	  Ihre	  Entscheidungen	  gefällt	  hatten,	  begann	  für	  die	  Teilnehmer	  die	  nächste	  Runde,	  mit	  einem	  neuen	  Gegenüber.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Entscheidung	  von	  Teilnehmer	  B.	  (bitte	  auf	  nächster	  Seite	  fortfahren)	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Das	  folgende	  Beispiel	  illustriert,	  wie	  die	  Zahlungen	  von	  Teilnehmern	  A	  und	  B	  in	  der	  vergangenen	  Studie	  bestimmt	  wurden.	  	  	  
	  	  	  
BEISPIEL	  	  
	  Am	  Anfang	  der	  Runde	  bekommt	  Teilnehmer	  A	  12	  Franken.	  Nehmen	  wir	  an,	  er	  sendet	  10	  Franken	  an	  Teilnehmer	  B.	  
	  	  Der	  Betrag	  von	  10	  Franken	  wird	  nun	  verdreifacht,	  so	  dass	  Teilnehmer	  B	  	  3x10=30	  Franken	  erhalten	  wird.	  	  	  Teilnehmer	  B	  weiss	  zum	  Zeitpunkt	  seiner	  eigenen	  Entscheidung	  allerdings	  noch	  nicht,	  ob	  er	  0	  oder	  30	  erhalten	  wird.	  Er	  bekommt	  ebenfalls	  12	  Franken	  am	  Anfang	  der	  Runde.	  Nehmen	  wir	  an,	  dass	  B	  sich	  entscheidet,	  18	  zurück	  zu	  senden,	  für	  den	  Fall,	  dass	  A	  den	  Betrag	  von	  10	  sendet	  (falls	  A	  null	  sendet,	  kann	  B	  nichts	  zurück	  senden):	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Nun	  haben	  beide	  Teilnehmer	  ihre	  Entscheidungen	  getroffen.	  Falls	  diese	  Runde	  für	  die	  Auszahlung	  gezogen	  wird,	  ergeben	  sich	  die	  Auszahlungen	  wie	  oben	  beschrieben.	  Da	  Teilnehmer	  A	  10	  geschickt	  hat,	  wird	  die	  Entscheidung	  von	  B	  relevant,	  und	  dieser	  sendet	  18	  Franken	  zurück.	  	  	  Also	  endet	  die	  Runde	  mit	  den	  folgenden	  Zahlungen:	  	  
Teilnehmer	  A:	  	  12	  –	  10	  +	  18	  =	  20	  
	  
Teilnehmer	  B:	  	  12	  +	  30	  –	  18	  =	  24	  	  	  
(bitte	  auf	  nächster	  Seite	  fortfahren)	  	  
18 
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3.	  Ihre	  Aufgabe	  und	  Ihre	  Zahlung,	  in	  Abhängigkeit	  der	  Genauigkeit	  
Ihrer	  Schätzungen	  	  Ihre	  Aufgabe	  ist	  es,	  so	  genau	  wie	  möglich	  einzuschätzen,	  was	  die	  jeweilige	  
Person	  auf	  dem	  Foto	  in	  der	  oben	  beschriebenen	  Entscheidungssituation	  
getan	  hat.	  	  	  
• Sie	  werden	  darum	  gebeten,	  für	  jeweils	  30	  Teilnehmer	  A	  und	  30	  Teilnehmer	  B	  solche	  Einschätzungen	  zu	  treffen.	  	  
• Am	  Ende	  der	  Studie	  wird	  nur	  eine	  dieser	  Personen	  zufällig	  
ausgewählt,	  und	  Sie	  werden	  danach	  bezahlt,	  wie	  präzise	  Ihre	  Einschätzung	  über	  die	  Entscheidungen	  dieser	  Person	  war.	  Da	  nur	  eine	  
Ihrer	  Einschätzungen	  ausbezahlt	  wird,	  sollten	  Sie	  jede	  Person	  
separat	  und	  aufmerksam	  für	  sich	  genommen	  betrachten.	  	  
• Erst	  ganz	  zum	  Schluss	  der	  Studie,	  nachdem	  Sie	  alle	  Ihre	  Einschätzungen	  getroffen	  haben	  und	  den	  Fragebogen	  ausgefüllt	  haben,	  werden	  Sie	  Rückmeldung	  darüber	  bekommen,	  wie	  präzise	  Ihre	  Schätzungen	  in	  der	  zufällig	  gezogenen	  Runde	  waren,	  und	  wieviel	  Sie	  dabei	  verdient	  haben.	  Sie	  werden	  allerdings	  keine	  Rückmeldung	  darüber	  bekommen,	  um	  welche	  Runde,	  bzw.	  welche	  dieser	  Personen	  es	  sich	  gehandelt	  hat,	  da	  wir	  die	  Anonymität	  der	  Entscheidungen	  unserer	  Teilnehmer	  A	  und	  B	  wahren	  müssen.	  	  
(bitte	  auf	  nächster	  Seite	  fortfahren)	  	  
	   	   Version:05/09/2011	  14:08	  	  
	   7	  	  
3a)	  Einschätzungen	  bezüglich	  Teilnehmer	  A:	  	  Falls	  die	  Person,	  die	  Sie	  sehen,	  ein	  Teilnehmer	  A	  war,	  wird	  Ihr	  Bildschirm	  wie	  folgt	  aussehen:	  
	  	  Wie	  Sie	  sehen,	  werden	  Sie	  gebeten,	  zwei	  Dinge	  einzugeben:	  
• In	  wieviel	  Prozent	  der	  Runden	  hat	  diese	  Person	  0	  vs.	  10	  an	  Teilnehmer	  B	  gesendet?	  
• Wie	  sicher	  sind	  Sie	  sich	  bei	  dieser	  Einschätzung?	  	  	  
Bezahlung	  für	  die	  Einschätzung	  von	  Teilnehmer	  A:	  Ihre	  Bezahlung	  hängt	  davon	  ab,	  wie	  präzise	  Ihre	  Einschätzung	  ist.	  Sie	  werden	  mit	  einem	  Anfangsbetrag	  von	  200	  Punkten	  beginnen.	  Für	  jeden	  Prozentpunkt,	  mit	  dem	  Ihre	  Antwort	  von	  dem	  tatsächlichen	  Verhalten	  des	  Teilnehmers	  abweicht,	  bekommen	  Sie	  einen	  Punkt	  abgezogen:	  	  
Punkte	  =	  200-­‐2*(absoluter	  Fehlerbetrag	  A)	  
	  
Das	  bedeutet,	  je	  näher	  Ihre	  Einschätzung	  an	  der	  korrekten	  Antwort	  ist,	  	  
desto	  höher	  wird	  Ihre	  Bezahlung	  sein.	  	  
Sie	  bekommen	  zum	  Schluss	  die	  erzielten	  Punkte	  in	  Franken	  umgerechnet,	  
mit	  dem	  Wechselkurs	  1:10	  (10	  Punkte	  =	  1	  CHF)	  
	  Auf	  der	  folgenden	  Seite	  finden	  Sie	  ein	  Beispiel,	  um	  dies	  besser	  nachvollziehen	  zu	  können.	  
	  
(bitte	  auf	  nächster	  Seite	  fortfahren)	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BEISPIEL	  (Bezahlung	  für	  Einschätzung	  über	  einen	  Teilnehmer	  A)	  	  Nehmen	  wir	  an,	  Sie	  hätten	  die	  Schätzungen	  in	  der	  zweiten	  Spalte	  abgegeben,	  und	  die	  korrekten	  Einschätzungen	  wären	  die	  in	  der	  dritten	  Spalte.	  Wie	  berechnet	  sich	  nun	  Ihre	  Bezahlung?	  	  
Ihre	  Schätzung:	  	  
in	  wieviel	  %	  der	  
Runden	  hat	  diese	  
Person	  den	  Betrag	  
10	  gesendet?	  
	  
Tatsächliches	  
Verhalten	  der	  Person	  
Abweichung	  
(Tatsächlich	  
–	  
Schätzung)	  	  
Absolutwert	  der	  	  
Abweichung	  	  
(Vorzeichen	  positiv	  machen)	  
50%	   40%	   -­‐10	   10	  
	   	   	   Abs.	  Fehlbetrag	  A=10	  	  In	  diesem	  Beispiel	  ist	  der	  absolute	  Fehlerbetrag	  A	  =	  10,	  also	  würden	  Sie	  200-­‐2*10=180	  Punkte	  erhalten,	  sofern	  diese	  Runde	  zur	  Auszahlung	  gezogen	  wird.	  	  Hierfür	  würden	  Sie	  also	  eine	  Bezahlung	  erhalten	  von	  180/10=18,-­‐	  CHF,	  welche	  auf	  Ihre	  Teilnahmegebühr	  von	  20CHF	  aufgeschlagen	  würden.	  Sie	  würden	  in	  diesem	  Beispiel	  also	  insgesamt	  38,-­‐	  CHF	  verdienen.	  
	  
(bitte	  auf	  nächster	  Seite	  fortfahren)	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3b)	  Einschätzungen	  bezüglich	  Teilnehmern	  B:	  Falls	  die	  Person,	  die	  Sie	  sehen,	  ein	  Teilnehmer	  B	  war,	  wird	  Ihr	  Bildschirm	  wie	  folgt	  aussehen:	  
	  	  Wie	  Sie	  sehen	  können,	  werden	  Sie	  für	  Teilnehmer	  B	  darum	  gebeten,	  eine	  Einschätzung	  zu	  geben	  für	  den	  durchschnittlichen	  Betrag,	  den	  die	  Person	  entschieden	  hat	  zurück	  zu	  schicken,	  für	  den	  Fall,	  dass	  Teilnehmer	  A	  10	  sendet	  (und	  somit	  30CHF	  bei	  B	  ankommen).	  	  	  
Bezahlung	  für	  die	  Einschätzung	  von	  Teilnehmer	  B:	  Auch	  hier	  gilt	  wieder,	  dass	  Ihre	  Bezahlung	  davon	  abhängt	  ,	  wie	  präzise	  Ihre	  Einschätzung	  ist.	  Sie	  werden	  wiederum	  mit	  einem	  Anfangsbetrag	  von	  200	  Punkten	  beginnen.	  Für	  jeden	  Franken,	  den	  Sie	  daneben	  liegen,	  werden	  Ihnen	  fünf	  Punkte	  abgezogen:	  	  Punkte	  =	  200-­‐5*(absoluter	  Fehlerbetrag	  B)	  	  
Das	  bedeutet,	  je	  näher	  Ihre	  Einschätzung	  an	  der	  korrekten	  Antwort	  ist,	  
desto	  höher	  wird	  Ihre	  Bezahlung	  sein.	  
	  
Sie	  bekommen	  zum	  Schluss	  die	  erzielten	  Punkte	  in	  Franken	  umgerechnet,	  
mit	  dem	  Wechselkurs	  1:10	  (10	  Punkte	  =	  1	  CHF)	  
	  Auf	  der	  folgenden	  Seite	  finden	  Sie	  ein	  Beispiel,	  um	  dies	  besser	  nachvollziehen	  zu	  können.	  	  	  (bitte	  auf	  nächster	  Seite	  fortfahren)	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BEISPIEL	  (Bezahlung	  für	  die	  Einschätzung	  von	  Teilnehmer	  Bs	  Verhalten)	  	  Nehmen	  wir	  an,	  Sie	  hätten	  die	  Schätzungen	  in	  der	  zweiten	  Spalte	  abgegeben,	  und	  die	  tatsächlichen	  Entscheidungen	  seien	  in	  der	  dritten	  Spalte.	  Wie	  berechnet	  sich	  nun	  Ihre	  Bezahlung?	  	  
Ihre	  Schätzung:	  wieviel	  
hat	  diese	  Person	  
durchschnittlich	  
zurückgeschickt,	  falls	  
sie	  3*10=30CHF	  
erhalten	  hat?	  
Tatsächliche	  
Entscheidung	  der	  
Person	  
Abweichung	  
(Tatsächlich	  –	  
Schätzung)	  	  
Absolutwert	  der	  
Abweichung	  
(Vorzeichen	  positiv	  
machen)	  
15	   8	   8-­‐15=-­‐7	   7	  
	   	   	   Abs.	  Fehlerbetrag	  B=	  
7	  	  In	  diesem	  Beispiel	  ware	  der	  absolute	  Fehlerbetrag	  B=	  7,	  so	  dass	  Sie	  200-­‐7*5=165	  
Punkte	  erhalten	  würden,	  falls	  diese	  Runde	  für	  die	  Auszahlung	  gezogen	  wird.	  
	  Dies	  entspräche	  165/10=16,50	  CHF,	  welche	  auf	  Ihre	  Teilnahmegebühr	  von	  20CHF	  aufgeschlagen	  würden.	  Sie	  würden	  in	  diesem	  Beispiel	  also	  insgesamt	  36,50CHF	  verdienen.	  
(bitte	  auf	  nächster	  Seite	  fortfahren)	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4.	  Im	  Anschluss:	  ein	  Fragebogen…	  	  Wenn	  Sie	  das	  Verhalten	  aller	  Teilnehmer	  A	  und	  Teilnehmer	  B	  geschätzt	  haben,	  werden	  Sie	  gebeten,	  am	  Bildschirm	  einen	  längeren	  Fragebogen	  auszufüllen.	  	  
5.	  Wenn	  Sie	  fertig	  sind…	  Wenn	  Sie	  die	  Studie	  abgeschlossen	  haben,	  bleiben	  Sie	  bitte	  weiterhin	  still	  an	  
Ihrem	  Platz	  sitzen	  und	  warten	  Sie	  darauf,	  dass	  der	  Experimentleiter	  Sie	  zur	  
Auszahlung	  bittet.	  Wenn	  Sie	  gerufen	  werden,	  bringen	  Sie	  bitte	  alle	  Ihre	  Sachen	  (Jacke,	  Tasche	  usw.)	  mit	  sich,	  da	  Sie	  das	  Labor	  durch	  den	  Auszahlungsraum	  verlassen	  werden.	  	  
Überblick:	  Ihre	  Zahlungen	  Um	  Ihnen	  einen	  zusammenfassenden	  Überblick	  zu	  geben:	  insgesamt	  werden	  Sie	  folgende	  Zahlungen	  erhalten:	  	   1. In	  jedem	  Fall	  erhalten	  Sie	  mindestens	  eine	  Teilnahmegebühr	  von	  20	  CHF.	  	  2. Zusätzlich	  erhalten	  Sie	  eine	  Bezahlung	  Ihrer	  Einschätzungen	  aus	  einer	  zufällig	  gezogenen	  Runde	  	  
• Falls	  ein	  Teilnehmer	  A	  gezogen	  wird:	  200-­‐2*(abs.	  Fehlerbetrag	  A)	  	  
• Falls	  ein	  Teilnehmer	  B	  gezogen	  wird:	  200-­‐5*(abs.	  Fehlerbetrag	  B)	  
• Die	  Punkte	  werden	  mit	  einem	  Wechselkurs	  von	  1:10	  in	  Franken	  umgerechnet	  (10	  Punkte	  =	  1CHF).	  Falls	  Sie	  perfekt	  schätzen,	  bekommen	  Sie	  also	  200/10=20CHF	  für	  Ihre	  Schätzung.	  
• Um	  die	  Anonymität	  der	  Entscheidungen	  von	  Teilnehmern	  A	  und	  B	  zu	  wahren,	  	  bekommen	  Sie	  keine	  Information,	  welche	  der	  Runden	  zur	  Zahlung	  gezogen	  wurde.	  	  
	  
…noch	  Fragen?	  Falls	  Sie	  Fragen	  zu	  dieser	  Anleitung	  haben,	  heben	  Sie	  bitte	  nun	  die	  Hand,	  und	  ein	  Assistent	  wird	  an	  Ihren	  Platz	  kommen,	  um	  Ihnen	  zu	  helfen.	  
Verständnisfragen	  Bitte	  füllen	  Sie	  nun	  den	  Verständnistest	  auf	  den	  nächsten	  Seiten	  aus,	  um	  sicher	  zu	  gehen,	  dass	  Sie	  verstanden	  haben,	  wie	  die	  Entscheidungssituation	  von	  Teilnehmern	  A	  und	  B	  aussah,	  und	  wie	  Ihre	  Bezahlung	  von	  Ihren	  Einschätzungen	  abhängt.	  	  	  	  
(bitte	  auf	  nächster	  Seite	  fortfahren)	  
	  
B.11.4 Panel of raters (English translation of text)
151
INTRODUCTION 
 
We are interested in using photographs of participants in future experiments, and your participation 
will assist in our endeavor.  Researchers have identified a substantial number of ways that facial 
stimuli affect our perceptions and decisions.  Unfortunately, many of these factors must be 
controlled for in experiments to identify causal influence.  As a result, certain elements of these 
photographs must be removed.  Our goal is to balance two conflicting goals: (i) remove elements of 
the photograph that will affect decisions in ways we cannot otherwise control for and (ii) maintain 
the integrity of the photographs, i.e. the photograph is believed to be of a real person and that this 
person is another participant in the current experiment. 
 
For example, hairstyles can have strong effects, though we have little evidence to suggest how they 
have such effects.  Since we do not know how hairstyles affect perceptions and decisions, we have 
removed hair from all of the photographs. 
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
For each of the [enter number here] photographs, you will be asked to rate the individual in the 
photograph on a variety of dimensions.  In addition, you will be asked to make a prediction about the 
actual behavior of each of these people in an economic experiment. 
 
DESCRIPTION OF THE GAME 
 
The game consists of two players, Proposer and Responder.  The game begins with the Proposer 
being in possession of a 12 tokens.  The Proposer then chooses an amount of the tokens to the 
Responder; the Proposer may send 0, 4, 8, or 12 tokens.  The number of tokens passed to the 
Responder is then tripled.  Without knowing the Proposer's decision, the Responder is then able to 
pass any number tokens (from the tripled amount) back to the Proposer conditional on the amount 
sent.     
 
EXAMPLE 
 
The Proposer is given 12 tokens and chooses to send 8 tokens to the Responder.  The number of 
tokens is then tripled, and the Responder receives 24 tokens.  The Responder - without knowing how 
much the Proposer has sent - decides to send the following amounts back to the Proposer: 
 
If the Proposer sent me 0 tokens: send 0 tokens back to the Proposer 
If the Proposer sent me 4 tokens: send 2 tokens back to the Proposer 
If the Proposer sent me 8 tokens: send 9 tokens back to the Proposer 
If the Proposer sent me 12 tokens: send 14 tokens back to the Proposer 
 
 
The game now ends with the following payoffs: 
 
Proposer: 13 tokens (the 4 tokens kept from the initial allocation of 12 tokens plus the 9 tokens sent 
by the Responder) 
Responder: 15 tokens (the 24 tokens received minus the 9 tokens sent back) 
 
 
PAYMENT  
 
You will be shown [enter number here - 20?] photographs and asked to rate them on a variety of 
dimensions.  You will receive a fixed payment of [enter amount here - 25 CHF?] at the end of the 
session along with a performance-based payment.  These payments are in addition to your earnings 
from the previous experiment.  [NOTE: Assumes we're piggy-backing on another experiment.]  We 
expect the total time for this session to be [enter time here - 30?] minutes. 
 
PERFORMANCE-BASED PAYMENT 
 
Each individual whose photograph you will see played the game 30 times in the role of either the 
Proposer or the Responder.  You will be asked to predict the overall behavior for each individual.   
 
For each Proposer, you will be asked the following: 
  (1) How many times (out of 30) did this individual send 0 tokens? 
 (2) How many times (out of 30) did this individual send 4 tokens? 
 (3) How many times (out of 30) did this individual send 8 tokens? 
 (4) How many times (out of 30) did this individual send 12 tokens? 
 
Responders made 4 decisions in each of the 30 trials, for a total of 120 decisions.  In each trial, 
Responders decided how much to send back to the Proposer for each possible amount sent by the 
Proposer.  Thus, for each Responder, you will be asked the following: 
 
 (1) Over the 30 trials, what is the average number of tokens sent by this individaul given that 
the Proposer sent 0 tokens? 
 (2) Over the 30 trials, what is the average number of tokens sent by this individaul given that 
the Proposer sent 4 tokens? 
 (3) Over the 30 trials, what is the average number of tokens sent by this individaul given that 
the Proposer sent 8 tokens? 
 (4) Over the 30 trials, what is the average number of tokens sent by this individaul given that 
the Proposer sent 12 tokens? 
 
At the end of the session, we will randomly select one Proposer and one Responder to calculate your 
performance-based payment. 
 
PAYMENT - RESPONDER 
 
error0 = | ( your guess about the number of times the individual sent 0 tokens ) - (actual number of 
times the individual sent 0 tokens) | 
error4 = | ( your guess about the number of times the individual sent 4 tokens ) - (actual number of 
times the individual sent 4 tokens) | 
error8 = | ( your guess about the number of times the individual sent 8 tokens ) - (actual number of 
times the individual sent 8 tokens) | 
error12 = | ( your guess about the number of times the individual sent 12 tokens ) - (actual number 
of times the individual sent 12 tokens) | 
total_error = error0 + error4 + error8 + error12 
 
payment_proposer= 120 - total_error 
 
error_avg0 
error_avg4 
 
 
error_avg0 = | ( your guess about the average number of tokens sent by this individaul given that the 
Proposer sent 0 tokens ) - (actual average number of tokens sent by this individaul given that the 
Proposer sent 0 tokens) | 
 
error_avg4 = | ( your guess about the average number of tokens sent by this individaul given that the 
Proposer sent 4 tokens ) - (actual average number of tokens sent by this individaul given that the 
Proposer sent 4 tokens) | 
 
error_avg8 = | ( your guess about the average number of tokens sent by this individaul given that the 
Proposer sent 8 tokens ) - (actual average number of tokens sent by this individaul given that the 
Proposer sent 8 tokens) | 
 
error_avg12 = | ( your guess about the average number of tokens sent by this individaul given that 
the Proposer sent 12 tokens ) - (actual average number of tokens sent by this individaul given that 
the Proposer sent 12 tokens) | 
 
total_avg_error = error_avg0 + error_avg4 + error_avg8 + error_avg12 
 
payment_responder = 72 - total_avg_error 
 
 
Your payment is: payment_proposer + payment_responder 
 
 EXAMPLE 
 
We'll break this down into two sub-examples, one for Proposer and one for Responder. 
 
SUB-EXAMPLE 1 
 
Suppose you guessed that the Proposer in the photograph would send 0 tokens 5 times, 4 tokens 7 
times, 8 tokens 3 times, and 12 tokens 15 times.  This Proposer actually sent 0 tokens 6 times, 4 
tokens 5 times, 8 tokens 9 times, and 12 tokens 10 times.  Let's figure out the value of 
"payment_proposer." 
 
error0  = | ( your guess about the number of times the individual sent 0 tokens ) - (actual number of 
times the individual sent 0 tokens) | 
 = | (5) - (6) | 
 = | -1 | 
 = 1 
 
error4  = | ( your guess about the number of times the individual sent 4 tokens ) - (actual number of 
times the individual sent 4 tokens) | 
 = | (7) - (5) | 
 = | 2 | 
 = 2 
 
error8  = | ( your guess about the number of times the individual sent 8 tokens ) - (actual number of 
times the individual sent 8 tokens) | 
 = | (3) - (9) | 
 = | -6 | 
 = 6 
 
 error12 = | ( your guess about the number of times the individual sent 12 tokens ) - (actual number 
of times the individual sent 12 tokens) | 
 = | (15) - (10) | 
 = | 5 | 
 = 5 
 
 
total_error  = error0 + error4 + error8 + error12 
  = 1 + 2 + 6 + 5 
  = 14 
 
 
payment_proposer = 120 - total_error 
   = 120 - 14 
   = 106 
 
SUB-EXAMPLE 2 
 
Suppose you guessed that the Responder in the photograph would send an average of 0 tokens in 
response to a Proposer sending 0 tokens, an average of 2 tokens in response to a Proposer sending 4 
tokens, an average of 17 tokens in response to a Proposer sending 8 tokens, and an average of 18 
tokens in response to a Proposer sending 12 tokens.   
 
This responder actually sent an average of 0 tokens in response to a Proposer sending 0 tokens, an 
average of 3 tokens in response to a Proposer sending 4 tokens, an average of 10 tokens in response 
to a Proposer sending 8 tokens, and an average of 9 tokens in response to a Proposer sending 12 
tokens.   
 
Let's figure out the value of "payment_responder." 
 
 error_avg0  = | ( your guess given that the Proposer sent 0 tokens ) - (actual average given that 
the Proposer sent 0 tokens) | 
  = | (0) - (0) | 
  = | 0 | 
  = 0 
 
error_avg4  = | ( your guess given that the Proposer sent 4 tokens ) - (actual average given that 
the Proposer sent 4 tokens) | 
  = | (2) - (3) | 
  = | -1 | 
  = 1 
 
error_avg8  = | ( your guess given that the Proposer sent 8 tokens ) - (actual average given that 
the Proposer sent 8 tokens) | 
  = | (17) - (10) | 
  = | 7 | 
  = 7 
 
error_avg12  = | ( your guess given that the Proposer sent 12 tokens ) - (actual average given that 
the Proposer sent 12 tokens) | 
  = | (18) - (9) | 
  = | 9 | 
  = 9 
 
total_avg_error = error_avg0 + error_avg4 + error_avg8 + error_avg12 
  = 0 + 1 + 7 + 9 
  = 17 
 
payment_responder = 72 - total_avg_error 
    = 72 - 17 
    = 55 
 
PAYMENT FROM SUB-EXAMPLES 1 AND 2 
 
Your total payment is the sum of your payments from the two sub-examples.  Let's figure out this 
amount. 
 
Your payment is: payment_proposer + payment_responder 
   106 + 55 
   161 
 
 
EXAMPLE  
 
You will try another example on your own to make sure you understand the payment system. 
 
[INSERT PRACTICE SCREEN HERE - You can use the following numbers: 
 
Amount Proposer (#times) Guess Error Payment 
0 5   10 5 100 ( = 120 -20) 
4 9   12 3  
8 6   8 2 
12 10   0 10 
 
Amount Responder (avg)  Guess Error Payment 
0 0   0 0 59 ( = 72 - 13) 
4 3   7 4 
8 10   12 2 
12 24   17 7 
 
END PRACTICE SCREEN] 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C
Neural evidence for computational
processes underlying risky decision
making
This chapter is being prepared for submission to Nature and follows their formatting
guidelines. Work in this chapter was conducted with Christopher J. Burke, Kerstin
Preuschoff, Philippe N. Tobler, and Ernst Fehr. This chapter was written by Tony
Williams.
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C.1 Summary paragraph
Uncertainty pervades our daily lives and requires people to balance their preferences over
outcomes with the likelihood of obtaining these outcomes. Two common approaches have
been used to understand the neural decision-making processes in these situations. The
first approach, common in animal learning and neuroscience, assumes that options are
evaluated using mechanisms such as foraging and conditioning (Daw et al., 2006; Kolling
et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2012; Niv et al., 2012; Schultz et al., 1997). The other approach,
common in economics and psychology, assumes that preferences are known, stable, and
can be modeled with expected utility or prospect theory (Fehr and Rangel, 2011; Fox and
Poldrack, 2009; Mas-Collel et al., 1995; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Direct compar-
isons of these approaches, however, are lacking but critical for understanding the neural
processes underlying decision-making. Here we show that commonly used models from
both approaches explain neural activity in the same regions, which are either encoding
or comparing subjective values of options. Furthermore, we show that neural activity is
best explained by a model from animal learning, even in subjects whose observed behav-
ioral choices are best explained by prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Caraco
et al., 1980; Stephens, 1986). Our results indicate that neural activity can be explained
using behavioral models from either approach but that specific behavioral models may lead
to erroneous inferences about the underlying neural processes. Recent theoretical mod-
els suggest that the discrepancy can potentially be resolved using summary statistics and
reinforcement learning that can generate prospect theory-like behavior, and these models
provide an evolutionary basis for risky decision-making rooted in ethology and foraging
(Niv et al., 2012; Stephens, 1986; Shen et al., 2014).
C.2 Main text
Daily life requires us to make decisions on a regular basis, and we do not always know the
outcomes with certainty. Therefore, we need some mechanism for learning and comparing
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values (Daw et al., 2006; Kolling et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2012; Levy and Glimcher, 2012;
Rushworth and Behrens, 2008). Traditionally, neuroscience has taken animal learning,
foraging, and reinforcement as the basis for neural processes of risky decision making (Daw
et al., 2006; Kolling et al., 2012; Niv et al., 2012; Schultz et al., 1997). The social sciences
have generally focused on descriptive theories of choice which are increasingly used to
model subjective valuation in the brain (Fehr and Rangel, 2011; Fox and Poldrack, 2009;
Mas-Collel et al., 1995; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Lee, 2013). To date, however, we
lack direct comparison of these approaches.
We studied choice behavior and neural activity in 29 healthy subjects while they made
decisions in a two-alternative forced choice task with risky options (Fig. 1; see Supple-
mentary Information). Following common procedures in economics and psychology, we
did not provide feedback on the outcome of either option after the trial in order to rule
out shifting or adaptive risk preferences during the task. While reinforcement plays a
major role in the development of preferences, economic theory generally assumes stable
preferences while psychologists and psychiatrists may regard risk-taking behavior as a
dispositional trait.
We considered three commonly used models of risk preferences used in neuroscience,
economics, and psychology (see Supplementary Information). Expected utility is the
dominant model in economics and assumes that individuals are either risk averse, risk
neutral, or risk seeking (Mas-Collel et al., 1995). Prospect theory is popular in psychology
and behavioral economics and allows for preferences over risk to depend on a reference
point, allowing risk aversion over gains and risk seeking over losses (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979). We also consider a mean-variance-skewness model in which preferences
can be described based on simple summary statistics. The mean-variance approach has
played a major role in optimal foraging theory and animal learning and also has a long
history in finance (Caraco et al., 1980; Stephens, 1986; Markowitz, 1952). We add the
third moment, skewness, to the model due to recent evidence suggesting neural encoding
of skewness (Burke and Tobler, 2011; Symmonds et al., 2011; Wu et al., 2011).
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Figure C.1: Task design. At the start of each trial, a fixation cross is displayed for
2.8s. Lotteries are displayed and subjects allowed to enter choice for up to 5s (7.8s after
trial onset). Feedback on lottery choice presented from time of decision until 5.5s after
lotteries appear on screen (8.3s after trial onset). No additional feedback is given in the
scanner. On each trial, subjects choose between one of the two options displayed on
screen. Each pie slice denotes 10 percent probability. Number of points corresponding to
the probability is outside the shaded area and indicates potential winnings.
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Figure C.2: Model probabilities. Individual subject model fits. Model probabilities
are Akaike weights calculated using AICc, a small-sample corrected version of Akaike
Information Criterion; 14 of 27 subjects are classified as prospect theory types at the
behavioral level. For further details, see Tables C.9 and C.10.
We compared the fit of these three models for each individual subject. Models were
fit using maximum likelihood and assumed a stochastic choice rule that allowed mistakes
to happen more often when they had a low cost (see Supplementary Information). We
compared the models using a small-sample corrected version of Akaike Information Cri-
terion. The comparison allowed us to classify the behavior of 14 subjects as conforming
to prospect theory, while we could not cleanly classify the remaining subjects as a single
model type (Fig. 2, Supplementary Tables 8-10). Previous studies either assume that a
single model is appropriate for all subjects without fitting other models or perform model
fitting at the group level and select a single model for the population (Symmonds et al.,
2011).
Given the parameter estimates from the behavioral models, we then calculated the
subjective value for each risky option. We used these subjective values to create regressors
containing the sum and the difference, in absolute value, of the subjective values for the
options on each trial. The sum of subjective values should correlate with brain regions
that encode value, while the difference in subjective values should correlate with brain
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regions involved in value comparison. We used statistical parametric mapping to identify
brain regions that significantly correlate with these model estimates (p < 0.001 voxelwise
and pFWE < 0.05 cluster-level corrected in each statistical parametric map). Regressors
generated from the three behavioral models consistently identify the same brain regions.
Value encoding, measured by the sum of subjective values, significantly correlates with
right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Fig. 3A) and right lateral intraparietal cortex (Fig.
3B). Value comparison, measured by the difference in subjective values, significantly
correlates with medial orbitofrontal cortex and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Fig. 3C).
Since the behavioral models imply different computational processes, we wanted to see
if the implied neural process based on the best-fitting behavioral model also best explains
neural activity. To conduct this test, we used statistical parametric maps and recently
developed methods from Rosa et al. (2010) to conduct Bayesian model selection on neural
data (see Supplementary Information). We restrict attention to the 14 subjects who are
classified as prospect theory types using behavioral choices. We further restrict attention
to the neural models using prospect theory and mean-variance-skewness, as Bayesian
analyses of functional neuroimaging data are computationally intensive and because the
prospect theory and expected utility models gave very similar statistical results in our
first analysis. Bayesian model selection provides strong evidence that the model with
regressors containing mean-variance-skewness subjective values is substantially better at
explaining the neural activity in right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Fig. 4A) and medial
orbitofrontal cortex (Fig. 4B) than the model with regressors containing prospect theory
subjective values. Importantly, this analysis only uses the subjects classified as prospect
theory types at the behavioral level. The exceedance probability, the belief that the
mean-variance-skewness model is better than the prospect theory model, is very high in
both right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (ϕ = 0.98, Fig. 4A) and medial orbitofrontal
cortex (ϕ = 0.96, Fig. 4B).
These results are important for computational, behavioral, and neural accounts of
decision making in risky environments as well as understanding neural development and
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Figure C.3: General subjective value encoding regardless of behavioral type.
Subjective value activations common to expected utility, prospect theory, and mean-
variance-skewness computational models (p < 0.0005 whole-brain uncorrected and
pFWE < 0.05 cluster-level corrected in each contrast); images show intersection of con-
trasts. Value signal (sum of subjective values) correlated with activity in (A) right insula
and dlPFC and (B) right LIP active over entire trial duration. Decision value (unsigned
difference in subjective values) correlated with activity in (C) mOFC, vmPFC, and ACC
at time of decision. Contrasts plotted at center of gravity for each cluster, defined as the
average MNI x-,y-, and z-coordinates of the peak voxel from each computational model.
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Figure C.4: Behavioral prospect theory types are neural mean-variance-
skewness types. Random-effects Bayesian model selection at time of decision using
only the 14 subjects classified as prospect theory (PT) types at the behavioral level. The
α plots indicate the number of subjects for whom the mean-variance-skewness (MVS)
model explains neural data better than PT model in (A) right dlPFC and (B) mOFC.
Expected posterior probabilities and exceedance probabilities provide strong support in
favor of MVS model in (C) right dlPFC and (D) mOFC.
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maladaptation in psychiatric disorders. Behavioral models of risky decision making are
intended, at most, to describe cognitive thought processes with no attention to neural
functioning (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Mas-Collel et al., 1995). Computational and
neural approaches have emphasized the need to forage in uncertain environments and
learn values through prediction and reinforcement (Daw et al., 2006; Kolling et al., 2012;
Lee et al., 2012; Niv et al., 2012; Schultz et al., 1997; Stephens, 1986). Several compu-
tational models suggest that the discrepancy between these approaches can potentially
be reconciled. Risk-sensitive foraging models using only mean and variance can gener-
ate prospect theory-like behavior and suggest a metabolic reference point (Caraco et al.,
1980; Stephens, 1986). A recent theoretical model uses risk-sensitivity and reinforcement
learning to explicitly generate behavior consistent with prospect theory (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979; Shen et al., 2014). Our finding that subjective values encoding simple
summary statistics best explains neural activity therefore does not contradict behavioral
models of decision making but instead provides a neurobiological basis for such behavioral
models as descriptive theories.
Given the prominent role of risk avoidance and risk seeking behavior in neural devel-
opment and psychiatric disorders, we need a better understanding of the neural circuitry
of risky decision making to understand maladaptations in development than can have
major consequences (Blakemore and Robbins, 2012; Deisseroth, 2014; Selemon, 2013).
Monoamine neurotransmitters commonly implicated in psychiatric disorders, such as
serotonin, norepinephrine, and dopamine, have also been implicated in risky decision
making (Schultz et al., 1997; Caplin et al., 2010; Doya, 2008; Juhasz et al., 2010; Kreek
et al., 2005; Long et al., 2009). Recent interest has arisen in computational approaches to
psychiatry both for diagnostic purposes and to identify potential treatments (Lee, 2013;
Stephan and Mathys, 2014; Clark et al., 2013). Our results suggest that computational
models from animal learning and foraging are potentially more informative for under-
standing neural processes of risky decision making than descriptive models borrowed
from psychology and economics.
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C.3 Methods
Thirty-three healthy human subjects participated in an fMRI experiment (Phillips Achieva
3T whole-body scanner) while making choices in a two-alternative forced choice task.
Three subjects are excluded due to seeing only a subset of all trials; one subject is ex-
cluded due to a scanner crash. Choices were lotteries with earnings in points; four (of
180) choices were played out after the scanner task, and points were exchanged for money
in Swiss francs. Three behavioral models were fit to choice data by maximizing the log-
likelihood of the model given the parameters. Each behavioral model provided subjective
values used as inputs to parametric regressors in two general linear models. General linear
models were implemented using SPM8 (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Uni-
versity College London). Two general linear models were estimated again using first-level
Bayesian analysis and subjected to Bayesian model selection in SPM8. Further details
are contained in Supplementary Information.
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C.4 Supplementary Information
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C.4.1 Supplementary Equations
Lotteries are denoted by x such that x = (x1, p1;x2, p2), where pi is the probability of
obtaining outcome xi, x1 ≥ x2, and p1+p2 = 1. A riskless lottery paying x1 with certainty
is denoted by x = (x1, 1; 0, 0).
Expected Utility Model
U(x) = p1x
ρ
1 + p2x
ρ
2
in which we use a power utility function u(xi) = x
ρ
i .
Prospect Theory Model
U(x) = w(p1)x
ρ
1 + [1− w(p1)]xρ2
= xρ2 + w(p1)[x
ρ
1 − xρ2]
= xρ2 +
(
δpγ1
δpγ1 + (1− p1)γ
)
[xρ1 − xρ2]
in which we use the probability weighting function w(pi) = δp
γ
i /[δp
γ
i + (1 − pi)γ] and
power value function v(xi) = x
ρ
i . Due to the editing process in prospect theory, the
smaller gain x2 is perceived as a certain gain, and only the risky component x1 − x2
receives a probability weight, w(p1). Also note that we only use the nonnegative domain
and two outcomes; therefore, the original and cumulative forms of prospect theory are
equivalent to each other and to rank-dependent expected utility (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979; Quiggin, 1982; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).
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Mean-Variance-Skewness Model
U(x) = βµMean(x) + βσV ariance(x) + βγ1Skewness(x)
Probabilistic Choice Rule
We use a Luce stochastic choice rule in which the probability of choosing lottery x when
both x and y are available, P (x|x, y) is given by
P (x|x, y) = e
U(x)
eU(x) + eU(y)
=
1
1 + eU(y)−U(x)
.
Log-likelihood Function
ln(L) =
∑
t
{
δt(x)P (x|x, y) +
[
1− δt(x)
][
1− P (x|x, y)]},
where δt(x) is a dummy variable equal to 1 (0) if lottery x (y) was selected on trial t.
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C.4.2 Supplementary Methods
Experimental task
Subjects completed a risky decision-making task in the MRI scanner. At the beginning
of each trial, two lotteries were displayed on the screen as pie charts; subjects had to
choose which lottery they preferred. Subjects were instructed to make their decision by
pressing the left or right button on a button box. Subjects were allowed up to 5s to make
a decision; following the decision, feedback indicating the selected option (or failure to
make a choice) was displayed until 5.5s after onset of trial. There were 180 trials consisting
of lottery pairs evenly spaced among three functional runs. The lottery pairs are listed
in Tables C.1–C.6. An additional 45 trials consisting of a prolonged fixation cross were
interspersed between lottery trials and lasted for 5.5s. After completing the task in the
scanner, three trials were selected for payment and played outside the scanner. Subjects
earned points, which were converted to Swiss Francs (CHF) at the end of the experiment
with 1 point = 0.25 CHF. In addition, subjects received 25 CHF for participating in the
experiment. The experiment was conducted using Cogent 2000 developed by the Cogent
2000 team at the FIL and the ICN and Cogent Graphics developed by John Romaya at
the LON at the Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience.
Analysis of behavioral data
Behavioral models were estimated using R statistical software (R Development Core
Team, 2011). We obtained maximum likelihood estimates for the behavioral models us-
ing the optimize command for the one-variable expected utility model and the optim
command and Nelder-Mead method for the prospect theory and mean-variance-skewness
models by minimizing the negative log-likelihood (Nelder and Mead, 1965). For the ex-
pected utility and prospect theory models, we constrained the parameters to be positive
by using the transformed variable elnψ for each parameter ψ. For the mean-variance-
skewness model, we did not constrain the parameter values. Since numerical optimiza-
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tion procedures converge to local minima/maxima which do not necessarily correspond to
the global minimum/maximum, we used several sets of starting values for parameters to
increase the chances of finding the global minimum (i.e. maximum likelihood) parameter
estimates. All sets of starting values for each model are listed in Table C.7. Parame-
ter estimates for each subject are given in Table C.8. The log-likelihood, small-sample
corrected Akaike Information Criterion (AICc), and Bayesian Information Criterion are
listed for each model and subject in Table C.9. Given the model fits, we focus only
on classifying subjects as prospect theory (PT) or unclassified, given lack of evidence
supporting expected utility (EU) and mean-variance-skewness (MVS) types. Following
conventional rules-of-thumb for model selection, a subject is classified as a PT type if
(i) AICc(EU)− AICc(PT ) > 2 and (ii) AICc(MV S)− AICc(PT ) > 2 (Burnham and
Anderson, 2002). Akaike weights and model classification for each subject are given in
Table C.10
Analysis of fMRI data
Random effects whole brain analysis. We hypothesized that encoding of subjective
values would occur from the appearance of lotteries on the screen until a decision was
made and that comparison of subjective values would occur at the time of decision.
These hypotheses suggested two distinct neural models. In the first neural model, the
event occurs from trial onset until the time of decision, thus capturing neural activity
related to value encoding. In the second neural model, the event is a stick function
at time of decision, which should capture value comparison. We included parametric
modulators for (i) the sum of subjective values for the two lotteries and (ii) the difference
in subjective values in absolute value. We hypothesized that the sum of subjective values
is a proxy for value encoding and would primarily correlate with neural activity in the first
model. Similarly, the difference in subjective values should reflect value comparison and
correlate with neural activity in the second model. We estimated both neural models using
subjective values from each of the three behavioral models (expected utility, prospect
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theory, and mean-variance-skewness) for a total of six distinct models (2 neural models
× 3 behavioral models). Furthermore, we used a canonical haemodynamic response
function (HRF) and included time and dispersion derivatives. Missed trials, in which
a decision was not entered within 5s, and null trials, which consisted of only a fixation
cross, were each modeled as separate conditions in the design matrix.
Bayesian Model Selection. Overall, we follow the procedures for Bayesian model
selection in SPM described in Rosa et al. (2010). We repeated the same preprocessing as
before but omitted the smoothing, as the log-evidence maps produced by the first-level
analysis are smoothed before conducting the Bayesian model selection. We estimated
two models using first-level Bayesian analysis. In each model, we included the sum of
subjective values and the difference of subjective values (in absolute value) as parametric
modulators with trials modeled using a stick function at the time of decision. The first
model used subjective values from the mean-variance skewness model estimated from
choice data. The second model used subjective values from the prospect theory model
estimated from choice data. Log-evidence maps resulting from the first-level analysis were
then smoothed using an 8mm full width at half maximum (FWHM) Gaussian kernel. We
then conducted a voxel-wise random effects Bayesian model selection analysis. Given our
interest in specific ROIs from our previous analysis, we created masks for MOFC and
right DLPFC using PickAtlas. MOFC is defined using bilateral MOFC regions using
anatomical AAL atlas. DLPFC is defined as an 8mm sphere around MNI coordinates [28
23 -2] with a dilation of 3; this voxel is the average of the peak voxel locations from the
expected utility, prospect theory, and mean-variance-skewness models.
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C.4.3 Supplementary Tables
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Lottery
Number
Left Lottery Right Lottery
pi1 x1 pi2 x2 pi1 x1 pi2 x2
1 0.50 20 0.50 0 0.30 25 0.70 0
2 0.50 20 0.50 0 0.30 30 0.70 0
3 0.50 20 0.50 0 0.95 10 0.05 0
4 0.50 20 0.50 0 0.20 30 0.80 0
5 0.50 20 0.50 0 0.20 35 0.80 0
6 0.50 20 0.50 0 0.20 40 0.80 0
7 0.10 40 0.90 0 0.20 35 0.80 0
8 0.10 40 0.90 0 0.20 30 0.80 0
9 0.10 40 0.90 0 0.20 25 0.80 0
10 0.10 40 0.90 0 0.40 15 0.60 0
11 0.10 40 0.90 0 0.40 20 0.60 0
12 0.10 40 0.90 0 0.40 25 0.60 0
13 0.90 40 0.10 0 0.70 50 0.30 10
14 0.90 40 0.10 0 0.70 40 0.30 10
15 0.90 40 0.10 0 0.70 40 0.30 15
16 0.90 40 0.10 0 0.50 40 0.50 20
17 0.90 40 0.10 0 0.50 40 0.50 15
18 0.90 40 0.10 0 0.50 35 0.50 20
19 0.10 20 0.90 10 0.25 15 0.75 10
20 0.10 20 0.90 10 0.25 30 0.75 5
21 0.10 20 0.90 10 0.25 25 0.75 5
22 0.10 20 0.90 10 0.35 15 0.65 10
23 0.10 20 0.90 10 0.35 30 0.65 5
24 0.10 20 0.90 10 0.35 25 0.65 5
25 0.50 20 0.50 10 0.30 25 0.70 10
26 0.50 20 0.50 10 0.30 40 0.70 5
27 0.50 20 0.50 10 0.30 40 0.70 0
28 0.50 20 0.50 10 0.10 30 0.90 10
29 0.50 20 0.50 10 0.10 35 0.90 10
30 0.50 20 0.50 10 0.10 40 0.90 10
Table C.1: Lottery pairs 1–30
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Lottery
Number
Left Lottery Right Lottery
pi1 x1 pi2 x2 pi1 x1 pi2 x2
31 0.90 20 0.10 10 0.80 25 0.20 5
32 0.90 20 0.10 10 0.80 30 0.20 5
33 0.90 20 0.10 10 0.70 30 0.30 5
34 0.90 20 0.10 10 0.70 35 0.30 0
35 0.90 20 0.10 10 0.60 35 0.40 5
36 0.90 20 0.10 10 0.60 35 0.40 0
37 0.05 40 0.95 10 0.20 20 0.80 10
38 0.05 40 0.95 10 0.20 15 0.80 10
39 0.05 40 0.95 10 0.30 20 0.70 10
40 0.05 40 0.95 10 0.30 25 0.70 10
41 0.05 40 0.95 10 0.40 20 0.60 10
42 0.05 40 0.95 10 0.40 25 0.60 10
43 0.25 20 0.75 10 0.40 25 0.60 5
44 0.25 20 0.75 10 0.40 40 0.60 0
45 0.25 20 0.75 10 0.50 25 0.50 5
46 0.25 20 0.75 10 0.15 45 0.85 5
47 0.25 20 0.75 10 0.15 40 0.85 5
48 0.25 20 0.75 10 0.05 45 0.95 10
49 0.75 20 0.25 10 0.60 20 0.40 15
50 0.75 20 0.25 10 0.60 30 0.40 5
51 0.75 20 0.25 10 0.50 25 0.50 10
52 0.75 20 0.25 10 0.50 30 0.50 5
53 0.75 20 0.25 10 0.90 20 0.10 5
54 0.75 20 0.25 10 0.90 25 0.10 0
55 0.95 40 0.05 10 0.75 40 0.25 25
56 0.95 40 0.05 10 0.75 35 0.25 25
57 0.95 40 0.05 10 0.60 50 0.40 20
58 0.95 40 0.05 10 0.60 45 0.40 20
59 0.95 40 0.05 10 0.50 45 0.50 25
60 0.95 40 0.05 10 0.50 35 0.50 30
Table C.2: Lottery pairs 31–60
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Lottery
Number
Left Lottery Right Lottery
pi1 x1 pi2 x2 pi1 x1 pi2 x2
61 0.05 50 0.95 20 0.20 40 0.80 20
62 0.05 50 0.95 20 0.20 35 0.80 20
63 0.05 50 0.95 20 0.30 30 0.70 20
64 0.05 50 0.95 20 0.30 35 0.70 20
65 0.05 50 0.95 20 0.50 25 0.50 20
66 0.05 50 0.95 20 0.50 30 0.50 20
67 0.25 20 0.75 10 0.40 25 0.60 5
68 0.25 20 0.75 10 0.40 30 0.60 5
69 0.25 20 0.75 10 0.40 15 0.60 10
70 0.25 20 0.75 10 0.40 35 0.60 0
71 0.25 20 0.75 10 0.10 30 0.90 10
72 0.25 20 0.75 10 0.10 25 0.90 10
73 0.50 50 0.50 20 0.30 50 0.70 25
74 0.50 50 0.50 20 0.30 45 0.70 20
75 0.50 50 0.50 20 0.20 50 0.80 25
76 0.50 50 0.50 20 0.20 45 0.80 30
77 0.50 50 0.50 20 0.10 50 0.90 30
78 0.50 50 0.50 20 0.10 45 0.90 30
79 0.75 50 0.25 20 0.85 50 0.15 10
80 0.75 50 0.25 20 0.60 50 0.40 25
81 0.75 50 0.25 20 0.60 45 0.40 30
82 0.75 50 0.25 20 0.60 40 0.40 35
83 0.75 50 0.25 20 0.85 50 0.15 15
84 0.75 50 0.25 20 0.85 45 0.15 25
85 0.95 50 0.05 20 0.85 45 0.15 40
86 0.95 50 0.05 20 0.85 45 0.15 35
87 0.95 50 0.05 20 0.60 50 0.40 40
88 0.95 50 0.05 20 0.60 50 0.40 35
89 0.95 50 0.05 20 0.50 50 0.50 40
90 0.95 50 0.05 20 0.50 50 0.50 35
Table C.3: Lottery pairs 61–90
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Lottery
Number
Left Lottery Right Lottery
pi1 x1 pi2 x2 pi1 x1 pi2 x2
91 0.5 20 0.5 0 1 13 0 0
92 0.5 20 0.5 0 1 10 0 0
93 0.5 20 0.5 0 1 7 0 0
94 0.1 40 0.9 0 1 5 0 0
95 0.1 40 0.9 0 1 7 0 0
96 0.1 40 0.9 0 1 10 0 0
97 0.9 40 0.1 0 1 25 0 0
98 0.9 40 0.1 0 1 30 0 0
99 0.9 40 0.1 0 1 33 0 0
100 0.1 20 0.9 10 1 7 0 0
101 0.1 20 0.9 10 1 10 0 0
102 0.1 20 0.9 10 1 15 0 0
103 0.5 20 0.5 10 1 12 0 0
104 0.5 20 0.5 10 1 15 0 0
105 0.5 20 0.5 10 1 17 0 0
106 0.9 20 0.1 10 1 15 0 0
107 0.9 20 0.1 10 1 17 0 0
108 0.9 20 0.1 10 1 19 0 0
109 0.05 40 0.95 10 1 12 0 0
110 0.05 40 0.95 10 1 15 0 0
111 0.05 40 0.95 10 1 18 0 0
112 0.25 20 0.75 10 1 12 0 0
113 0.25 20 0.75 10 1 15 0 0
114 0.25 20 0.75 10 1 17 0 0
115 0.75 20 0.25 10 1 15 0 0
116 0.75 20 0.25 10 1 17 0 0
117 0.75 20 0.25 10 1 19 0 0
118 0.95 40 0.05 10 1 35 0 0
119 0.95 40 0.05 10 1 33 0 0
120 0.95 40 0.05 10 1 30 0 0
Table C.4: Lottery pairs 91–120
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Lottery
Number
Left Lottery Right Lottery
pi1 x1 pi2 x2 pi1 x1 pi2 x2
121 0.05 50 0.95 20 1 22 0 0
122 0.05 50 0.95 20 1 25 0 0
123 0.05 50 0.95 20 1 27 0 0
124 0.25 20 0.75 10 1 12 0 0
125 0.25 20 0.75 10 1 13 0 0
126 0.25 20 0.75 10 1 16 0 0
127 0.5 50 0.5 20 1 30 0 0
128 0.5 50 0.5 20 1 33 0 0
129 0.5 50 0.5 20 1 36 0 0
130 0.75 50 0.25 20 1 42 0 0
131 0.75 50 0.25 20 1 35 0 0
132 0.75 50 0.25 20 1 38 0 0
133 0.95 50 0.05 20 1 47 0 0
134 0.95 50 0.05 20 1 43 0 0
135 0.95 50 0.05 20 1 40 0 0
136 0.50 30 0.50 0 1.00 10 0.00 0
137 0.50 30 0.50 0 0.10 20 0.90 15
138 0.50 30 0.50 0 0.10 20 0.90 10
139 0.50 30 0.50 0 0.25 15 0.75 10
140 0.50 30 0.50 0 0.25 20 0.75 10
141 0.50 30 0.50 0 1.00 15 0.00 0
142 0.50 30 0.50 0 0.90 15 0.10 0
143 0.50 30 0.50 0 0.90 15 0.10 5
144 0.50 30 0.50 0 0.75 15 0.25 5
145 0.50 30 0.50 0 0.75 20 0.25 0
146 0.60 30 0.40 5 1.00 20 0.00 0
147 0.60 30 0.40 5 1.00 15 0.00 0
148 0.60 30 0.40 5 0.25 25 0.75 15
149 0.60 30 0.40 5 0.25 20 0.75 15
150 0.60 30 0.40 5 0.10 25 0.90 15
Table C.5: Lottery pairs 121–150
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Lottery
Number
Left Lottery Right Lottery
pi1 x1 pi2 x2 pi1 x1 pi2 x2
151 0.40 30 0.60 5 1.00 15 0.00 0
152 0.40 30 0.60 5 1.00 10 0.00 0
153 0.40 30 0.60 5 0.75 20 0.25 10
154 0.40 30 0.60 5 0.75 20 0.25 5
155 0.40 30 0.60 5 0.90 20 0.10 5
156 0.50 50 0.50 0 1.00 20 0.00 0
157 0.50 50 0.50 0 0.10 30 0.90 15
158 0.50 50 0.50 0 0.10 30 0.90 20
159 0.50 50 0.50 0 0.25 30 0.75 15
160 0.50 50 0.50 0 0.25 30 0.75 20
161 0.50 50 0.50 0 1.00 15 0.00 0
162 0.50 50 0.50 0 0.90 25 0.10 10
163 0.50 50 0.50 0 0.90 20 0.10 15
164 0.50 50 0.50 0 0.75 25 0.25 10
165 0.50 50 0.50 0 0.75 20 0.25 15
166 0.60 50 0.40 10 1.00 30 0.00 0
167 0.60 50 0.40 10 0.10 45 0.90 25
168 0.60 50 0.40 10 0.10 40 0.90 25
169 0.60 50 0.40 10 0.25 40 0.75 25
170 0.60 50 0.40 10 0.25 35 0.75 25
171 0.40 50 0.60 10 1.00 25 0.00 0
172 0.40 50 0.60 10 0.90 25 0.10 15
173 0.40 50 0.60 10 0.90 30 0.10 15
174 0.40 50 0.60 10 0.75 25 0.25 15
175 0.40 50 0.60 10 0.75 30 0.25 15
176 0.50 40 0.50 10 1.00 25 0.00 0
177 0.50 40 0.50 10 1.00 20 0.00 0
178 0.50 40 0.50 10 0.25 30 0.75 20
179 0.50 40 0.50 10 0.75 25 0.25 15
180 0.50 40 0.50 10 0.10 30 0.90 20
Table C.6: Lottery pairs 151–180
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Expected Utility Prospect Theory Mean-variance-skewness
ρ δ γ ρ βµ βσ βγ1
1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.01 -0.002 0.01
2 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.05 -0.002 0.01
3 1.00 1.00 0.25 0.25 0.10 -0.002 0.01
4 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.01 -0.001 0.01
5 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.05 -0.001 0.01
6 1.00 0.75 0.25 0.10 -0.001 0.01
7 0.25 1.00 0.25 0.01 0.000 0.01
8 0.75 1.00 0.25 0.05 0.000 0.01
9 1.00 1.00 0.25 0.10 0.000 0.01
10 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.01 -0.002 0.05
11 0.75 0.25 0.75 0.05 -0.002 0.05
12 1.00 0.25 0.75 0.10 -0.002 0.05
13 0.25 0.75 0.75 0.01 -0.001 0.05
14 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.05 -0.001 0.05
15 1.00 0.75 0.75 0.10 -0.001 0.05
16 0.25 1.00 0.75 0.01 0.000 0.05
17 0.75 1.00 0.75 0.05 0.000 0.05
18 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.10 0.000 0.05
19 0.25 0.25 1.00 0.01 -0.002 0.10
20 0.75 0.25 1.00 0.05 -0.002 0.10
21 1.00 0.25 1.00 0.10 -0.002 0.10
22 0.25 0.75 1.00 0.01 -0.001 0.10
23 0.75 0.75 1.00 0.05 -0.001 0.10
24 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.10 -0.001 0.10
25 0.25 1.00 1.00 0.01 0.000 0.10
26 0.75 1.00 1.00 0.05 0.000 0.10
27 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.10 0.000 0.10
Table C.7: Starting values for optimization routines.
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Subject
Expected Utility Prospect Theory Mean-variance-skewness
ρ δ γ ρ βµ βσ βγ1
4 0.84 1.93 1.16 0.72 0.42 0.001 0.08
5 0.20 0.93 0.40 0.78 0.23 -0.002 0.40
6 0.36 0.70 0.53 0.58 0.09 -0.004 0.07
7 0.51 0.39 0.72 0.74 0.17 -0.009 0.00
8 0.20 0.87 0.20 0.77 0.01 0.000 0.45
9 0.89 1.44 0.90 0.82 0.43 0.002 0.01
10 0.81 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.48 -0.003 0.02
11 0.79 0.99 1.01 0.79 0.58 -0.005 0.20
13 0.64 2.64 1.68 0.53 0.19 -0.001 0.06
14 0.51 0.51 0.73 0.67 0.00 -0.004 -0.29
15 0.87 1.93 4.04 0.75 0.54 -0.001 0.07
16 0.70 0.77 0.83 0.79 0.44 -0.005 0.19
17 0.65 0.83 0.75 0.75 0.29 -0.004 0.07
18 0.84 1.22 0.79 0.83 0.34 0.002 -0.02
19 0.60 0.76 0.72 0.73 0.20 -0.003 0.03
20 0.49 0.59 0.60 0.70 0.22 -0.005 0.25
21 0.27 0.47 0.28 0.75 0.32 -0.011 0.85
22 0.80 0.73 0.92 0.90 0.74 -0.008 0.14
23 0.76 1.19 0.85 0.75 0.44 -0.002 0.23
24 0.46 0.31 0.64 0.68 0.19 -0.010 0.20
25 0.62 0.77 0.67 0.74 0.44 -0.006 0.42
26 0.75 0.72 0.88 0.86 0.35 -0.004 -0.22
27 0.68 1.80 1.63 0.55 0.27 -0.002 0.12
28 0.56 0.35 0.98 0.80 0.40 -0.016 0.11
29 0.48 0.25 0.78 0.78 0.15 -0.017 -0.04
30 0.57 0.59 0.81 0.69 0.25 -0.006 0.07
31 0.78 1.19 1.55 0.72 0.26 -0.001 -0.31
Table C.8: Individual parameter estimates for behavioral models.
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Subject N
Expected Utility Prospect Theory Mean-variance-skewness
ln(L) AICc BIC ln(L) AICc BIC ln(L) AICc BIC
4 172 -93.12 188.26 191.38 -84.14 174.42 183.72 -89.49 185.12 194.42
5 180 -121.12 244.27 247.44 -103.99 214.11 223.55 -115.87 237.88 247.32
6 178 -119.18 240.37 243.53 -115.82 237.78 247.19 -117.11 240.35 249.76
7 179 -106.56 215.13 218.30 -88.72 183.57 193.00 -98.21 202.55 211.98
8 177 -128.44 258.91 262.06 -98.05 202.24 211.63 -104.76 215.65 225.04
9 175 -91.63 185.29 188.43 -83.36 172.86 182.22 -83.36 172.85 182.21
10 178 -93.31 188.65 191.81 -92.70 191.54 200.94 -92.08 190.30 199.71
11 179 -90.38 182.78 185.94 -90.37 186.87 196.29 -91.67 189.47 198.90
13 179 -114.16 230.35 233.52 -105.40 216.93 226.36 -117.75 241.63 251.05
14 178 -108.88 219.78 222.94 -101.81 209.75 219.16 -106.91 219.96 229.36
15 174 -82.30 166.62 169.76 -67.26 140.67 150.00 -82.03 170.21 179.55
16 178 -101.43 204.88 208.04 -99.61 205.37 214.77 -102.28 210.70 220.11
17 167 -100.68 203.39 206.48 -99.13 204.40 213.61 -103.44 213.02 222.23
18 175 -100.33 202.68 205.82 -93.05 192.24 201.59 -92.29 190.72 200.07
19 169 -107.00 216.02 219.13 -105.59 217.32 226.56 -109.06 224.26 233.50
20 180 -112.39 226.80 229.98 -106.27 218.67 228.11 -113.91 233.96 243.41
21 178 -115.78 233.57 236.73 -83.47 173.08 182.48 -81.62 169.37 178.78
22 175 -81.84 165.70 168.84 -76.98 160.10 169.46 -76.44 159.02 168.37
23 180 -104.77 211.57 214.74 -102.24 210.61 220.06 -103.14 212.42 221.86
24 178 -107.30 216.61 219.77 -88.15 182.44 191.84 -97.42 200.97 210.38
25 170 -102.01 206.04 209.16 -99.99 206.12 215.39 -99.76 205.67 214.94
26 180 -93.36 188.75 191.92 -88.90 183.93 193.37 -92.32 190.78 200.22
27 175 -110.64 223.31 226.45 -108.80 223.73 233.08 -111.39 228.91 238.26
28 180 -104.30 210.62 213.80 -76.41 158.95 168.40 -77.73 161.61 171.05
29 174 -102.48 206.98 210.12 -69.47 145.09 154.42 -73.09 152.32 161.66
30 180 -105.44 212.91 216.08 -99.87 205.87 215.31 -106.18 218.50 227.94
31 158 -86.57 175.17 178.21 -83.93 174.02 183.05 -84.03 174.21 183.24
Table C.9: Log-likelihood and model selection values for behavioral models. Number of observations, N , varies by subject due to
missed trials on which the subject did not enter a decision within 5s.
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Subject Expected Utility Prospect Theory Mean-variance-skewness Classification
4 0.001 0.994 0.005 Prospect Theory
5 0.000 1.000 0.000 Prospect Theory
6 0.177 0.645 0.179 Prospect Theory
7 0.000 1.000 0.000 Prospect Theory
8 0.000 0.999 0.001 Prospect Theory
9 0.001 0.498 0.501 Unclassified
10 0.598 0.141 0.261 Unclassified
11 0.859 0.111 0.030 Unclassified
13 0.001 0.999 0.000 Prospect Theory
14 0.007 0.987 0.006 Prospect Theory
15 0.000 1.000 0.000 Prospect Theory
16 0.544 0.426 0.030 Unclassified
17 0.621 0.374 0.005 Unclassified
18 0.002 0.318 0.680 Unclassified
19 0.650 0.340 0.011 Unclassified
20 0.017 0.983 0.000 Prospect Theory
21 0.000 0.136 0.864 Unclassified
22 0.022 0.359 0.619 Unclassified
23 0.306 0.494 0.200 Unclassified
24 0.000 1.000 0.000 Prospect Theory
25 0.316 0.304 0.380 Unclassified
26 0.080 0.891 0.029 Prospect Theory
27 0.534 0.433 0.033 Unclassified
28 0.000 0.790 0.210 Prospect Theory
29 0.000 0.974 0.026 Prospect Theory
30 0.029 0.970 0.002 Prospect Theory
31 0.227 0.405 0.368 Unclassified
Table C.10: Akaike weights and model classification for individual subjects. Akaike
weights calculated using AICc, a small-sample corrected version of AIC.
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